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THE IMPACT OF PEACE MOVEMENTS ON A SOCIETY IMMERSED IN CONFLICT

**An analysis of the framing processes of the Basque peace
movement**

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ABSTRACT

The Basque conflict has waged since the 1950s in its current form. However, with the arrival of democracy 36 years ago, the Basque Country has been the scene of an intense peace mobilization, dominated by two peace organizations: *Gesto por la Paz*, a group of community organizations that mobilize to publicly reject political violence, and *Lokarri/Elkarri*, an organization that includes a conflict resolution proposal based on dialogue between conflicting parties. While there is some literature on these organizations, none has analysed their extraordinary impact on Basque society.

This research explores how the Basque peace movement has impacted on the social and political culture of the Basque conflict. It seeks to understand the nature of this impact and to determine the channels and methods by which it was achieved, using frame analysis. Three interlinked questions serve to guide the research, asking first if there is a Basque Peace Frame and if it could be considered a master frame, how this Basque Peace Frame has evolved, and, finally, how the Basque Peace Frame has impacted on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict. This qualitative research spans the period between the March 2006 declaration of ceasefire by ETA and the end of fieldwork for this research in September 2008. The research includes 18 in depth interviews, written media, and analysis of seven notable Basque social organizations related to the conflict, in addition to the two peace organizations mentioned above.

The research found the impact of the Basque peace movement in the Basque Country is significant and rich. The Basque Peace Frame developed based on the rejection of the use of violence as a political tool and identifies that violence as the main barrier to achieving an inclusive conflict resolution. The Basque peace movement organizations developed a specific kind of mobilization to enforce the Basque Peace Frame based on silent and symbolic acts. The objective was to counter the former dynamics of mobilization that were contentious and directed to promote Basque national rights. The Basque Peace Frame proposed a change in the way the political collective identity was constructed in the Basque Country, showing that an association between nationalism and violence is not obligatory. The Basque Peace Frame has evolved and spread between social organizations in the Basque Country, using sympathetic identity networks as the main channel of frame diffusion. Even organizations that did not reject the use of contentious methods of protest are now questioning the use of violence, signifying exciting prospects for the future of non-violent political action in the Basque Country.

Keywords: *Basque Conflict; Basque Country; Collective Action Frames; Collective Identity; Frame Analysis; peace movements; Peace Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movement Impacts.*

Nire Ama maitiari

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The Basque Country is a tiny place compared to its neighbours, but it is prosperous, with a well-accommodated middle class and booming industry and commerce. Yet, this small area between the north of Spain and the south west of France is immersed in a violent political conflict that, in its current form, has prevailed for 50 years. The Spanish state and the armed organization ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; Basqueland and Freedom*) are the two main actors engaged in this war that has left almost 2,000 people dead and countless others deeply affected. Perhaps the most enduring societal impact of the Basque conflict is the entrenched social unrest and the pervasive breakdown of community relations. For many years under the Franco dictatorship, these problems were concealed under a law of silence, an unspoken rule that inhibited Basque people from speaking publicly about the conflict. The public space that existed was used only to protest against the Spanish claims for the Basque Country, and this use was contentious in nature (Casquette, 2003).

The end of the Franco era and the beginning of democracy in Spain witnessed a corresponding transformation in Basque society. The private identity connections that allowed national ideas to persist in the times of the Dictatorship (Perez-Agote, 2008) became useful in the post-Franco era between people who rejected the use of violence. These groups perceived an opening that might allow them to use public space to protest against the conflict-induced suffering of the Basque people. Initially, they were local groups based in parishes and community centres, but soon they spread to almost every Basque town. In 1986, these groups came together to create an organization to

help coordinate their actions, and *Gesto por la Paz*¹ emerged. This was the beginning of a new way of protesting in the Basque Country that deliberately broke with the past. *Gesto por la Paz* members renounced traditional methods of protest and instead adopted the strategy that had kept Basque society subjugated during the Dictatorship years: silence (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b). However, now the use of silence had a remarkable effect on Basque society, which began to perceive that public protesting was more than contentious actions against a political system. The main objective of *Gesto por la Paz* was to raise awareness of the dangers of political violence, which inspired the use of symbolic actions, like the *Gesto*, a silent demonstration following a politically motivated killing. However, with time, some sectors of Basque society already engaged in public mobilization started to question the limits of their peace mobilization. These sectors, with ties in the *nationalist left*² networks, but mixed with people from different socio-economic backgrounds, had one notion in common: the idea that protests against political violence could contain a political proposal. This group of people decided to create an organization, called *Elkarri*³, to promote a conflict resolution scenario based on dialogue and political agreement between parties. As a result, two of the main elements covered by a peace movement were in place: the rise of social problems and a concrete political agenda (Carter, 1992; Cortright, 2008). After 15 years of activities, *Elkarri* changed its name and approach to *Lokarri*⁴, a smaller organization with an emphasis on new technologies, but with similar

¹ *Gesto por la Paz* means 'Gesture for Peace' in Spanish.

² The nationalist left or *Izquierda Abertzale* is a term commonly used to designate radical Basque nationalism. Therefore, it is the term I have adopted for this research.

³ *Elkarri* means 'Dialogue' in Basque.

⁴ *Lokarri* means 'Bond' in Basque.

objectives and ethos. *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* are the two main protagonists of this research. During all the years they have been working for peace in the Basque Country, they have encountered enormous resistance by a social code of conduct that encouraged non-action against political violence. They have enjoyed success too. It is the contention of this thesis that *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* changed the opinions and perceptions of Basque society. Today, to understand the Basque conflict it is important to know the values and history of the Basque peace movement⁵, of which *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* are the two main organizations.

The role of the Basque peace movement organizations in the Basque Country. A research overview

This research is focused on the actions of the two main Basque peace movement organizations, *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. These two organizations were born in a moment of extreme polarization within Basque society. That moment witnessed how social groups started to use public space to demand and end to political violence in the Basque Country. These two organizations share the same principles of action, but they have several differences in methods and demands. *Gesto por la Paz* is an organization that tries to coordinate the efforts of several local groups against violence. The organizational ethos is highly social, trying to raise awareness of the importance of rejecting political violence and to demand attention for the more important and underlying issues regarding that violence. *Lokarri*, in the other hand,

⁵ In this research the term Basque peace movement is used to refer to the social movement against political violence consequence of the Basque conflict. For more information about the different categories of peace movements see OVERY, B. (1982) *How effective are peace movements?*, London, Harvest House.

incorporates something new into the peace mobilization: a political proposal. Its methods are more focused on obtaining political support for that proposal. The main undertaking of this thesis is to explore the different impacts of these two organizations on Basque society and my argument is that these organizations created a Basque Peace Frame, which has profoundly affected other social organizations related to the conflict in the Basque Country. This thesis sheds light on the power of the Basque peace movement in influencing Basque society perception of the conflict. For this purpose, the thesis uses social movement theory, especially frame analysis theory (Gamson, 1992b; Goffman, 1974), (Johnston & Noakes, 2005; Snow & Benford, 2000; Hunt et al., 1994). Using frame analysis theory, I describe the Basque Peace Frame and I compare it with the perception of the conflict that is dominant in other social organizations related to the conflict. The substantive content covers most of the issues present in the conflict, including: victims of political violence (torture or terrorism)⁶, prisoners of ETA, and organizations devoted to peace in different ways, including research centres and peace education organizations. It was also possible in my research to interview and follow several organizations:

- *Bakeola*⁷, a Christian organization involved in peace education and social work programs in the Basque Country.

⁶ During this research the use of term victim will vary. When the term victim of political violence is used, the term will gather all kind of victims, like torture or terrorism victims. The victim of terrorism term is used regarding victims of ETA only. This is an important clarification because some organizations only defend a particular kind of victim.

⁷ *Bakeola* is a constructed word in Basque using two concepts: Bakea (Peace) and Ola (To forge). The idea behind that is to remember that peace has to be constructed and forged between everybody.

- *Baketik*⁸, a peace research centre directed by the former director of *Elkarri*, which tries to promote an ethical approach to peace (Fernandez, 2006).
- *Basta Ya*⁹, an organization that defends a conflict resolution scenario where ETA must be defeated and no nationalist claims should be allowed, as well as defending the interests of victims of terrorism.
- The *EGK*¹⁰, an institutional organization created to coordinate and help youth organizations in the Basque Country.
- *Etixerat*¹¹, an organization that defends the rights of ETA prisoners and their families.
- *Gernika Gogoratuz*¹², the oldest and most recognizable independent peace research centre in the Basque Country.
- The *TAT*¹³, a group that defends victims of torture in the Basque Country, particularly those carried out by State security forces.

Through analysis of these organizations, and *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*, I have addressed the research question and the hypotheses that are central to this research.

Research question, hypotheses and results

The different organizations and their objectives and approaches presented show a rich landscape for peace collective action research in the

⁸ *Baketik* means 'from the peace' in Basque.

⁹ *Basta Ya* means 'Enough' in Spanish.

¹⁰ *EGK* stands for *Eusko Gazte Kontesilua* or 'Basque Youth Council' in Basque.

¹¹ *Etixerat* means 'to home' in Basque.

¹² *Gernika Gogoratuz* means 'Remembering Gernika' in Basque.

¹³ *TAT* stands for *Torturaren Aurkako Taldea* or 'Team Against Torture' in Basque.

Basque Country. The first step in analyzing social movement impacts is to identify categories of impact (Ajangiz, 2002: 40; Casquette, 1998: 205; Gamson, 1990: 20; Giugni, 1995; Giugni, 1998; Giugni, 1999; Lofland, 1996: 345; Tilly, 1999: 269). Most of these categorizations assume at least two different categories of impacts: external or internal; cultural or institutional. I have focussed on the cultural impacts, particularly perceptions and changes in discourse that may have occurred as a consequence of peace action, which places this research within social movements theory. These consequences are the outcomes from the work of the Basque peace social organizations.

To understand these outcomes, I studied those organizations, their mobilization nature and tried to correlate that with the change of perceptions in society. To do this, I chose a set of social organizations related to the conflict and studied the effects caused by the Basque peace movement, looking for common patterns between the Basque Peace Frame and the different organizations' discourse. For my analytical framework, I used a specific theoretical body within social movements research: the collective action frame approach. A frame is a mental schemata of interpretation that allows individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences in their life spaces (Goffman, 1974: 21). In the field of social movements, this tool is used to understand the set of perceptions created by a given movement. It is a general and standardized tool that guides perception and allows knowledge production (Donati, 1992: 141). These structures of knowledge are the product of a shared experience between individuals, as well as the result of a negotiation process (Gamson, 1992b: 111). These presentations of reality are used to constrain, or guide, what should be considered important and usually advise on how to

mobilize for a specific issue (Johnston, 2005: 2). This approach is used to identify and understand moments of extensive mobilization and how social movements recruit for that mobilization.

In this research, I try to go a step further and apply this concept to a whole process of social movement action, not to a specific point of action. Using this approach, I define the Basque Peace Frame and its evolution over time, and I compare it to the discourse of different social organizations in the Basque Country. The objective is to find similar points of connection between the frame and the discourse of the mentioned organizations and see if these similarities are a consequence of the actions of the Basque peace movement. With this in mind, the main research question is: *How has the Basque peace movement impacted on the social and political culture of the Basque conflict?*

It is important to explain two limitations to this question. The first is an ontological limitation, as I take a group of social organizations as the actors where the impacts are analyzed. The second is the nature of the concept of impact in social movements. The study of that dimension faces a number of challenges, especially the following three (Casquette, 1998: 224), (Giugni, 1995): first, it is important to understand the difficulty of demonstrating causation in social research, and specifically here in relation to the impacts of a social movement; second, the impacts assessment would be strengthened through longitudinal research, which is beyond the reach of this doctoral research; third, the objectives vary during a social movement's life, adding to the complexity of identifying and assigning actions to impact. As I present in the research, the effects detected are not directly tied to the Basque peace movement organizations' objectives and they occur after several years of

activity. Moreover, while those impacts can be traced to the Basque peace movement actions, they are also connected with the variations in the Political Opportunity Structure (POS). These dimensions must be taken into account when answering the research question. My central research question is explored through three sub-questions that guide this research and this thesis makes the following claims in response to those questions:

1 – Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame? *The Basque peace movement organizations have created a Peace Action Frame to understand the conflict. This Basque Peace Frame can be considered a Master Frame.*

2 – How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? *The Basque Peace Frame has evolved over time. This evolution was caused by the mutual interaction between Basque peace movement organizations and the interactions with other Basque Civil Society Organizations based on identity networks.*

3 – What is the impact of the Basque Peace Frame on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict? *The Basque Peace Frame created an impact on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict. That impact was possible due to the existence of common collective identity networks between the Basque peace movement organizations and the Basque Civil Society Organizations.*

This doctoral research has produced the data and analysis to answer these questions in the following way. The research argues that the Basque peace movement developed a powerful and articulated collective action frame that has some of the traits of a master frame, making it a reference point in peace activism. However, it is not possible, with the data at hand to assert that the Basque Peace Frame is a master frame. The interviews conducted with

members of the social organizations show that several of the concepts that appear in the Peace frame are inherent in Basque social mobilization regarding the conflict. The different results show that the Basque peace movement, because of its nature and the political opportunity structure it helped create was able to become a key actor in influencing perception of the conflict in the Basque country. The diagnosis that the Basque peace movement organizations make about the conflict is shared by all of the conflict-related organizations researched. Even the most ideologically driven organizations felt that the use of political violence was counterproductive. It is also possible to find traits that appear in the Basque Peace Frame in the other organizations, like the high level of awareness towards the victims of terrorism. In the beginning, the Basque peace movement organizations had to struggle against the widely held social idea that the conflict was something a person should not speak about. The victims were silent victims, with no social or political rights, but the Basque peace movement put the victims on the agenda and started to protest against their lack of rights and recognition. Today, the victims of terrorism' rights are a key part of any social organization that addresses conflict issues. More importantly, it is perceived within the social organizations that Basque peace movement organizations methods are only one way of carrying out peace related activism in the Basque Country. The political institutions use the Basque peace movement organizations methods when designing plans to mobilize society against political violence. During the fieldwork period, most of the *Gestos* were called by city councils as well as by *Gesto por la Paz* local groups. The research also shows that issues included in the Basque Peace Frame were transmitted through collective identity networks that were built at the beginning

of the peace mobilization period. These channels of communication were necessary for the propagation of ideas and without them the frame would have encountered huge problems of transmission. These networks had to be similar in nature and in affinity. I show that the frame has continued to evolve since its inception, which has been made possible by both internal and external factors.

The internal factors relate to the relationship between the two peace organizations, *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*. Both organizations occupy a determined position in the Basque peace movement, with a defined role. *Gesto por la Paz* is an expressive and symbolic organization. Its members belong to a myriad of local groups and come from different political backgrounds. It started as groups protesting against violence and developed into a highly effective mechanism of creating and using symbolic resources to promote its goals. *Lokarri*, on the other hand, is an instrumental organization that defends a political solution to the conflict. It uses intellectual resources and methods that are closer to a pressure group than a social movement. *Gesto por la Paz* is more associated with the street, and *Lokarri* with the office (Funes, 1998b: 503). My research shows that the two organizations became dependent on one other, making them highly specialized in what they do. This was not a conscious decision, but more an unspoken agreement. These high-specialized roles produced, as a consequence, two organizations that are very efficient in what they do. *Gesto por la Paz* has a high mobilization potential and *Lokarri* has political weight in terms of creating a public discourse; together, they create a very powerful frame.

The external factors include the consolidation of democratic values in the Basque Country during the 1990s. These democratic values are one of the

issues that led to a social questioning of ETA and its methods while other externalities include the loss of social support for the armed struggle and the improved perception of democratic methods as valid means of achieving political goals. Other important external factors that appear during this research are the interaction between the Basque peace movement organizations and the social organizations mentioned before. Particularly important is the issue of defending victims of political violence. The rights of victims of terrorism is an issue championed by organizations like *Basta Ya*. They used the success of the Basque peace movement during the 1990s to take that rights issue and promote it in a more forceful way.

The answer to the research question is rich and complex. Basque society has changed since the days when the peace mobilization started. Many issues could be connected to the Basque peace movement, but making claims of direct causation is a difficult exercise. A number of issues, however, were publicised and promoted thanks to the Basque peace movement organizations. These issues are the rejection of violence, the use of public space to protest against political violence, victims' rights and the use of the peace agreement as a valid political tool. I argue these issues now have a place within the social organizations' ethos. These issues have been promoted, not only by the Basque peace movement organizations, but also by other social organizations, and they have been promoted during an active protest cycle and disseminated using shared collective identity networks. I show, using one of the organizations as example, the *EGK*, that without a collective identity connection point it is not possible to promote those issues through organizations. It is clear that the use of those issues and the Basque peace movement organizations' methods has

become a rule to follow in any social initiative related to peace in the Basque Country. That rule is present, not only in the social organizations, but in the political institutions as well. Finally, these are the most relevant issues that appear in other social organizations, but I demonstrate there is a feedback process that encourages the Basque peace movement organizations to promote issues that were not originally part of their ethos, but were present in other social organizations' ethos. The clearest example is the aforementioned issue of defending the rights of victims of terrorism. This is an old demand from the Basque peace movement, but now the intensity of the demand is not driven by the Basque peace movement organizations, but by some social organizations, like *Basta Ya*.

The reasons behind this research

There is a lack of objective approaches to the Basque Conflict in literature. Most of the works devoted to this issue are based on assumptions that defend one side of the conflict or the other. The same happens with the Basque peace movement organizations, where most of the writings behind them focus on the ideological component of those organizations. For example, one of the main authors used in this research, Maria Jesus Funes (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b) makes a correlation between *Lokarri* (or *Elkarri* in his work) with the Basque *nationalist left*, and *Gesto por la Paz* with a politically diverse mass of people representative of the vast majority of the Basque society against violence. This approach does not take into account most of the complexities of Basque society. *Lokarri* is as politically diverse as *Gesto por la Paz*, with some members having strong ties to the *nationalist left*, but those

members do not direct the organization. The main thread of their work is the need for a political proposal based on pacifist terms.

The second issue is that, during the Dictatorship years, most of Basque society was not against political violence. It is important to remember that the Basque Country was one of the few regions in Spain that suffered a totalitarian regime, whereas the rest of the country had a milder authoritarian rule. A contentious national identity was present in Basque society (Perez-Agote, 2008), (Zulaika, 1988). That national identity clashed with the perception that political means were enough to achieve those national goals, and opposed the use of violence. This is one of the reasons an approach that was not based on national identity was needed. Another reason is the lack of research about the social aspects of the Basque Conflict. There is a substantial literature about the political issues regarding the conflict (Clark, 1990; Douglass et al., 1998; Ibarra, 1987; Ibarra, 2005b) (Letamendia, 1994b; Llera Ramo, 2003; Mata, 1993; Woodworth, 2001; Zirakzadeh, 1991), but only a few devoted to specific social issues related to the conflict (Casquette, 2003; Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b; Ibarra & Grau, 2007; Anton, 2007; Tejerina, 2001). The Basque social environment around the conflict is a vibrant one that needed further attention. It is interesting to note that there are several pieces of work about Basque social movements (Ajangiz, 2002; Barcena et al., 1998; De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004; Tejerina et al., 1995), but few about movements related to the Basque conflict. This is a symptom of how, traditionally, the conflict has been addressed in the Basque Country. This thesis also tries to deliver new ideas in the study of social movements' impacts. The comparative exercise adopted here is useful in understanding the way social movements promote their demands in social

networks and how a wider audience adopts these demands. I recognize that it is not a complete exercise, because this research is limited by the case study, but the ideas here might open doors to new approaches.

Another important reason behind this research is the need to fill a gap in the research approach between the political sphere and the social sphere in the Basque Country. Traditionally, the approach to the conflict has the different political parties and political institutions as the main actors. This issue led me to the philosophical question of this research: *What is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario?* Social organizations could change the direction and nature of social perceptions in a conflict environment. This research shows that Basque peace movement organizations were able to embed some ideas into other layers of Basque society; and indeed these ideas reached the political parties and institutions. Today, in the Basque Country, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to engage in social action regarding a conflict issue without embracing the ethos of non-violence and the recognition of the collectives that suffered previously through violence. The results of this research and the nature of the Basque Peace Frame that is described suggests that any conflict resolution scenario implemented in the Basque Country will be in difficulties if it does not comply with those values. In the case at hand, it is clear that civil society played a fundamental role in understanding and changing the future dynamics of the conflict. Therefore, I suggest looking at the social values and the way they are promoted as a part of any conflict analysis research.

Personal reasons that led me to do this research

I became interested in this project during the last year of my university degree in political science. As a person who was born in the Basque Country, I was shocked when the Spanish government at that time, represented by the Right wing Popular Party, used the 2004 Madrid train bombing to start a campaign (wrongly) blaming ETA for the terrorist attack. However, the response from Basque society, and wider Spanish society as well, condemned ETA's alleged actions. However, what shocked me more was the structured response that appeared from the Basque peace movement organizations. As had happened six years earlier, during the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel Blanco, a council deputy of a small town of the Basque Country, the social response articulated by the Basque peace movement organizations was tremendous. I could feel in that moment the anger of a collective of people who wanted to end political violence and demanded an end to ETA's actions and a settlement of the political conflict. While the bombs in Madrid turned out not to be part of the ETA strategy, they had ignited something that was buried below the surface of Basque society: a fatigue with political violence and its societal cost. Another outcome was that the Madrid bombings gave a visual image of the senselessness of violence. Basque society is accustomed to lonely corpses on the floor, covered by a blanket, or massive damage to buildings. The image from the Madrid bombing, of piles of bodies, covered in blood, was something that ETA was not prepared to defend. The images were too brutal, too difficult to justify. After I finished my masters degree, I became involved with peace groups, and through my work as a social worker, I could observe first-hand the problems the conflict created in local communities. During this time, I felt that

Basque society had a clear idea of how they wanted to resolve the conflict, but the political institutions were not listening.

My first approach to the issue was the idea of research and to determine what was the conflict resolution process that Basque civil society wanted. In my first year at the University of Bradford, I found two main challenges in my research. The first was a methodological problem, namely the difficulty of researching civil society. I found that a civil society is seldom a unitary body with a common goal, but a field of action where different forces collaborate or contend with one another. The second problem was that Basque civil society is complex and highly active. That made the idea for a doctoral thesis too broad. I therefore narrowed my focus to one part of Basque society: the Basque peace movement. In the Basque Country, there are two different kinds of peace mobilization present: a movement against the military (Ajangiz, 2002) and a movement against the political violence that emanates from the Basque conflict. From my past experience, I felt the movement emanating from the Basque conflict was the main protagonist of my research. During the process of research, I have refined the object of study, focusing on two organizations, *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*, and found the methodological tools to explore their impacts on social perceptions in the Basque Country. While I have diverted quite far from my initial objective, the results of this research help to determine the kind of responses to a violent conflict that we can find in a social environment. More importantly, the results suggest how these changes can affect the political parties and institutions that are in charge of that conflict resolution scenario.

Thesis structure

This thesis is divided into nine chapters, each devoted to one aspect of the research. The first is the current chapter, introducing the guidelines for this research and the research questions and hypotheses that are tested in the final analysis, as well as the results of this research.

Chapter two is my *Conceptual framework*. I explain the different approaches to the social movements theory. I explain the Resource Mobilization Theory approach with the subgroups attached, including the organizational approach and the political opportunity approach. I explain New Social Movements theory and I emphasize the identity components of social movements. Finally, I explain the frame analytical approach and the concept of collective action frame(s) and master frame(s). This is complemented by an exploration of the different issues regarding social movement impacts study. I explore deeper the cultural impacts dimension as it is an important part of this research.

Chapter three is devoted to *Methodology*. Here I revisit the different social movement theory approaches focusing on the methodological implications that are inherent to them. After I explain why I decided to use a frame analytical approach in this research. I expose the different methodological issues that appeared during this research: the way I approached the fieldwork, the problems I encountered there, and how I dealt with those problems. I describe the issues for accessing the organizations and the problems and advantages that my situation as a Basque person brought. Finally, I explain the different ethical issues of my research: anonymity of interviewees, informed consent and the subjectivities involved.

The nature of the Basque peace movement and the two organizations that are the main object of study are explained in Chapter four. *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* are explained in detail using four different points: history of the organization, nature of the organization (its ethos), organizational structure, and repertoire of action. In this chapter, I describe the different approaches of the two organizations. *Gesto por la Paz* is a social and symbolic organization that advocates for social awareness. I describe the different symbolic resources that *Gesto por la Paz* uses, including the *Gesto* and the *Blue Ribbon*. *Lokarri* is an instrumental organization that advocates for a political solution and uses methods directed to convince the political elites. Its more important initiatives are described, such as the *Consultation*, or the *Peace social observatory*.

In contrast, Chapter five is devoted to explaining the other part of the object of study: the Basque social organizations that appeared to address different conflict issues. The organizations discussed are: *Bakeola*, a catholic peace group focused on social and educational work; *Baketik*, a peace think tank directed by the former director of *Elkarri*; *Basta Ya*, a victims of terrorism organization with political objectives that does not recognize nationalist claims; the *EGK*, an institutional platform that coordinates youth groups; *Etixerat*, an organization that defends the rights of family members of ETA prisoners; *Gernika Gogoratuz*, a peace research institute that has many years of experience in the Basque Conflict; and the *TAT*, an organization that provides help to victims of torture. These organizations cover most of the relevant issues around the Basque conflict, including victims of violence rights, ETA prisoners, victims of state violence, and peace research.

Chapter six is devoted to the analysis and presentation of the Basque Peace Frame. I use the collective action frame approach. For this, I describe the different core framing tasks: diagnosis of the conflict, prognosis and motivation. I defend the idea that both organizations share the same principles, but they have subtle differences, mainly in the prognosis and mobilization framing efforts. These differences are because one organization, *Lokarri*, defends a political proposal and *Gesto por la Paz* does not. I describe how the two organizations tried to promote the Basque Peace Frame through different framing processes.

Chapter seven describes the Basque Peace Frame dynamics between *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. The chapter has three parts. The first part explains the frame dynamics during the period before fieldwork that started with the ETA declaration of a ceasefire in 2006. I found that period was a very good example of the mobilization dynamics of the Basque peace movement organizations. The second part is devoted to the changes that occurred during the fieldwork period. Finally, I explain how these dynamics inside the organizations had an effect on each other and how that interaction process affected the frame elaboration process.

Chapter 8 focuses on how the Basque Peace Frame affects the different social organizations presented in chapter 6. For that exercise, I divided the organizations into four categories: Organizations that are focused on peace research and social work, *nationalist left* organizations, organizations that defend victims of terrorism rights, and institutional organizations. This division of organizations based on their nature responds to a methodological decision to make this comparative exercise clearer. That does not mean that the

organizations respond to these boundaries in real life. Most peace researchers in the Basque Country are peace activists, and their organizations are definitely closer to the Basque peace movement. In this chapter, I describe the need for shared collective identity networks to understand frame propagation and how, without them, communication is extremely difficult in the Basque Country.

Finally, I conclude my research with the last chapter where I reiterate the questions presented at the beginning of this research and the key findings described throughout, which are summarised at the beginning of this chapter. I also answer the main research question, explaining the nature of the impacts of the Basque peace social movement. I expose how this research fits inside the actual body of knowledge on social movements and I make some contribution towards answering the philosophical question: *What is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario?*

CHAPTER 2 – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The main objective of this research is to understand the relationship between the Basque peace movement organizations and other Basque Civil Society Organizations, with the final aim of being able to describe the effects that occur in that relationship. Using theoretical approaches described later, this research intends to see how the Basque peace movement organizations affected the cultural framework of other Basque Civil Society Organizations. In particular how the Basque peace movement was able to create a peace frame (Basque Peace Frame) that had enough salience and resonance to evolve into, possibly, a master frame. With this idea in mind, then, the role of the researcher is to immerse them in the reality created by the interaction of the Basque peace movement organizations and Basque Civil Society Organizations and to define the Basque Peace Frame. This involves knowledge of the actors researched, in particular the organizational level of the social movements, and knowledge of the field; in other words, social movements, social movement organizations, frame analysis and social movement impacts. In this part I explore the theoretical foundations of this research. Note that in the next chapter, devoted to methodology, I revisit some of the theoretical approaches explained in this chapter, particularly the *RMT* and *the New Social Movement* approach. During that exercise I focus on the methodological implications of the mentioned approaches. That explanation complements the description given here.

For the analysis of the social movement theories I use the works of Alain Touraine (1981), Alberto Melucci (1988; 1989; 1996), Casquette (1998), and

Zald and McCarthy (1987a; 1987b). I try to connect these different explanations with the Basque reality using the works of De la Peña and Ibarra (2004) and Funes (1998a; 1998b). For the analysis of the different approaches to social movement organizations, I use the cited works of Zald and McCarthy, Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci. For frame analysis theory, the main authors are Snow et al. (1988; 1992; 2000; 1986), all based in the analysis made by Erving Goffman (1974). Finally, social movement impact analysis uses Giugni (1999), Gamson (1992b; 1982), and Melucci (1988; 1989; 1993; 1996) to describe the cultural component of that dimension.

Social Movement theory

The principal actors of this research are the two main Basque peace movement organizations, *Lokarri* and *Gesto Por la Paz*. These are, because of their history and impact, the most important organizations in the Basque peace movement. Before going on, I would like to provide a brief note about the nature of the Basque peace movement. In the literature, there is little consensus about the definition of 'peace movement', although some academics have tried to shed some light on it (Carter, 1992; Cortright, 2008; Overy, 1982). Mauricio Garcia Duran (2005) defines a peace movement as follows: 'In a context of an armed conflict, a peace movement is a massive social mobilization, based on underlying organizations and networks with a varied repertoire of collective action and framing a mobilizing consensus; which makes claims rejecting war and demanding peaceful solutions in a way that challenges the opposing parties, both government and illegal armed groups. The emergence, evolution, and results of that mobilization depend on how the movement faces

opportunities and constraints in the political context, builds alliances, and promotes its specific goals' (Garcia Duran, 2005: 312).

However, applying this definition to the Basque reality, some problems arise. First, the above definition fits perfectly in highly violent environments with an extremely high polarization around violence. The Basque case is regarded as a low level violent environment (Harbom & Sundberg, 2008), because the polarization is not set in the use of violence, but in the political ideas. The Basque peace movement emerged in moments of intense violence, during the early 1980s, with the Spanish State funded paramilitary organization *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* (GAL)¹⁴ phenomenon on its height, and the 1990s, starting with the worst *ETA* action, the bombing of Hipercor in Barcelona in 1987 and following the longest kidnappings of several people. The height of its mobilization was after the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel Blanco, a Popular Party (PP) councilman in Ermua, a small town in Biscay, one of the provinces of the Basque Country Autonomous Community. The Basque peace movement, mainly led by *Gesto Por la Paz*, in that time was intense, but nothing like massive in scale¹⁵. This is amongst other reasons, because most of the social action in the Basque Country was channeled through the Basque *nationalist left*, and the Basque peace movement also suffered appropriation by the Spanish political parties.

Another problem appears when we relate the concept of networks to an analysis of mobilization. In the Basque Country we find different organizations,

¹⁴ *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* (Freedom Antiterrorist Groups) see WOODWORTH, P. (2001) *Dirty War, clean hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy*, Cork, Cork University Press.

¹⁵ About this period, the best reference is Funes, M (1998) *La Salida del Silencio. Movilizaciones por la Paz en Euskadi 1986-1998*. Akal: Madrid.

which, undeniably, work for peace and have ties with the Basque peace movement organizations, but their main goal is not to mobilize anyone. The most important for this research are *Gernika Gogoratuz*, a peace research centre based in the Biscayan town of Gernika, *Bakeola*, a catholic organization especilized in social work and peace education, and *Baketik*, created in September, 2006, directed by the former director of *Elkarri*, an organization that promotes a conflict resolution approach based on ethical principles instead on empathy principles (Fernandez, 2006). The latter is an interesting experiment in producing outcomes designed to build a culture of peace and conflict resolution with the support of one community of Catholic priests. These organizations are categorized as the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations because they share the same roots and collective identity, but their goals are different. A full analysis of the role of these organizations and their relation with the Basque peace movement can be found in Chapter 8. The main differences between them and the Basque peace movement organizations are the mobilization nature and the main social component of the latter. One of the problems that social movements now face in the Basque Country arises from shifts in the membership model, from the 'militant' model to the 'volunteer' model (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004).

Returning to the Basque peace movement organizations, one of the first things to do to ground a theory is to find a definition of Social Movement Organization (SMO) that suits the case researched. It helps to ground the theoretical frame. One of the most complete definition of Social Movement Organization is the one given by Loftland (1996): 'SMOs are associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or

group life ought be organized that, *at the time of their claim-making*, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society - the then dominant constructions of what is realistic, reasonable and moral' (Lofland, 1996: 2-3). As well, Mario Diani and Donatella Della Porta ellaborate some of the main traits of the SMOs, like the mobilization of resources and the neutralization of opponents (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 137). When trying to fit the definition above with the reality one big question arises. Yes, it is possible that before the cease-fire, with no part of the political spectrum defending a discourse of peace and understanding, the Lofland definition could be applied without many problems. But now, exists a general discourse of peace. So, let us analyze the definition.

Following Lofland, the important fact about this definition is the *claim about reality*. This is '*at the time of its assertion*, defined as improper, implausible, immoral, false, threatening, corrupting, seditious, treasonous, blasphemous, degenerate, despicable, or in some other manner not respectable or otherwise meriting serious consideration. Instead, the asserters and the realities they assert are, in mainstream views, best ignored, repressed, treated therapeutically as a sickness, or in some other manner kept excluded, marginal, or encysted.' (Lofland, 1996: 3). Of course, the peace claim must be taken with the more serious considerations, but following the words of Txema Montero, former prominent member of *Herri Batasuna* (*nationalist left* political party, close to *ETA*) the Basque peace movement is something 'Beautiful. Beautiful but useless' (Medem, 2003). Besides personal opinions, the peace assertion made by the Basque peace movement organizations does not enjoy serious support. This is because of the strong political component of the

Basque peace action. The Basque peace movement is not seen as a monolithic entity, but a multifaceted body, which each face determined by political ideology (Funes, 1998a). Lofland and part of the discourse of the Basque peace movement organizations suggest a solution to this dilemma, as follows: Lofland asserts that, to be excluded, there must be a *societal mainstream* a 'set of institutions and their authoritative decision-makers who provide plausible rationales for exercising powers and authority in such matters'. As repeated in the political discourse of all the Basque political parties, conflict resolution is a matter of political elites only. On the other hand, the Basque peace movements Organizations defend the participation of the Basque Civil Society in that process. Also important is that the Basque peace movement organizations have been tied to particular ideological sides in the Basque Country. *Lokarri* have been tied to the *nationalist left* and *Gesto Por la Paz* with the Spanish political parties. This caused a feeling of distrust within Basque society, but the two Basque peace movement organizations are not as far apart as it appears, as some accords, like the *Maroño Accord*, between *Gesto por la Paz*, *Elkarri*, and *Bakea Orain* (now defunct) demonstrate that their main guidelines might not be ideological but originate in their arguments for a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

Depending on the author, the main social movement theories can be divided in to several groups. Mario Diani (1992) divided them into four main approaches, the *Collective Behaviour* approach, part of the so-called classical approaches; The *Resource Mobilization* approach, including *Political Process* theory, which, whilst 'technically' part of the rational choice school associated with Resource Mobilization Theory (*RMT*) also provides one of the most

important concepts in social movement theory - Political Opportunity Structure; and the *New Social Movement* approach (Diani, 1992). Jesus Casquette (1998) shares the division defended by Diani, dividing the social movement theories into three categories: *Classical* approaches, *Resource Mobilization Theory* and *New Social Movements* (Casquette, 1998). Cohen and Arato (1992) also divide social movement theories in two categories, distinguishing between the main perspectives in collective action, as they called them, the *Resource Mobilization Theory* and the *New Social Movement* approach (Cohen & Arato, 1992). I adopt that division and explain briefly the nature of the two approaches, giving first a glimpse in to the classical approaches.

The Classical Approaches

The classical approaches appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century as a way of providing an answer to the different levels of social phenomena. The classical approaches can be differentiated in to different branches: collective behaviour, the mass society approach, and the relative privation approach, although some authors put these three branches under the collective behaviour label (Chesters & Welsh, 2011: 46). Each of these three branches have differences in their conceptualization of social movements, but all three answer to the same causal sequence to explain the emergence of social movements. This causal sequence, which appears in all the classical approaches, starts with the definition of tensions that are present in a society in crisis; these tensions disturb the psychological balance of individuals; finally, when individuals that were previously isolated start to interact and create a group focused on action, then a social movement is created.

That causal sequence is the following:

Structural Strain → Disruptive Psychological State → Social Movement

(McAdam, 1982a: 7)

The classical approaches presented here share a basic understanding about the origin of social movements. They differ in the nature of the first two stages of the sequence; in other words, in the nature of the structural strain and what kind of consequences this will have on the psychological state of the individual, but they share the final stage when collective action (normally dangerous) appears.

Before explaining the three different branches it is interesting to explain briefly the irrationalism approach to collective action, which had a considerable influence in the three classical approaches.

Irrationalism

Irrationalism was the basis for most of the social theories until the 1960s. It was a response to collective action at the end of the nineteenth century, which was provided by a group of European intellectuals including Le Bon (1841-1931), Tarde (1843-1904) and Sighele (1868-1913). For these authors, collective action was a discontinuous form of social phenomena caused by proximity between individuals. The social phenomena, characterized in this time for its irrationality and use of violence was the behaviour of masses of people together. This is why this theory was called mass psychology theory. This idea was built around six points (Casquette, 1998: 43; Moscovici, 1985: 90-91):

- A mass is a body of individuals who shares the same mental unity. They are not the aggregated individuals who share a common space.

- The individual acts consciously. The mass acts unconsciously. This is because consciousness is an individual trait and unconsciousness a collective trait.
- Regardless of their extremist behaviour, the masses are conservative by nature. At the end, they always re-establish the relations of power they overthrew.
- Regardless of their intelligence or cultural level, all the masses need to be dominated by a strong leader. These leaders with their charisma move the masses to follow whatever ideal they impose. These individuals are the engines of history.
- Propaganda is the main way of communication by the masses. It is based on collective beliefs and uses the power of suggestion. That is why the main elements in propaganda are imaginary emotions, allegory and the direct imperative.
- Every policy aimed at governing the masses is a policy of imagination. It is based in a strong ideal (revolution, homeland) that has to be assumed by everyone.

The political significance of these ideas was clear. The masses could not have real interests or needs. If it is taken in to account that the most powerful movement in that time was the workers' movement, it is possible to say that irrationalism was a counter attack to the growing workers' movement.

Irrationalism waned in the 1930s, but three main approaches took their ideals from the irrationalist approach, the collective behaviour approach, the mass society approach and the relative privation approach.

The collective behaviour approach

This approach appeared in North America during the 1950s and it focused on understanding the emergence and significance of social movements as agents of social change. The collective behaviour approach studied forms of behaviour associated with the crowd and the mob as social responses to the prevailing social structure. The collective behaviour approach can be divided in two different variations, one based in the study of the psychosocial dimensions of collective action and the other based on the structural implications of the same. This first variation, led by the Chicago School, implies that conventional behaviour is based and guided by culture and the established social order; therefore, collective behaviour appears where that social order cannot provide established guidelines. The psychosocial approach, then, is based on the assumption that the individual is always a member of a social group. The structural variation, on the other hand, focused on the categorization of the different structural tensions that threaten and disturb the correct social behaviour.

The Chicago School approach to collective action

The famous Sociology School of Chicago developed the psychosocial variant. Its main authors are Park & Burgess (1921), Blumer (1946; 1957), Turner & Killian (1957), and Lang & Lang (1961).

These authors defend the idea that conventional behaviour is guided by the prevailing society. Collective behaviour, hence, appears when society stops to give defined guidance for action and the impulses and desires of the individuals cannot be satisfied by that society. Its origin comes from some sort of institutional or cultural crisis that promote the appearance of non-conventional ways to address these crises. These tensions make the individual

take uncoordinated ways of action with no purpose. When these dynamics become circular, then they became contagious they become *social unrest* (Blumer, 1946: 171-172).

The difference between institutionalized behaviour and collective behaviour made the School of Chicago scholars to develop a specific set of conceptual tools to study collective behaviour. This collective behaviour was understood as the individual's behaviour under the influence of a common and collective impulse that was the result of social interaction (Park & Burgess, 1921: 865).

Under this idea, the Chicago School, social movements are one kind of collective behaviour: a collective action in great scale, wide, with continuity over time, that has as objective to alter social order in a significant way (Lang & Lang, 1961: 490-491). Other kind of collective behaviour are things like mobs, riots, revolutionary movements, fashion, and mass communication, among others (Blumer, 1957: 128). This is the same logic that allowed the School of Chicago to put all these different things under the same label: all of them are unstructured situations where social organization and the systems of meaning do not give solid guidance for social action. It is in these situations when collective behaviour emerges that tries to create new foundations for a new kind of society (Park & Burgess, 1921: 924-925).

Smelser and the functional approach

The difference between the functional approach and the psychosocial approach can be seen in the different perceptions about the role of the tensions that lead to social action. Under this approach, these tensions are structural

forces that disrupt the normal functions of society. The main author of this approach is N.J. Smelser (1962). Smelser shares some points with the School of Chicago: To understand collective action it is important to assume that it is outside the established institutions. Collective behaviour is not institutionalized. Regarding the degree of institutionalizations it loses its distinctive trait (Smelser, 1962: 21). Smelser shares the view of the irresponsible nature of collective behaviour. It is defined as action of the impatient (Smelser, 1962: 88). Finally, Smelser, similar to the Chicago School puts different kinds of collective action under the same analytic approach. He does not consider the idea of developing different approaches to explain social movements or riots, for example.

The main differences between Smelser and the School of Chicago starts with the statement that collective behaviour has a sociological, and not psychological, explanation (Smelser, 1962: 24). The main difference comes from Smelser's structural approach that explains the different tensions in collective behaviour as having structural explanations. For that task, Smelser developed six different conditions to explain these structural tensions (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 7; Crossley, 2002: 43):

- Structural conduciveness. This concept engulfs the particularities of a society that make collective behaviour episodes happen.
- Structural strain or protest inherent cause. Smelser never specifies the origin of these tensions, but mentions issues like industrialization, urbanization, and unemployment, in other words, social change.
- The existence in the population of a generalized belief identified with the origin of the structural tensions. This generalized belief gives the different

actors a shared definition of reality that allows individuals to act collectively.

- The generalized belief may be present before the collective action episodes. Therefore, what is needed is what Smelser calls precipitating factors, something that make the collective action start.
- The mobilization for action of the different participants. The structural strain and the generalized belief act as the main driving forces.
- Finally, Smelser argues that is needed a failure in the social control mechanisms by the authorities that facilitates the start of the collective action episode.

These six factors come together under the term “value added theory” that means that they need to combine in different ways for an episode of collective behaviour to happen. As they are being combined, the collective behaviour episode starts to be more specific, preventing alternative phenomena (Smelser, 1962: 26).

The mass society approach

The main author is William Kornhauser (1959). He defined participation in collective action in political events as the result of the disconnection between individuals and traditional social and political values. He focuses on the study of alternative collective action methods and how they are preferred over traditional institutional ways. In what he calls mass society, great numbers of individuals make political action outside the regimented procedures set up by society (Kornhauser, 1959: 219). He finds democratic societies more prone to fall into mass society politics because in these societies the individual is constantly encouraged to engage in political action. For Kornhauser, one specific trait of

the mass society is the high level of social atomization, that is, the existence of a conglomerate of individuals connected only by their relation with a shared authority, commonly the State. The individuals are not related through any independent group (Kornhauser, 1959: 30). The main consequence of that analysis is the assumption that the mass is irrational and cannot be contained. Its objectives are remote and extreme; its members come from the most pampered and atomized sectors of the population (Casquette, 1998: 54).

The relative deprivation approach

This approach focuses on the relation between social conditions, the perception of these conditions, and the final behaviour that comes from that perception. Ted Gurr (1970) argues that the individual feels discontent every time they perceive a big difference between what they give and what they perceive they deserve: discontent is not the difference between what they give and what they get, but the difference between what they want and what they think they are able to get (Gurr, 1970: 359). That discontent, following the causal process of the classical approaches, creates frustration and relative deprivation feelings that are compensated by the participation in collective protest. The origin of these relative deprivation perceptions lies in the accelerated social changes that create a difference between the products and life conditions that the individuals believe they deserve and the products and life condition they can achieve and maintain (Gurr, 1970: 319). This approach does not describe a difference between individuals that are part of the collective action and individuals that are not part of it. The only difference is the intensity of participation, derived from the degree of relative deprivation perception.

The classical approaches and framing

Although it is clear that the classical approaches are inadequate to describe the framing processes central for this research, it would be unfair to reject them totally. The main authors of frame theory have been influenced in lesser degree by the classical approaches. One of the most clear examples is the refined relative deprivation approach taken by William Gamson with its concept of a “frame of injustice” (Gamson et al., 1982), a tool to organize the perception of injustice that leads to mobilization.

Of all the authors from the School of Chicago it is possible to affirm that Herbert Blumer is most influential over contemporary framing ideas. Without trying to give Blumer the credit for the following ideas, and without trying to be exhaustive, I will list some examples of hints advanced by him that are present in contemporary framing research:

- Erving Goffman developed the concept of “keying”, that redefines activities, events, and biographies to be seen by participants as something else (Goffman, 1974: 43-44). This is defined later by Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford as “frame transformation” (Snow et al., 1986: 473). Blumer described these elements previously, identifying what he calls “cultural drifts”, the need to achieve cultural values change by social movements (Blumer, 1946: 200).
- The emphasis that framing authors give to collective identity, as the assumption that identity constructions, whether intended or not, are inherent in all social movement framing activities (Hunt et al., 1994: 185) has its background in what Blumer calls “esprit de corps” understood as the way that people have to conform to a group and to identify themselves in a shared effort (Blumer, 1946: 205-206).

- The construction of a response to an issue, or motivational framing (Snow & Benford, 2000: 617) finds a precedence in the assertion made by Blumer that “an organized movement with a clear direction cannot be explained only in terms of disposition or motivation. The movement has to be constructed (Blumer, 1957: 147)”

These are only a few examples of the complex relation between the classical approaches and the framing perspective. As said at the beginning of this section, the classical approaches are inadequate as themselves to explain a framing process, but they gave the first steps to develop new paradigms for the studies of social movements.

Resource Mobilization theory

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) embodies one of the main trends in sociological reasoning. It is a North American approach to Collective Action, and focuses more on the *how* of social movement mobilization. *RMT* is interested in the ways collective phenomena are organized, and how they develop, rather than *why* they appear. *RMT* emerged in the 1960s in the USA, in response to two factors: first was the inability of the classic approaches to account for the emergence of the new social movements of that time, and second, the need for a new way to analyze them. *RMT* emphasizes the differentiation of resources of a given collective phenomena, the level of organization and the political opportunities of a given movement (Casquette, 1998: 67). The first authors who used the *RMT* term in reference to social movements were McCarthy and Zald (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a).

The core idea of this approach is the analysis of the organizational factors rather than the individuals. Instead of asking why individuals take part in

collective action, *RMT* presumes this type of social phenomena is a routine expression of politics and instead examines the efficacy of the organizations that form a social movement to use the resources within their reach to achieve the objectives the social movement defends. This is why *RMT* can be described as a *functional* approach (Casquette, 1998: 63). Following Casquette (1998) it is possible to define the traits of *RMT* as follows:

- The actions of the social movements are rational responses. In these responses, the costs and the benefits of the different ways of action are taken into account.
- The objectives of social movements are conditioned by the conflict of interests between institutionalized relations of power.
- The injustices created by these relations of power cannot be overestimated to define the creation of social movements. However, this creation depends on resource availability, the organization, and the opportunity frame for collective action.
- Resources like money, activists' dedication and knowledge allow social movements sufficient degree of organization to start the struggle for their objectives.
- Formally structured and centralized organizations are typical of the modern social movements. They are more efficient at mobilizing resources than informal and decentralized organizations.
- These social movements work in a relatively stable opportunity structures that allow or hamper their mobilization efforts. They influence their strategies and condition their probabilities of success.

- The success is acknowledged by the recognition of the organization as a valid political actor or by the capabilities for securing material benefits.

The main flaw of this approach is the lack of recognition of reasons why a social movement emerge. This approach disdains the importance, as stated in the third point of the list above, of the power relations that are dominant in a given society. This is one of the main ideas defended by one of the authors of the *New Social Movement* approach, Alain Touraine (1981; 1985) who saw social movements as a response to the injustices created by the main conflict in any given society (Touraine, 1981: 77; Touraine, 1985: 772). The actions of the Basque peace movement organizations are totally conditioned by their origin, as these origins define their network of allies and their possibilities of action (Funes, 1998a). This is fully explained in chapters 4 and 7.

Another aspect of *RMT* is the lack of importance that this approach gives to irrationality. *RMT* measures success or failure of a SMO by its capacity to become a valid political actor or its success in mobilizing resources.

RMT is really useful in analyzing the capabilities of any given organization at the time of social mobilization. Finally, *RMT* developed one of the most useful concepts in social movement analysis: the *Political Opportunity Structure (POS)*.

The *POS* is defined as the series of political opportunities or challenges, the strategies and means, as well as the resources that shape the action of any social movement (Pérez Ledesma, 1994: 95; Tarrow, 1998: 19). The social movements shape the *POS* and the *POS* shapes the social movements. The social movements engage the *POS* in a sort of dialectical relation that shapes the collective action and the ways that action has to survive. This explains why

in the Basque Country, the main way of action chosen in the 1980s and early 1990s is direct action, but the ways of action chosen in the late 1990s and 2000s are more related to the development of political alliances (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004), (Ibarra, 2005a). Charles Tilly developed this idea under the name of *Political Process*. This, according to Casquette (1998) and Cohen and Arato (1992), is one of the variants of *RMT*. This approach defends the importance of the political frame to shape collective action. Any political development has direct effects on the resources and, therefore, on the possibilities of success of any social movement. The main difference between *RMT* and the *Political Process* approach is that *RMT* identifies the success of any given movement in the recognition of a SMO as a valid political actor or in the capability to mobilize resources, the *Political Process* approach identifies success as the capability of any social movement to influence and change any public policy. This means that all the repertoires of action of a social movement will be shaped by the political scenario this social movement is shaping. However, the *POS* again misses something important: the nature of the organization itself. Finally, the *RMT* and its variants do not take into account one methodological difficulty: the highly complicated task of measuring success. The measure of the importance of the actions of a social movement in changing a policy or changing a certain discourse of an actor is, at least, extremely complex (Ibarra, 2005a: 299-308; Giugni, 1999: xiii-xxiii). Finally, as noted by Ibarra (2005a), 'the results of collective action are not always the goals of a social movement' (Ibarra, 2005a: 300).

New Social Movements theory

The theoretical basis for understanding the nature of the Basque peace movement organizations and their role in the Basque Civil Society is given by *New Social Movements (NSM)* theory. Following Alain Touraine's (1981) definition of social movement, 'The social movement is the organized collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community' (Touraine, 1981: 77). This definition does not seem plausible in a society like the Basque Country. Although the Basque society has a high degree of traditionalism, the forms of collective action are more close to the struggles of modernity (workers' movement) and post-modernity, like the new social movements or solidarity movements (Funes, 1998a: 15). However, it is a good starting point to understand the philosophy of the *New Social Movements* approach. One of the most important concepts is the concept of struggle. Touraine (1981) identifies this struggle with the class struggle, but the whole approach is based on some kind of conflict that shapes collective action. Another important concept in this definition is *historicity*, the 'overall system of meaning that sets dominant rules in a given society' (Touraine, 1981: 81). This is a particular historical context where both the social movements and their adversaries "play" the game of conflict. The struggle and the moment define collective action.

Using this definition in the Basque Country, the peace process started in 2006 could be described as a new historical context. In this context, *Elkarri* changed its nature and became *Lokarri*, "Citizen Network for the Agreement and the Consultation", and *Gesto por la Paz* was immersed in a serious debate about the approach towards the new situation. As they were the two main

organizations of the Basque peace movement, it is possible to say that the Basque peace movement was also in a new context. Using the guidelines of a definition of social movement given by another of the authors of the *New Social Movements* approach, Alberto Melucci (1989), the Basque peace movement organizations researched are part of a social movement that is a specific class of collective phenomena, with three specific and clear dimensions: they involve solidarity, they are engaged in conflict, and, to a certain degree, they break the limits of compatibility of the system (Melucci, 1989: 29). To corroborate this, both *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* come from conflicting networks, and both were constructed with the idea of standing against the way mobilization was framed. This mobilization was characterized by the use of violent methods to demand Basque national rights (Casquette, 2003). Since the beginning the Basque peace movement organizations enjoyed considerable support and were the escape valve of an important social sector who did not believe in violence, either nationalist or state-sanctioned (Funes, 1998a: 35). Funes (1998a) also defines the highly ideological component that appears in the Basque peace movement organizations. This ideological component is why the *New Social Movements* approach is best suited to understanding the actions of the Basque peace movement organizations.

One of the main problems is how organizations without any conflicting pattern can fit in a social movement, which, according to Melucci, is in conflict. One solution could be classifying this kind of organizations (Peace research institutes in the case of the Basque Country) as creators of identity and ideology for the Basque peace movement. In that way, they can be active contributors to that struggle. This trait applicable at *Gernika Gogoratuz*, *Baketik*, and *Bakeola*

tries to differentiate these organizations from *Lokarri* or *Gesto por la Paz*, which are more social mobilization oriented. It is important to say that the different categorizations that appear through the thesis are not, by any means, clear-cut differentiation between organizations, only a methodological tool that is useful to understand the framing efforts of the Basque peace movement.

Another problem is the focus of the *NMS* on the ideological patterns, ignoring the resources or the organizational dimension. The *NMS* is a really powerful tool to understand the creation and the goals of a social movement, but as I explain later, the way the movement is organized and the tools these organizations use is best explained using another tool: the organizational approach.

Social movement organizations

In this section I outline some of the most relevant analysis about social movement organizations. I divide this section according to the main social movement theories. First, I explain the approach to organizations taken by the classical theories. For that I use the work of Casquette (Casquette, 1998: 69). After that I explain the organizational approach based in *Resource Movement Theory*. For that I am going to use the works of Zald and McCarthy, two of the “fathers” of the organizational theory (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a), (Zald & Ash, 1966), (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b). Finally, I develop the organizational analysis behind *New Social Movements* theory. For that task I base my explanation on the works of Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1988; (1996).

The classical approaches

The classical approaches failed to analyze social movement organizations. Basically, the ties between the organization and the movements were non-existent, at least, discontinuous. For the classical approaches, the only organizations leading to political change were pressure groups and political parties. This is because the basic understanding of social movements is tied with their non-structured ways of action. Social movements for the classical approaches are a deviation from the “normal” way of life of society (Casquette, 1998: 69).

Resource Mobilization Theory

The *RMT* developed the *organizational approach*, where the focus is the organizational development of any given social movement. The most notable authors of this approach are Mayer N. Zald and John McCarthy. This approach tries to explain the organizations and the highly complex dimension that is behind the activity of the social movements. In the introduction to Zald and McCarthy’s work *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*, William Gamson outlines the main focus of Zald and McCarthy’s work (Gamson, 1987: 2):

- They focus the attention on interaction between SMOs and a variety of other organizations (other SMOs in the same movement, countermovement organizations and authorities).
- They focus on the organizational infrastructure of these SMOs.

In analyzing Zald and McCarthy’s work, the main piece of work that approaches the organizational dimension of the social movements is the article

entitled *Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Movements: A Partial Theory* (1987a). One important contribution from these authors is the deconstruction of the concept of social movement. They divide social movements into five different parts: the social movement itself, countermovements, SMOs, Social Movements Industry (SMI) and Social Movements Sector (SMS).

For Zald and McCarthy, a *social movement* is 'a set of beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society' (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20); a *countermovement* is 'a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement' (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20).

Probably, the most successful term developed by Zald and McCarthy is the concept of SMO. The definition that Zald and McCarthy gave is 'a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals' (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20). Following this definition 'All SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broader preferences of a social movement constitute a *Social Movement Industry* (SMI)' (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20). This is the organizational analogue of a social movement. Finally, the *Social Movement Sector* (SMS) 'consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which social movements they are attached' (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20). The reference about the SMOs is central for this approach, as Zald and Ash (1966) stated: 'Social movements manifest themselves, in part, through a wide range of organizations' (Zald & Ash, 1966: 327).

Zald and McCarthy explain this analytical deconstruction with the following example. In a given context, there is any number of SMIs (called them

ecologist action, nuclear disarmament, women justice and so on). Altogether, they form the SMS, and the SMIs are formed by SMOs. Therefore, the Student Non Violent Coordinating Comitee, as Zald and McCarthy used as an example, was part of the “justice for black Americans” SMI (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 21). Trying to delimit these concepts is tricky, as Zald and McCarthy say it is difficult to put the SMOs in a certain SMI or another.

The basic element of this analysis is the SMO. Zald and McCarthy focus this analysis on the capabilities of the SMOs to mobilize resources. First, they understand that each SMO has a number of *target goals* (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 22). As well, any SMO needs resources to achieve these goals and the way the SMO works to achieve these goals depends on the resources the SMO has at hand. ‘In any case, resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible’ (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 22).

Zald and McCarthy divide the individuals in any SMO into *adherents*, who are sympathethic to the SMO, and *non-adherents*, who are not. Last, there are the *constituents*; the people who provide resources to a SMO (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 23). At the first level, the main task of a SMO is converting *adherents* into *constituents* and, at a second level, turning *non-adherents* into *adherents* (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 23). To conclude the explanation of the organizational approach, the authors define the three main characteristics of this approach (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 12-13):

- The main focus of this approach is the SMOs study. The functions that these organizations have are multiple. The most important is trying to increase the number of activists and define strategies and tactics.

- The organizational approach assumes the existence of a rich society, full of coordinated activities by associations with limited objectives. This point is defined after having studied some organizations in the USA. Thus, Zald and McCarthy admit that is difficult to implement this idea in societies without a solid civil society (Casquette, 1998: 73).
- The technologies available for the SMOs vary over time. Therefore, technological advances can make a huge difference to an SMO's ways of action. In extreme cases, technology can enable some SMOs to become highly professional.

Another important contribution of Zald and McCarthy is the idea of context. The SMOs develop their activities in a particular context, and the SMOs should adapt to this context. The main reason for this adaptation is to secure the resources needed for survival. The main consequence is that the power relations and other internal processes of the SMOs are affected by the position of the individuals or other organizational actors in the regulation and control of resources. Thus, for Zald and McCarthy, to explain any SMO the analyst is required to study the context in which they move.

This context implies the existence of competitive actors: 'SMOs must appeal for support. Consequently, at the most general level, SMOs must compete not only with all other SMOs, but with voluntary organizations of other kinds as well as for the time, effort, loyalty and money that citizens can give or withhold.' (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 164).

Following this reasoning, Zald and McCarthy give us the different levels of interaction involved in the context. First are the SMOs that compete for the same resources. Zald and McCarthy state the existence of relationships of

collaboration between fellow SMOs in the same SMI as well of relationships of competition. In the case of competition, they state that these kinds of relationships appear when two SMOs have the same base of *adherents* (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 164).

Second is the relation between two SMIs and the progression of SMOs between SMIs. In that case, Zald and McCarthy use the language of economics in identifying successful SMOs with organizations that are able to offer new products. This product differentiation is the way to control one segment of the SMI market (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 167).

Finally I would like to elaborate some critiques of this approach. The first one is the lack of explanation about values, ideals and discourses. It lacks important aspects about collective action like loyalty, cultural frameworks and collective identity. The attention is given to the availability and managing of resources, although these other dimensions are addressed in later works (McAdam et al., 1996a). The final critique is the difficulty of differentiating under this approach between an SMO and a pressure group, especially when countermovements play an important role in the context. A relevant explanation of this critique appears in the work of Casquette (Casquette, 1998: 78). The main problem arises when Zald and McCarthy try to define the use and nature of the resources used by SMOs and pressure groups, giving more importance to the member commitment than to the money in the case of SMOs, giving them more horizontal structures. On the other hand, money and a hierarchical structure are more important in the analysis of pressure groups. This analysis can be problematic when trying to explain the nature of highly structured SMOs.

New Social Movements theory

In this section I explain the organizational analysis from the *NSM* perspective. For this, I use the works of Alain Touraine (1981) and Alberto Melucci (1988; 1996).

Alain Touraine's approach is meaningless without first providing a glimpse of his idea of social movements. For Touraine, a social movement is 'the organized collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community' (Touraine, 1981: 77). After that, Touraine describes the social movement as an intention, a double relation between the adversary and the cultural stakes. These relations are described as a combination between three principles: *identity*, *opposition* and *totality*. These principles guide the action of the social movements (Touraine, 1981: 81). The principle of identity refers to how a social movement defines itself. The cultural stakes at play between the social movement and the adversary form the principle of totality. The principle of opposition explains the organization of any social movement. Touraine states that a social movement organizes itself at the point of identifying its adversary (Touraine, 1981: 83).

After this statement, Touraine does little to explain the nature and the work of SMOs (Touraine does not use this term). It is possible, however, to locate a *NSM* approach with the concept of an organization's nature in Alberto Melucci's work.

First, a few words about terms are in order. Melucci never uses the term SMO, instead of that he uses the term organization. This is because Melucci gives more importance to the processes of organization than to the organizational entity. With this in mind, Melucci begins his explanation about

organizations saying that '[a] social movement can survive over a period of time inasmuch as it is able to resist its own centrifugal forces and withstand the actions of its adversaries. This become possible only if it can develop a relatively stable organization and leadership' (Melucci, 1996: 313).

Melucci reviews the *RMT* approach, acknowledging the importance of resources, the inevitable bureaucratization of an organization, and the change of objectives that comes with that process. However, Melucci begins to deviate from the *RMT* perspective: 'On the other hand, however, a social movement is a profoundly different kind of reality compared to the large corporations producing goods or services that have generally served as the original models for organizational theory' (Melucci, 1996: 314). For Melucci a social movement is firmly committed to building conflicting collective identities, so cannot be identified as a system of exchanges (Melucci, 1988: 332). This causes the movement to be organized in specific ways, depending on the context and the conflict between the movement and the adversaries.

Melucci builds his approach upon these ideas. Regarding the nature of organizations, Melucci states 'an organization imposes on a multiplicity of groups and interests (the basis of the movement) the limits of a Unitarian structure, gives it a central direction and establishes an agenda of shared objectives. But in order to be able to do so, it must also provides a series of incentives designed to build and secure the consensus and loyalty of its membership' (Melucci, 1996: 315). In that statement it is possible to see convergences between Melucci's ideas and the organizational approach given by Zald and McCarthy.

Melucci differentiates between internal and external procedures in an organization. In the internal system of allocation of resources, Melucci identifies three different procedures: the system of roles and the division of labour; the mechanism and criteria for the distribution of costs and benefits; and the structure of incentives. He also identifies a system of specialized roles designed to follow the objectives of the organization. This specialization depends on the nature of the organization itself. This system distributes the resources through the different levels of the organization and ensures a balance that makes the organization successful (Melucci, 1996: 315).

In the organization internal system, Melucci identifies a power system. This power system is formed by three different dimensions: the structure of distribution of power; the processes for the aggregation of demands and the formation of decisions; and the mechanisms that guarantee the succession of the leadership functions (Melucci, 1996: 316).

Following this, Melucci identifies the external dimension or the relationships with the environment. The context where the resources are gathered is important to the organization, as they must gather these resources from the society of which they are part. These resources can be material or, as Melucci states, hidden, for example support or consensus (Melucci, 1996: 316).

After this introduction, Melucci describes the different processes of the organization, dividing them between internal and external. Melucci identifies three main internal processes: the formation of norms, the recruitment and succession of leadership, and the conflicts and factions.

Formation of norms

According to Melucci, norms are the point at which operational needs come together with needs of integration and control (Melucci, 1996: 318-323). Every movement has its norms that are institutionalized and legitimized inside the organization. The degree of institutionalization depends on the importance and complexity of the organization. It happens the same with the flexibility and rigidity of these norms. As a rule, Melucci identifies four different areas of normative regulation inside an organization (Melucci, 1996: 323).

Firstly, the exchange between members and the organization must be regulated. Here is where the internal incentives come into play, as well as the structure of rewards and sanctions. Secondly is the regulation of relations among the different components of the organization. The tasks and responsibilities inside an organization must be defined. Thirdly, the norms must include a definition of the relationship that the organization maintains with the social group it represents. Fourthly, these norms must specify the objectives and means of collective action.

Having said that, Melucci states that the regulation process is not rigid. These norms are always under conflict and challenge by the members of the movement and can change overtime.

The recruitment and succession of leadership

This process guarantees the continuation of the organization, either through continuity or change. Melucci (1996: 319) states that the selection of leadership is made through three different channels:

- The social groups that make up the constituency of the movement make the selection, and thus the selection processes bypass the organization, although, this is rare.
- The selection happens through delegation at the intermediate levels of the organization. This depends on how centralized the organization is.
- The last mechanism is centralized selection, when the leaders themselves decide who will be the next leader by appointment.

These models of selection reflect different organizational logics. These procedures can change from one organization to another, but every change has two characteristics: it reflects a certain balance in the power relations and is an important element of social mobilization.

Conflicts and factions

Tensions and conflicts are a consequence of the inherent complexity of every organization. The differences in the understanding of every aspect of a movement can be small or, as Melucci states, provoke schisms (Melucci, 1996: 320). However, conflicts appear under a series of specific conditions and areas. First are the conflicts about the quantity and fairness of the incentives. Second, the quantity and quality of internal communications can obstruct the aggregation of demands. Third, the totality of resources determines the capacity of an organization to answer demands, and finally, conflict can depend on the capacity of an organization to redraw its ideological framework. The more capable an organization is of adapting its ideological framework to the different demands, the less likely it is to engage in internal conflict (Melucci, 1996: 321).

After explaining the internal processes of an organization, Melucci analyzes the relationship between the organization and its environment. For

Melucci there are three main variables to understand this relationship (Melucci, 1996: 325):

- The requisites of affiliation required by the organization. Melucci explains this saying that the more elastic the requisites the wider the support, but this comes with an increased probability of facing internal conflict.
- The attitudes of social groups that are not part of the social movement's constituency. The "spectator groups" as Melucci calls them, can give the organization indirect resources or moral support. However, they can also hamper the organization's recruitment.
- The response of the opponents, or, in particular, the reaction of the political powers and the apparatuses of the state. Melucci says that the behaviour of the adversary is key to understand the success or failure of an organization. This behaviour can also modify the structure of the organization.

The organizations not only have to deal with society as a whole, but with other organizations that are part of the social movement, particularly if they claim that they represent the whole social movement. As Melucci states 'these organizations define the objectives of the movement and the means for collective action differently, and compete against each other for support by potential adherents. The competition may have a radicalizing influence on objectives and tactics. The dissatisfied support base of one organization may be successfully mobilized by another which proposes more radical objectives or tactics' (Melucci, 1996: 325-326).

It does not mean that the relationships between organizations are always of competition; Melucci states that these relationships can be of cooperation,

alliance and even fusion. Cooperation appears when different organizations decide to take different roles in pursuit of the same goal. When this becomes regular an alliance occurs and they intensify cooperation. Finally, if they become one entity, fusion happens. Of course, for alliances and fusions the debate about costs and benefits is central (Melucci, 1996: 326).

After defining the internal and external processes and systems of the organizations, Melucci makes an analysis of forms of organizations. Instead of making a typology, Melucci prefers to provide analytical tools through which the organizations can be analyzed (Melucci, 1996: 327).

First, Melucci states that organizations can be analyzed by their objectives. It is possible to distinguish between expressive and instrumental goals. The former are aimed to fulfil the satisfaction of the social and psychological needs of the members. The latter are the attainment of specific goods. Melucci states that this distinction is problematic in the analysis of contemporary forms of action. Second, Melucci divides the organizations between inclusive and exclusive. The former implies elastic and flexible ways of selecting members and the latter selects members in stricter and more rigid ways.

Another analytical tool is focused on the incentives the organization offers to its members. They can be material incentives, solidarity incentives and value incentives. The first are economic goods or resources, the second are derived from the participation itself and the third are about the whole objective of the organization (Melucci, 1996: 327).

The relations with the environment, particularly with other organizations, constitute another analytical approach. In that case, organizations can be

analyzed in terms of isolation or integration. This dimension, internally, refers to the heterogeneity or homogeneity of an organization.

Finally is the power issue. In this case it is possible to differentiate between authoritarian and participatory organizations. When taking into account leadership it is possible to differentiate between orientations toward mobilization or towards articulation.

These analytical dimensions can be combined to get an articulate frame analyzing social movements. Finally, Melucci states that this catalogue is far from exhaustive (Melucci, 1996: 327).

Frame analysis theory

This part is devoted to expose the different theoretical issues regarding frame analysis. I begin with a brief introduction of the foundations of frame analysis and the different branches of knowledge devoted to that. After that I give a longer explanation of the theoretical concepts of frame analysis regarding social movement studies.

Following that path, I start with the work of Erving Goffman (1974), regarding its impact in the application of frame analysis to social movements. After that I consider the different aspects of frame analysis in social movement theory, discussing particular authors like Snow and Benford (1986, 1988, 1992, 2000) and Gamson (1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1996).

A sociological approach to frame analysis. A brief review of Erving Goffman's work *Frame Analysis*.

Erving Goffman's work is prolific and dense, taking up the concept of framing developed by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson in his work *A Theory*

of *Play and Fantasy* (1972). Bateson proved the fact that to understand a communicative act, a reference to a metamessage of what is happening is required (Rivas, 1998: 182). Following this rationale, Goffman builds his dense work, *Frame Analysis*, upon the following question: “What is happening here?” (Goffman, 1974: 8). To identify one event from others and to give it some sense we have to use some interpretive frames. Goffman calls them *primary frames*, because they do not relate to any other previous interpretation. The primary frames concept is the main definition of frame used by Goffman. Frame denotes ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Goffman, 1974: 21). Goffman makes a distinction between two kinds of primary frames: natural and social. The natural primary frames make it possible to distinguish and isolate events considered “not in order, not oriented, unanimated, not guided, purely physical”. The social primary frames make it possible to distinguish events that have “the will, the end, the controlled effort of an intelligence, a living agency, mainly the human being” (Goffman, 1974: 22). Briefly, the human being perceives different events using primary frames and the different kinds of primary frames provide a way to describe such events. Using Goffman’s words, the sun rising is a natural event, moving the curtain to block the sun, a social one (Goffman, 1974: 25).

Following Bateson, Goffman formulates a central concept for the analysis of different frameworks, the *key*. The *key* is the assembly of different conventions by which one event, given sense by one primary frame, transforms itself into another event, using the original as a model, but with a sensible difference for the participants. *Keying* is a process of transcription. The *keying*

plays a central role to determine what is really happening (Goffman, 1974: 45). Goffman has two different objectives: to isolate the basic frames in human society to give sense to the process of experience and to analyze the different vulnerabilities that affect these reference frames (Goffman, 1974: 10). Goffman implies the idea that the different frames are not stable structures. This idea is revisited later by different authors applying frame analysis to social movements (Snow & Benford, 2000: 628).

The primary frames of a given social group are central components of its culture. In the interpretation of such frames appear things like schematics categories, their relations and finally, an undetermined group of forces and agents. However, the question of a frame of cultural frameworks (the system of beliefs or ideologies the frame operates within) remains outside of Goffman's analysis. This is addressed later by the different analysts of the political discourse and social movements (Rivas, 1998: 185).

Frame analysis in social movements theory

Probably, the first to apply frame analysis to social movement was William Gamson. In 1982 he and others introduced the "frame of injustice" concept (Gamson et al., 1982). They based their analysis on Goffman's work, defining frameworks as mental orientations that organize perceptions and interpretations. This is a cognitive approach that was eventually abandoned by Gamson himself, focusing on the collective processes and organization processes related to mobilization (Gamson, 1988). The other group of researchers devoted to frame analysis regarding social movements are Snow, Benford, Hunt, and Rochford. Other significant authors regarding frame analysis and social movements are Gerhards (1995), Gerhards and Rucht (1992),

Donati (1992), and Johnston (1995). I am going to revisit these authors as I describe the different aspects of frame analysis and social movements. For that I follow the categorization given by Snow and Benford (2000).

Collective action frames

The main difference between Goffman's approach and the social movement application of frame analysis is its collective nature. Social movements become signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers (Snow & Benford, 1988). In other words, social movements become creators and administrators of collective action frames. They are collective because they are aimed at a group of people and action-oriented because they are aimed at mobilizing these people. Framing, under this approach, denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process (Snow & Benford, 2000: 614).

Going beyond Goffman's theory, collective action frames perform the interpretive function noted above, by simplifying and condensing aspects of the world, but in ways that are "intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow & Benford, 1988: 198). Collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO) (Snow & Benford, 1992; Snow & Benford, 2000: 614). Collective action frames are the outcome of negotiating shared meaning (Gamson, 1992b: 111). Collective action frames are

constituted by two characteristic features: core-framing tasks (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Benford, 2000: 617) and the interactive, discursive processes that attend these core-framing tasks and thus are generative of collective action frames (Gamson, 1992b; Snow & Benford, 1992).

Core framing tasks

Snow and Benford identify three different tasks or processes. These are “diagnostic framing”, “prognostic framing” and “motivational framing” (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Benford, 2000: 617).

Diagnostic Framing

To date, most of the analysis regarding “diagnostic framing” is related to the *injustice* frame defended by Gamson et al. (1982). The first task of a given SMO is to define the victims and culprits of any given situation. Since social movements seek to remedy a problem, it is paramount to define the source(s) of causality, blame or/and culpable agents (Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). However, different SMOs can define different attributes for a given situation. Regarding the Basque peace movement organizations, *Gesto por la Paz* assigns more blame upon different nationalist political sectors, in contrast with *Lokarri*, which needs to be in tune with the different political groups. *Lokarri* needs to maintain a calm relationship with the different political parties due its political project. The same can be said about the role of the victims of violence (Anton, 2007: 68), but in this case *Gesto por la Paz* is the organization that nurtures the victims of violence demands for recognition.

Another interesting attribution process is what is called “boundary framing” (Hunt et al., 1994: 194) and “adversarial framing” (Gamson, 1995).

These processes tend to delimit boundaries between “good” and “evil”, thus building protagonists and antagonists.

Prognostic Framing

Prognostic framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem and the strategies for carrying out the plan (Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). This prognosis seems to be restrained by two main factors: the diagnosis and what is called “counterframing” (Benford, 1987: 75). Counterframing can put movement activists into a defensive stance, which can lead to a clearer prognosis. Coming back to the case study prognostic framing establishes one of the most importance differences between Basque peace movement organizations. *Lokarri* uses a more “institutional” approach because it tries to enforce a political agenda, while *Gesto por la Paz* relies on a more “contentious” approach to achieve social mobilization. This difference is fully explored in chapter 7.

Motivational Framing

Motivational framing provides a rationale to engage in collective action. That implies the construction of a proper discourse and vocabulary for that task. This task entails the development of the “agency” component of collective action frames. The agency component refers to what Gamson describes as the “consciousness that [it] is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action” (Gamson, 1995: 90).

Variable features of collective action frames

Different studies on collective action frames found four main features that affect the analysis. These are the identification problem, flexibility, variation in interpretive scope, and resonance (Snow & Benford, 2000: 618).

Problem identification and direction/locus attribution

Under the same frame it is possible to find different ways of identifying problems. This enables the elaboration of different lists of collective action frames. The most interesting results come from comparative studies. For instance, Gerhards and Rucht found differences between the problems identified by the same frame in different time periods: “the larger the range of problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be addressed with the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame” (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992: 580).

Flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity

Collective action frames can vary in terms of exclusivity and flexibility. Hypothetically, the more flexible and inclusive a frame, the more prone it is to become a master frame (Snow & Benford, 2000: 618).

Variation in interpretive scope and influence

Normally, a collective action frame is limited to the interests of certain groups or organizations. However, collective action frames can vary in their scope and become a constraint of other social movement's actions. These frames are considered master frames (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138). Master frames constitute a way to constrain any number of movement organizations. Master frames can be affected by four different variables: attributional function,

linguistic codes, mobilizing potency and narrative fidelity. Using these four dimensions it is possible to classify different master frames in terms of flexibility, openness and resilience (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138-141).

Resonance

The concept of resonance was developed by Snow and Benford (1988). This concept is relevant to assess the effectiveness of mobilization potency of such frames, and addresses the question of why some frames are more effective than others; why they “resonate” (Snow & Benford, 1988). Resonance can be measured using two different variables: credibility of the proffered frame and its relative salience. Credibility depends on discourse consistency and empirical credibility, which means a certifiable credibility of the frame articulators. A fit between the perception of world events and the actions of the SMOs make any given frame more credible (Gamson, 1992a). Framing is made more credible, with broader appeal, when the claimed evidence is more culturally believable with a greater amount of slices of such evidence (Snow & Benford, 2000: 620).

The other feature about resonance is its salience to targets of mobilization. Beliefs, values and ideas associated with the movements are central to understanding frame salience. The more central or salient the beliefs, ideas and values of the movement to the targets of mobilization, the greater the probability of their mobilization (Snow & Benford, 2000: 621).

Master frames

One collective action frame concept that is important to this research is the master frame concept. A master frame is a collective action frame that

emerges from a specific movement to become several movements' paradigm for action. Master frames have the same functions as collective action frames, but on a larger scale. They provide the punctuations, articulations and attributions for a specific phenomenon. In other words, a master frame is a hugely successful collective action frame (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138). Master frames work in the same fashion as collective action frames, but in a larger scale. They work as meta-frames. They normally colour other movements' collective action frames with only three substantial differences. First, master frames normally take the lead role to assign blame in a particular issue or problem. Second, master frames can be very flexible in the articulation mode or incredibly rigid, which normally depends on the mobilizing potential of the master frame. Therefore, in places where the master frame is highly credible and it is perceived as legitimate, it tends to be more rigid. Finally, the more rigid the master frame is, the more cultural elements from its surrounding are needed to give the frame fidelity. Master frames need a high degree of resonance to operate, as they need to permeate sectors for which the master frame was not designed. The factors that affect this process are varied: the protest cycle, the credibility and the clarity with which the frame is able to allocate blame. In this research this concept is important because, as explained in the introductory chapter, the Basque Peace Frame has some, but not all, of the characteristics to be considered a master frame that relies on a clear enemy and a clear and rigid way of action to be credible. In this case, the enemies are ETA and the Spanish State and the way of action is rejection of violence, respect for the victims of political violence, and social and political reconciliation.

Framing processes and dynamics

I discuss now the different framing processes and the literature on these framing processes (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 2000). I begin with the development, generation and elaboration of such processes and I finish by discussing how frames are diffused across movements, cultures and time.

Frames not only appear to be constructed, developed and elaborated upon the core-framing tasks explained before, but also by the way of three sets of overlapping processes that can be conceptualized as discursive, strategic and contested (Snow & Benford, 2000: 623).

Discursive processes

As can be deduced from the name, these processes concern discourse, talk, conversation and speeches. Here it is possible to define two different processes: frame articulation and frame amplification (different from the strategic process of framing amplification, explained later in this chapter). Frame articulation involves the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion (Snow & Benford, 2000: 623). Frame amplification involves the highlighting of specific issues, events or beliefs to make the frame more credible and effective.

Strategic processes

Strategic processes are those that are deliberative, utilitarian and goal directed. These processes have been conceptualized as “frame alignment processes” in the work of Snow et al. (1986), from which it is possible to define

four different strategic processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.

Frame bridging refers to the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent, but structurally unconnected, frames regarding a particular issue or problem (Snow et al., 1986: 467). One important idea is the linkage between a given social movement industry and what McCarthy calls “unmobilized sentiment pools” (McCarthy, 1986). These pools are aggregates of individuals who share common grievances, but who lack organizational base. This process appears in the case study, in the form of mechanisms created to mobilize concerned people about peace in the Basque Country. *Lokarri* seems to have switched its main frame alignment process from *frame transformation* to *frame bridging* using new technologies to unite individuals concerned about peace (Anton, 2009).

Frame amplification refers to the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that impacts on a particular issue, problem or set of events (Snow et al., 1986: 469). This process involves a two-dimensional approach, the value amplification and the belief amplification. The former refers to the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents, but without collective action. The latter involves the amplification of stereotypes or a set of beliefs about antagonists, situations and future events.

Frame extension refers to the intentions of a social movement of portraying its activities as congruent with the beliefs of the potential adherents, a process particularly common in the peace movement. Normally this

mechanism appears studying groups close to the social movement, but not part of it. (Snow et al., 1986: 472).

Frame transformation refers to the mechanisms adopted by an SMO to change the current frame and put in place a frame closer to its ideals. When a frame does not resonate enough or mobilization decreases, the movement tries to plant and create new values, new rules. New values have to be nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or “misframings” reframed (Goffman, 1974: 308). Going back to Goffman, that is precisely what he means as *keying*. This is the action of redefining activities or events to make them seem as “something else” (Goffman, 1974: 45). Snow et al. define two different transformation processes: transformations of domain specific frames and global interpretive frames (Snow et al., 1986: 474). The former relates to substantial, but fairly self-contained, changes in a dominant frame. The latter involves a more general change, normally aimed to create a master frame.

Contested processes

Contested processes emerge from challenges between movements or antagonists. The main contests are created between movement opponents, bystanders, and the media: frame disputes within movements; and the dialectic between frames and events (Snow & Benford, 2000: 625). Normally, these contests occur in a multi-dimensional and complex environment. The most studied of contests are the challenges created by the media. However, it is important to note the counterframing processes, or processes created to delegitimize a social movement, normally pursued by social movement’s opponents.

Finally I explain how these frames diffuse. Framing activity is more prone to diffusion when one of the parts, the transmitter or the adopter, takes an active role in the process. The two main frame diffusion processes are strategic selection or adaptation and strategic fitting or accommodation.

Strategic Selection is done when there is intentional cross-cultural borrowing. *Strategic fitting* involves cross-cultural promotion. In other words, the former involves adoption of frames, while the later involves the opposite process (Jennes, 1995; Jennes & Broad, 1994; Snow & Benford, 2000: 627).

Contextual constraints and facilitation

Framing is a dynamic process that changes over time. However, this process is not isolated from other structural or cultural issues, and is modulated, created and developed from them. Here I focus on two processes that impact directly upon frames: Political Opportunity Structure and cultural constraints and opportunities.

Political Opportunity Structure

The POS is defined as the ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure’ (Tarrow, 1998: 76-77). It is possible to assert that changes in the institutional arena will affect the different framing processes of a social movement. For some frames, changes in material conditions lead to changes in frame resonance, which in turn lead to reframing.

Cultural opportunities and constraints

Culture constitutes a major factor affecting different framing processes. The more relevant cultural material includes the extant stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives, and the like. This is what Swindler calls the “tool kit” (Swindler, 1986). These are the foundations for new cultural meanings and new cultural framing processes. Movements become both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings. Collective action is thus the stage in which new meanings are produced, as well as full of old meanings (Tarrow, 1992: 189). In this research I look at the Basque Peace Social Movement, not only as a hub for public and collective action, but also as a creator of culture itself. Inside this category are the peace organizations described in chapters 5 and 8, which do not have as their main objective social mobilization, but are creators of cultural values for the peace movement.

The cultural effects of framing processes are a significant point of focus for this research; hence I devote a full part of this theoretical chapter to this.

The impact of social movements

Considering that social movements emerge to effect change, to achieve something, the lack of studies addressing social movements’ impacts is quite paradoxical. Social movements emerge to compel political elites to take decisions on their behalf, to change, or ultimately have a lot of weight in public policy (Ibarra, 2005a: 299). Some authors note this difficulty:

‘Part of the problem is that while it is possible to correlate outcomes with movement efforts, it is not easy to identify particular movement actions as the cause for a specific outcome. To the voices of

movement activists we must add the impact of public opinion, interest groups, parties, and executives as potential causes for outcomes of interest to movements' (Tarrow, 1998: 162).

With impacts, apart from that methodological question, it is important to take into account the following issues: first, there is a terminology problem. Whilst accepting different terms, like *consequences*, *impacts* or *results*, it is important not to associate any of these terms with *success* or *failure* (Casquette, 1998: 203). The reason for this is that social movements often achieve results that are not initially intended (Ibarra, 2005a: 300; Giugni, 1999: xxi). Second, most of the studies made are focused on public policy outcomes, mostly based on the idea defended by Tarrow that social movements are defined as 'collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities' (Tarrow, 1998: 4).

However, social movements are not only aimed at achieving something in the public policy arena; they seek impacts at a number of different levels. It is possible to classify the different impact in two levels, external and internal, each with their own categories:

Impact Scenarios	
<i>External Impacts</i>	<i>Internal Impacts</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political Institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demands Inclusion Processual Substantial Structural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Movement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systemic Structure Support
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political Actors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agenda Structures Symbolic Dimension Action and Organization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collective Identity Size Organization Structure
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Members

Cultural Change Political Change Material Change	Winnings Biography
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Source: (Ajangiz, 2002: 40)

In the table above, cultural change is identified as one of the external impacts of social movements on society. This categorization is made for analytical purposes; in practice it is quite difficult to separate clearly external impacts from internal impacts, as social movements create effects in all the areas they work.

Internal impacts have received less attention than external impacts in the literature. Social movements are created to transform their environment, but this is not as clear as one may think. External and internal impacts overlap, particularly when cultural and symbolic changes are involved (Casquette, 1998: 221). Following the table above, the *systemic structure* refers to the way social movement's actions modify their alliance networks. Here it is possible to identify the way the social movement changes its strategy and its relations with opponents and antagonists. *Support* involves social movement's capacity to recruit members and leaders. Probably the most important dimensions of internal impacts are *collective identity* and *organization structure*. The construction, maintenance and transformation of individual and collective identities is one of the most notable impacts of social movements (Casquette, 1998: 222). Using Melucci's words: 'what the individuals demand collectively is the right to realise their own identity; the possibility to use their personal creativity, their affective lives, and their biological and interpersonal existence' (Melucci, 1980: 218). These dimensions can be affected by a movement's actions in qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The actions that create opponents and an identity crisis can take the movement to a fracture, and

reduce membership. This directly affects the organization *structure*. Sometimes, this dimension can be central for the movement, ignoring other dimensions of action. Finally, the members themselves could be affected. The selective incentives could grow, giving more *winnings*, or, more frequently, non-material *winnings*, for example, to be part of a group that rewards in terms of self-esteem. The activist, through their participation in the social movement, acquires a *biography* in which their experience and knowledge have great value (Ibarra, 2005a: 304).

External impacts are the most visible of impacts and are the dimensions of impacts the social movements aim for. First, it is possible to identify impacts that affect the *political institutions*. When a *demand* is formulated, for example, it can be in response to an authority decision or more proactively, because the movement creates it. However, the most important of impacts in this dimension are *processual* and *substantial* impacts. Gamson identifies two kinds of impacts (or “success¹⁶”) (Gamson, 1990: chpt 3). The first one refers to the moment a social movement is recognized as a valid speaker by its antagonists to defend a set of rights recognized as legitimate. This gives the social movement the opportunity to create new channels for participation in the decision-making processes, which is referred to as a *processual* impact (Kitschelt, 1986). Gamson asserts that there are four different indicators to assess the acceptance of social movements by the authorities:

- The creation of processes of consultation.
- The opening of negotiations with the antagonist indicates that they see the social movement as a legitimate and continuous speaker.

¹⁶ Gamson’s success is the achievement of objectives clearly defended by an organization or social movement (Gamson called them “contentious groups”)

- Formal recognition of the social movement as a valid representative of a social base. This, however, does not necessarily mean the acceptance of the means and ways developed by the social movement.
- Inclusion of members of the social movement in authority positions, retaining their status in the social movement.

The second kind of “success” refers to the achievement of new advantages to the social movement’s social base. That is, if the social movement achieves benefits determined by the social movement itself. This type of impact is called by Kitschelt a *substantial impact* (Kitschelt, 1986). Gamson combines the two dimensions, acceptance and advantage, and identifies four possible outcomes:

		ACCEPTANCE	
		Total	None
NEW ADVANTAGES	A Lot	Total Response	Prevacuum
	None	Cooptation	Collapse

Source: (Gamson, 1990: 20)

The *total response* and *collapse* categories are, respectively, total success or total failure for the social movement. The two other categories, *cooptation* and *prevacuum* are mixed. *Cooptation* admits acceptance, but without any new advantages and *prevacuum* involves new advantages without acceptance.

Structural change or *structural impacts* ‘indicates a transformation of the political opportunity structures as a consequence of a social movement’s activity’ (Kitschelt, 1986: 67). These are much more important impacts. The movement changed the decision-making process, the structure at least. These changes can go much further to achieve, at their best, a change of political regime. This is highly unlikely, except, maybe, the processes of change that

happened in the eastern bloc countries. However, it is possible to define indicators for these changes as the inclusion of new political parties that are highly receptive to the social movement's demands. This is not the same as a social movement or organization that becomes a political party. Social movements not only want to have an impact on the *political institutions* or *authorities*, they seek to impact on the *political actors*. These kinds of impacts are called *sensitizing impacts* (Giugni, 1995). They can vary between social and political impacts. The *symbolic dimension*, for example, can be applied to the social dimension as well. These impacts work in different aspects: first, they occur when transforming the political and media *agendas*, modifying their priorities, forcing the inclusion of social movement's demands on those agendas. Thus, they shift the discourse through media; second, the alignment with different political actors forces the change of the political *structures*. The most important of structural changes is the appearance of new political actors (for example, green parties in Germany in the 1980s); third, they change political actors' priorities, changing their *symbolic dimension* and their *frameworks*. They have to adapt their discourse to the new cultural frames that appear from the social movement's actions and discourse; finally, and as a consequence of all the impacts explained under this point, the social movements transform the *action* and *organization* of other political actors (Ibarra, 2005a: 306).

Social movements may achieve changes in *society*. Three dimensions in particular are affected by social movements' actions: *culture*, *political culture* and *material change*. A social movement can change the *political culture* of a society. People can adopt new attitudes and, for example, ask for more

participation if the social movement endorses a culture of political participation. Regarding *material change*, almost any type of change is possible, from the redistribution of salaries to new infrastructures. These changes are enacted in public policies that might appear as a result of the social movements' actions. Finally, the social movement can change the *culture*. It can transform public opinion and create new social frameworks. This process becomes endless; the movements change their discourses to fit in with the new frames that change their discourses.... At the end, they achieve change in behaviour and values.

Cultural impacts

Cultural impacts relates to the way social movements change values, knowledge and norms of a given society (Casquette, 1998: 217). Melucci (1989; 1993) explores the field of cultural change and identifies three consequences derived from social movements: first, social movements enforce institutional change through political reforms and the redefinition of organization practices; second, they are a source of elite recruitment; third, they feed the process of *cultural innovation*. This is the production of models of behaviour and social relationships that enter into everyday life and the market, modifying the functioning of the social order by means of changes in language, sexual customs, affective relationships, dress and eating habits (Melucci, 1993: 249). However, all these impacts are minor, while Melucci states that the most important impact is derived from the challenge to the dominant codes over which social relationships are built (Melucci, 1993: 248). Melucci identifies three different kinds of *symbolic challenges* (Melucci, 1989: 75-76; Melucci, 1993: 249-250). First, the *prophecy*: that is the act of announcing, based on experiences affecting the individual's life, that alternative frameworks of sense

are possible and that the operational logic of power apparatuses is not the only possible rationality (Melucci, 1993: 249). Second, the *paradox*: the reversal of the dominant codes by means of their exaggeration, which in turn reveals their irrationality and the measure of silence and violence they contain (Melucci, 1993: 250). Third, the *representation*, in which the collective actors' capacity to isolate form from content permits, by means of a play of mirrors, their retransmission to the system of its own contradictions (Melucci, 1993: 250). The effects created by these three forms of symbolic challenge are not structural, but symbolic. They consist mainly in *rendering power visible*. These are the *systemic effects* (Melucci, 1989: 76-77). The role of collective action is to create public spaces to show the most hidden aspects of power. Once power has been discovered, it is possible to negotiate over it.

One of the most important cultural impacts is the creation of *master frames of protest* (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1992), which are ideological narratives that legitimate protest and are shared by different social movements, as explained earlier in this chapter. This is linked to another important cultural impact, that is, the creation of new *collective identities* (McAdam, 1995: 50). Other impacts pointed out by McAdam include the creation of innovative forms of action or the creation of cultural items. The strike is, perhaps, the best example of the former. The strike is a form of action that supersedes the boundaries of the working class movement and has been identified with protest and contentious politics. The new ways of clothing, fashion, language or symbols are examples of the latter. McAdam points out the capacity of social movements to affect the work of mainstream cultural institutions such as the church. Actually, the example of the *Liberation Theology*

in Latin America is a fascinating example of new cultural uses of the Catholic church fuelled by social movements (McAdam, 1995: 52). Finally it is important to note what Eyerman and Jamison call *cognitive praxis* (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). This is the creation of new knowledge or the reinterpretation of existing knowledge in specific socio historic contexts. One example of this is the vulgarization/popularization of scientific knowledge by the environmentalist movement, making accessible information about greenhouse effects, acid rain, and more.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical basis of my research. Firstly, I defined peace movement and applied it to the Basque scenario. It is possible to say that a peace movement exists in the Basque Country with its own character. Alongside the organizations that struggle for a peaceful settlement of the conflict exist a number of peace research centres that, without having a strictly social nature, are providing inputs into the Basque peace movement. Secondly, I described and analyzed the different approaches that exist to explain collective action. I gave a brief explanation of the classical approaches to social movement theory, followed by a deeper analysis of the two main social movement theories, *Resource Mobilization Theory* and *New Social Movements*, in order to elaborate their strengths and weaknesses.

Thirdly, I analyzed the different approaches to social movement organizations. I classified these approaches within the main theories of social movements. After explaining briefly the classical approach, I focused on the organizational approach in *Resource Mobilization Theory*, using the texts of Zald and McCarthy, before looking at the work of Alberto Melucci to give an

explanation of the organizations in a social movement from the *New Social Movements* perspective. Fourthly, I discussed the different approaches of frame analysis, providing a definition of what a frame is and how social movements deal with it. Finally, I discussed the different issues regarding social movement impacts, emphasizing the cultural dimension.

From the theoretical discussion provided in this chapter, I conclude that when analyzing the Basque peace movement organizations it is useful to use two perspectives. One perspective is dedicated to the structural analysis of the organizations and their role in the Basque peace movement itself. For that the *New Social Movement* approach is more useful, taking into account its strong emphasis on ideological factors. The Basque peace movement organizations face a conflict between themselves and the political actors in the Basque Country. The second perspective is dedicated to the organizational development and inner working of the Basque peace movement organizations. To achieve this we need both the ideological approach elaborated by Melucci, and the organizational approach of Zald and McCarthy. It is possible to assert that the Basque peace movement organizations share a common frame that tries to modify other cultural frameworks of the conflict. The theoretical concepts presented in this chapter assist in answering the research questions presented in the introduction: Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame? How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? How has the Basque Peace Frame impacted on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict? The *RMT* and the *New Social Movement* approaches are revisited in the next chapter, focusing on the methodological implications inherent to them.

CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY

Introduction

I began my research with a clear research direction, and my research questions demonstrate the focus and range of my endeavour. However, the development of my research methodology was necessarily an iterative process, as my research took me into largely uncharted territory. I did not and could not determine concretely the methods and tools I would need for this research from the outset, and my choice and adaptation of methodology for this research would prove itself only in the final analysis. The engaging starting point about social research is, like nineteenth century exploration, that we do not know the path ahead or what lies between us, and our destination. We, as social scientists, begin with an approach and tools that have proved useful in similar research, adapting our methodology according to the research environment and specific challenges encountered as the research progresses, and in the process develop new methods and tools (Law, 2007). My methodology maintained its essence throughout, but was significantly re-shaped by the research experience. In the following section, I outline the choice of existing methods and tools available to me for this research, as utilised by the social movement theories, *Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT)* and *New Social Movements (NSM)*. For that I will take the concepts explained in the previous chapter and I will focus on the methodological assumptions inherent to the *RMT* and the *New Social Movement* approaches. I explain my decision to employ frame analysis, followed by a description of my research journey, how I approached the field, the problems I encountered and how I approached the different organizations. I

explain my situation in the field, and discuss issues of access and withdrawal. Finally, I consider the ethical issues connected with my research, including the common issues of anonymity and informed consent, but also more subtle issues, such as the subjectivity of my position as a researcher, my role as Basque, male and academic.

Different approaches to the study of social movements

The following section is devoted to revisit and describe briefly the methodological assumptions used in the different social movement theory approaches. I highlight the underlying methodological factors shared by certain approaches to the study of social movements, though this is not to say that every approach shares the same methodological assumptions. For example, within *RMT* there exist different ways to tackle particular issues, notably the *political process* approach, which stresses the importance of the environment in explaining social movement organizations through the creation of the concept of *Political Opportunity Structure* (*POS*). This is a concept whose existence and change, according to *political process* authors, can be measured (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 277), and the *political process* approach provides means of looking at resources in mobilization theory as an external issue, whose nature is defined by the perceptions of the organizations researched (Tarrow, 1998: 76). Here lies a difference between the *political process* approach and other *RMT* approaches that see resources as something internal to, and rationally managed by, the organization. Nevertheless, the greatest difference in methodological assumptions is between theories. I outline the different characteristics of the methodological approaches adopted or developed by

different social movement theories and I connect them with the critical approach I used in this research.

Resource Mobilization Theory. A rational choice needs a rational methodology

It is important to note that when we talk about the *RMT*, in fact, we are talking about a family of concepts, propositions and research projects about social movements. While there is no consensus between authors in defining this approach (Casquette, 1998: 62), it is possible to outline the common points between orientations, mainly concerning methodology of research.

Alberto Melucci identified perfectly the epistemological project of *RMT* when he said that it looks at the “how” and *NSM* looks at the “why” (Melucci, 1980). With the “how”, Melucci meant the description of mobilization processes and the gathering of resources for action, which implies a functional approach to the study of social movements. *RMT* appeared as a response to irrationalist models of social action (Jenkins, 1983: 528; Alvarez-Junco, 1995: 104). The level of mobilization that occurred in the 1960s in the USA made some theorists (Leites & Wolf, 1970; Lipsky, 1968; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Zald & McCarthy, 1987a; Zald & McCarthy, 1987b) think about the rationality or irrationality of the individual and concluded that the rational management of resources is the most important factor when explaining collective action (Casquette, 1998: 62). However, as I explain in the previous chapter, *RMT* is not a monolithic approach. There are different orientations within *RMT* (Casquette, 1998: 69), but they share one approach, which is their emphasis on the importance of understanding social action through the strategic thinking of the individual and the calculation of costs and benefits before the beginning of a

course of action (Gamson et al., 1982; Gamson, 1990; McAdam, 1982b; Tarrow, 1998; Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). While *RMT* theory uses the individual as the central actor who takes decisions, *NSM* uses the organization as a central actor in decision-making. I call the former an *individual rationality model* and the latter a *collective rationality model*.

The *individual rationality model* employs the “individualist methodology”, which is the doctrine that affirms that all social phenomena are explicable using the properties, objectives and beliefs of individuals (Elster, 1982: 543). It is important to note some assumptions associated with this approach that are included in the different *RMT* methodological approaches, like the *organizational approach* (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b) or the *political process approach* (Kriesi, 1989; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978).

The *RMT* theory of social movements was widely influenced by Mancur Olson’s (1965) theory of rational choice. It became the basis for understanding the individual rationality model and some of the basic points under the *RMT* methodological approach. Olson stated that, before being part of a collective action, the individual checks the costs and benefits of that decision in a purely instrumental way. The Olsonian ontological assumption is that the human being is selfish and looks to maximize the benefits of a given choice and trying to minimize the costs at the same time. Indeed, ‘unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is a coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*’ (Olson, 1965: 2). This assumption is relevant in complex entities, such as State institutions, or interest groups, and highlights one of the problems derived, that is, the

existence of the *free rider*. For Olson, the individual, when in a group, will try to benefit from the efforts of others and enjoy the outcomes independently of their support for the organization (Olson, 1965: 16). This is the explanation given to understand individuals that do not take part in the achievement of goals, but enjoy their success. These are collective goods that cannot be negated. A problem derived from the free rider concept is that it is unable to explain why some individuals are very active in certain organizations. Olson attempts to resolve this by introducing the *selective incentives* concept. These are in addition to, but different from, public goods; they are perks that are only enjoyed by the committed individuals (Olson, 1965: 51).

What is the impact of Olson's theories on the study of social movements? Olson broke with the preconception that collective goods and individual goods are in harmony. This was one of the ontological assumptions that earlier social movement theories entertained (Gurr, 1970: 359). After Olson's contribution, social theorists started to treat the relationship between public goods and individual goods as problematic. Social theorists assumed a natural inaction on the part of the individual when collective goods were at stake. Based on this, *RMT* (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a) developed a multifactor model of resource allocation, organization and political opportunities. Indeed, as a result of Olson's principles, resources became central to the description of social movements, leaving aside concepts like ideology, beliefs and privation situations. Few individuals assume the costs of collective action by themselves. An explanation of collective behaviour demands detailed attention to incentive selection, the mechanisms of cost reduction, and the professional benefits of collective action. (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 18). Another author key to

understanding *RMT*, Oberschall (1973) states that to build a theory of mobilization and opposition, of groups in conflict, of social movements and masses, of protest behaviour and of collective action, requires considerable modification of Olson's theories (Oberschall, 1973: 118).

The *RMT* approach then, relies on a rationale that is based on the individual. It is the individual who makes the decisions and those decisions explain the different dynamics within collective action. However, this model alone is not sufficient to understand the different realities that appear in any given social movement. Collective action is a complex phenomenon, and there are plenty of examples that do not support this ontological assumption of selfishness. Other authors (Cohen, 1985; Kitschelt, 1991; Turner, 1991; Tarrow, 1998) acknowledged this complexity and, using different approaches, moved from an individualistic rationale to a collective rationale, forming the *political process* approach. This change of approach was derived from three main critiques of the individualistic model. First, the rational action models ignore factors such as altruism, present widely in collective action. Second, a huge number of social movement organizations look for public benefits without giving any material personal incentive to their members, and third, the rational action model ignores the effect of the group or the collective, focusing solely on the individual, without any bonds to others. This has important methodological implications. Within *RMT*, the unit of analysis must be the individual. This individual is in an almost static field of interactions and only acts using an instrumental rationality. The role of emotions, discourses and symbols are rejected or ignored. This approach seems to be limited, as applying these methodological assumptions cannot explain why people act in unselfish ways.

Another point is the inability to explain widely successful collective action movements, like the ecological movement. These groups base their ideals in public benefits that cannot be divided. On the other hand, contemporary movements offer social incentives, like prestige, solidarity and so on. They are what Melucci calls solidarity incentives (Melucci, 1996: 327). Finally, the individual rationale assumes the different preferences that could be adopted by the individual are a static set of options that do not change with time. Instead, time is an external variable that contributes to our understanding of collective action. This suggests an epistemological approach that considers preferences as a central part of the research imperative and because these preferences change during the course of that action, they become an internal part of the process (Melucci, 1996; Casquette, 1998: 172). To be part of the group and be part of a particular social context entails a social construction of motives and of identities. The 'rationality' of an action must be understood in the context of a complex interplay between the social values and preferences of the individual.

As stated earlier, *RMT* uses, primarily an individual rationale approach to the research of social movements. However, following the *political process* critique, other authors (Rule, 1989; McAdam et al., 1996b; Tarrow, 1998) moved from an individual approach to a collective rationality approach. This approach assumes that individuals participate in a conscious way in those episodes of collective action that entail a high positive ratio between costs and benefits, but not for the individuals alone, but as a part of a collective (Rule, 1989: 147). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (1996) propose that the individual rationale ignores the degree to which the individuals are ontologically immersed

in different kinds of structures and social practices (McAdam et al., 1996b: 26).

I explain the *political process* approach through reference to the work of Charles Tilly and then offer an explanation of the New Social Movement approach to methodology. Tilly moves the unit of analysis from the individual to the group. The group tries to achieve collective goods for its members. Tilly calls these groups “contenders”, that is, “any group that, during a specific period of time, turns all resources at its disposal to trying to influence the authorities” (Tilly, 1978: 52). These are the main characteristics of the *political process* approach:

- Collective action has costs.
- All contender groups analyze those costs.
- Collective action has benefits, in the form of collective goods.
- The contender groups compare expected costs with expected benefits.
- Both costs and benefits are uncertain because a) the contender groups have imperfect information about the situation of the political system; b) all the contender sides are involved in a strategic interaction.

(Tilly, 1978: 99)

On one side, this model can be considered an extension of the individualistic rationality model. While these models attribute the individual with the power to take decisions, the collective model relies on the idea of the group. This model is used by Alain Touraine, François Dubet, and Michel Wieviorka (1983) in their study of the Polish trade union movement *Solidarnosc*. In their analysis of the decision-making process of *Solidarnosc*, Touraine, Dubet, and Wieviorka considered that it was self-limited. They made rational decisions

between cost and benefit based on government actions (Touraine et al., 1983: cap. 3). The model of the *political process* defended by Tilly (1978) and used by Touraine, Dubet, and Wieviorka is based on a collective rationale, which is a bridge of understanding between the *RMT* and the *NSM* (Casquette, 1998: 175). In particular, the *political process* approach and the *NSM* share a model of collective rationale.

New Social Movements, the interpretation of the group

The *NSM* approach shares its rationality about social movements research with *RMT* in its assumption that collective action is the outcome of the behaviour of rational actors. The decisions made are based upon a schemata of costs and benefits. However, the *NSM* approach addresses the inadequacies of the *RMT* approach. *NSM* theory changes the epistemological orientation of movement analysis, basing it on the collective instead of the individual, focusing on the reason why social movements appear and develop, rather than looking at how they conduct themselves. This is, perhaps, the most fundamental difference between the two approaches. A second, and important, difference is that while *RMT* asserts that its conceptual and analytical tools are applicable to all social movements in any given society (Casquette, 1998: 99), the *NSM* approach has narrowed its focus to the social movements that appear after the second world war, and particularly from the 1960s onwards (Casquette, 1998: 100; Della Porta & Rucht, 1995: 6). This is a fundamental difference to *RMT*, as the *NSM* approach is, by definition, non universalistic. *RMT* is based upon a positivistic approach to social movement phenomena, which is rooted in the positivistic approaches that dominated social sciences journals during the 1960s and 1970s (Neuman, 2003: 71). However, *NSM* theory uses a more

interpretive approach. Rather than focusing on tangible collective (or selective) goods, the focus is on, what are called, “cultural goods” and *NSM* theory advocates tend to focus on the production and limits of cultural and symbolic trends in society (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Johnston, 2009; Johnston et al., 1994: 7). These cultural goods are mainly produced by a clash of identities.

The *NSM* approach interprets this as a direct consequence of the modernity process. Stepping a little bit further from the Marxian sentence that “modernity is constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation....” (Marx & Engels, 1969: 52), Giddens identifies the nature of rapid change and highlights the importance of symbols in this new society. Tradition is measured in symbolic ways, becoming incredibly important (Giddens, 1990: 37-8). It is in this new environment *NSM* appeared, questioning boundaries and fighting, not for tangible benefits, but to create new identities, and to win symbolic fights. The importance of this for the methodological discussion is particularly significant, largely due to the very nature of the outcomes that *NSM* movements look for. The concept of identity here is complex and depends upon a wide interpretation of the environment and, in the case of social movements, on the process through which this environment, coupled with personal positioning in a group, leads to the establishment of collective identity. It is sufficient to note that the debate about collective identity is ongoing and far from settled (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Tilly (1984) highlights the interpretive stance of the *NSM* approach: ‘the actions are subjective, the outcomes, fluid. Social movements are products of the changes in their social environment. The recognition of the historical significance of collective action forms, is the beginning of wisdom’

(Tilly, 1984: 305). The *NSM* approach focuses on the creation and interpretation of norms and meanings (Melucci, 1996: 317). Therefore, *NSM* stresses the importance of understanding the common ground within a social movement, that is, the processes that individuals recognize as common and cause them to act together (Melucci, 1996: 64). These different processes merge in what Melucci (1996) calls *collective identity* (Melucci, 1996: 67)

The study of collective identity is a relevant part of this research (Melucci, 1988; Pizzorno, 1978; Friedman & McAdam, 1992; Hunt & Benford, 2007; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Collective identity is constituted through the individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which can be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity (Polletta & Jasper, 2001: 285). It is a continuum of shared cognitive frameworks regarding orientations (Melucci, 1989: 35) that is developed from the different tensions and negotiations between actors (Melucci, 1996: 70). Its role in this research is related to the meaning of communication channels between different organizations. As is explained in chapters 6, 7, and 8, an understanding of the sharing of collective identity traits is one of the ways in which we can make sense of the way the Basque Peace Frame diffuses. It gives a common ground to understanding and provides incentives for the acceptance of new ideas about a struggle or conflict (Friedman & McAdam, 1992: 162). Collective identity processes are dynamic and ever changing constructs, therefore, it is important to understand how these constructs work in an environment as the Basque Country. Collective identity involves a process of construction of reality or action

system (Melucci, 1996: 70) that gives the possibility to include or exclude other collectives. It is agreed that these construction systems are never settled, as Melucci states when the term *identity* is explained (Melucci, 1996: 85) and the Basque Country is not an exception. However, the role of political collective identities is more determined. Political collective identities are a recognized way of perceiving the other in the Basque Country. The Basque national identity has been constructed continuously for centuries and is well established as a defining political feature (Castells, 1998: 30). The national identity, therefore, works as an exclusive construction, thanks to the different processes of radicalization explained in chapter 6 (Perez-Agote, 2008: 135). This trend is changing as noted by various authors (Ibarra, 2005b; Perez-Agote, 1998) that detected trends of inclusion in the Basque national identity. This is relevant for this research explaining the identity position of the nationalist left as this collective still relies in old ways of reproduction of identities. This fact makes the nationalist left less prone to defining themselves with any other political position but nationalist.

The *NSM* approach uses a different epistemology. It tries to understand why, in a post-industrial society and in a particular environment (mainly western Europe), a particular kind of collective action occurs. They focus on movements like peace, ecology and antimilitarist movements, women's movements, solidarity with the third world, civil and human rights defence and the urban alternative movements (Casquette, 1998: 175; Della Porta & Rucht, 1995: 6). The focus of the analysis is on social movements' attempts to construct new social identities in response to the dissolution of older identity structures (Casquette, 1998: 103), such as family, religion and class. To achieve this, the

NSM approach explores other dimensions. It does not focus on structures of resources, but on cultural conflicts and the winning of “cultural appropriations” (McAdam, 1995: 37). The field is not a field of contesting resources, but a field of contesting cultural and identity models. These models are in continuous struggle and continuously changing. The knowledge no longer resides with the individual, or the group, but in the subjective perception that the group has about its meanings and actions. Ontologically speaking, actors are not individuals, but parts of complex groups that are in perpetual conflict. The different organizations are a construct of different conflicting processes (Melucci, 1996: 20). These groups need conflict to survive. This conflict is mainly symbolic and cultural, with an everlasting process of collective identity transformation (Melucci, 1988: 332; Melucci, 1989: 25-30; Melucci, 1996: 70).

It is important to emphasise that the focus of this research is the different cultural impacts of the Basque peace movement organizations through the identification and analysis of the Basque Peace Frame (see chapter 6). However, the different collective identity processes that exist in Basque society condition these cultural impacts. These collective identity processes are key to understanding the nature of the Basque Peace Frame and the mechanisms at play that allow its diffusion. Finally, and this is key to understanding the methodology used in this research, the main goal of *NSM* from its constant collective identity transformation, is the need to politicise everyday life. Therefore, the goal of social movements will not be structural changes in the system, but changes in the system of values, which is precisely what I am researching here.

The unit of research, then, is the interacting group. The group is the beginning and the end; the agent in charge of making society believe the cultural changes they defend are real, not fictional. The *NSM* approach demonstrates how difficult it is to understand how a social phenomenon appears, if one's analysis is based solely on an epistemological position that sees only the rational individual. An important part of the *NSM* approach is the interpretation that the group makes of its environment and how the group tries to communicate and transfer that interpretation to other groups in society, effectively engaging in different frame alignment processes (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624; Tarrow, 1992: 188). This is not to say that the phenomenon is new, but the methodological approach is. There have been different models to approach these dilemmas, but I would like to revisit in detail the model proposed by the French Sociologist Alain Touraine and the Italian cultural theorist and cognitive psychologist Alberto Melucci presented in the previous chapter and focus on their methodological implications.

Alain Touraine uses a collective approach to the study of social movements. The fundamentals of his ideas are articulated in his book *The Voice & The Eye* (1981). First, Touraine bases his ontology in the idea of a “sociology of action”. In his words “a society is a system capable of producing, of generating its own normative guidelines instead of having them passed down via an order or a movement that transcends history – no matter whether one calls it God, Spirit or History” (Touraine, 1981: 14). Touraine perceives a society with hierarchical systems of actions. These are social relations between actors with conflicting interests who share certain cultural orientations (Touraine, 1981: 25). Touraine's approach conceives of society as formed of two components:

historicity and *class relations*. *Historicity* is firmly based on *class relations*. Touraine describes all social relations as relations of power that emanate from the main intrinsic conflict, the class struggle (Touraine, 1981: 33). This implies that the analysis of society, as a system of action, is an analysis of change and therefore, the analysis of relations between the State and social movements (Touraine, 1981: 53). Here he introduces the idea of *historicity*, which implies knowledge, and the capacity to develop functioning models of social interactions. For Touraine, social movements are agents of action, an organized collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against a class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community (Touraine, 1981: 77). Finally, action is seen as the behaviour of an actor guided by cultural orientations and set within social relations defined by an unequal connection with the social control of these orientations (Touraine, 1981: 61). It is possible to assume, then, that a social movement is a cultural actor driven by an unequal system of power relations and its main goal is to reframe that system closer to its ideals.

Touraine explains in detail both his conception of society and social phenomena and how to study it. He calls his method *social intervention*. This method aims to study collective action, approaching the action as directly as possible, constructing interactions with different social partners. It implies that the researcher cannot be a distant observer and rejects any sense of positivist objectivity (Touraine, 1981: 27). Touraine defined four main principles of research practice (Touraine, 1981: 142-45). First, the researcher has to enter into relationship with the social movement itself. Second, it is important to go beyond language and focus on the militant role of the group researched, and

third, the researcher must engage with the group and its opposition. The researcher has to identify the principle of identity and the principle of opposition, and becomes the interlocutor between the militant group and its opposition. Finally, this process of intervention culminates in a process of self-analysis inside the social movement. This is the moment to analyze the social movement's actions, with which the researcher should have become entirely familiar. Evidently, the relationship between the movement and the researcher is close and leads, in the end, to the possibility of episodes of change.

Another interesting methodological approach, and one developed by one of Touraine's students, is Alberto Melucci's (1989; 1996) approach to the study of social movements. As with Touraine's approach, Melucci begins with an explanation of society as a whole. He sees social movements as products of the transition between industrial society and "complex" society or the information age. This emergent society is characterized by the decline of material productivity and its substitution with production organised through social relations and signs (Melucci, 1989: 45). Society becomes paradoxical as it provides all the means for individualization, but becomes the target of a regulation process that looks for uniformity, "control can no longer restrict itself to the external regulation of the production/appropriation of resources; it must also intervene in the internal processes of the formation of attitudes" (Melucci, 1996: 92). This is a key point as these processes find opposition in the form of social movements. For Melucci, social movements are the mobilization of a collective actor defined by specific solidarity, engaged in a conflict with an adversary for the appropriation and control of resources and whose action entails a breach of the limits of compatibility of the system within which the

action takes place (Melucci, 1989: 27-8; Melucci, 1996: 29-30). These conflicts arise in those areas where the control apparatus tries to regulate individual and collective identities until the individuals reclaim their right to be themselves and self-define their subjectivity and field of action. That makes social movements creators of cultural codes. As we can see, the role of social movements as creators and multipliers of cultural trends is not different from Touraine's approach.

From this point, Melucci builds a vision of social movement research using a constructivist standpoint. First, he rejects the idea of social movement reification and proposes a new epistemic version that sees social movements as the result of analysis. The important question is how and why social aggregates arrive at a collective definition of their joint action (Melucci, 1996: 384). Following this statement, Melucci proposes several points for the researcher. First, the researcher should assume that the actors can make sense of themselves without the help of any researcher; second, the researcher should take into account the impact of the researcher's action, in itself, a process to be observed and analyzed; finally, the researcher must assume that his or her intervention will create an artificial environment in the movement (Melucci, 1996: 385). To overcome this, Melucci suggests the idea of a reflective process about the actor-researcher relationship to achieve recognition of the communication processes between the two. Both parts demand cognitive resources: the researcher's interest in gathering information and the actor's interest in increasing its capacity for action (Melucci, 1996: 392). Melucci tries to find a methodology that detects the action system of any given actor and how the different parts come together and are translated into mobilization. The

methodology needs an analysis of the tensions between actors and processes and needs to focus the analysis on the different collective identity processes that occur within any collective actor.

Conclusions

I have given some insight into the different methodological approaches that appear in the different trends for social movement study. For that task I revisited the RMET and the New Social Movement approaches and I discussed the main methodological assumptions inherent to these approaches. The discussion has moved from individualistic and rational approaches to a collective and interpretive approach defended by various *NSM* authors. From these authors I find the contribution made by Alain Touraine (1981) and Alberto Melucci (1988; 1989; 1996) particularly useful. These authors provide a bridge from an interpretive approach to a critical one, which is particularly relevant for the next section, where I explain the approach taken in this research.

Methodological approach to the study of the Basque Peace Movement

In this section, I explain the methodological approach used in my research and the different steps I took to collect the data. At the beginning of this research, the decision to undertake a case study of Basque peace movement organizations was made by following my passions. The Basque conflict has been constantly present in my life and I felt the need to make some contribution to understanding the line I instinctively defend – non-violent action against the conflict. I have been part of marches and gatherings protesting against violence, mainly political violence, and I always felt civil society lacked

recognition. The idea of doing research based on the Basque peace movement organizations come directly from the philosophical question that drives this thesis: *What is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario?*

In devising this research, the initial idea was to describe the conflict resolution proposal that comes from the Basque peace movement organizations. Reality showed that the Basque peace movement organizations have a heterogeneous approach to conflict resolution. *Lokarri* tries to enforce a political settlement, based on peaceful dialogue (see chapter 4) and the purpose of *Gesto por la Paz* is to influence society to promote the principles of rejection of violence and respect for Human Rights. However, both organizations managed to create a paradigm of peace action that permeates Basque society. As basic social theory shows us, social organizations are mostly the symptom of an unmet need growing in any given society (Melucci, 1996: 1). Following this reasoning, how did the Basque peace movement organizations manage to achieve this? That question haunted, and continues to haunt me. The scope of this thesis cannot address such a broad area, and consequently my working objectives are much more modest. I try to understand and describe the mechanisms used by the main Basque peace movement organizations, *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*, to make their message permeate other social organizations related to the conflict. For this purpose, I decided to focus on the framing efforts of the Basque peace movement organizations. The objective of this thesis is to answer the questions presented in the introduction: Is there a Peace Master Frame? How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved?

How has the Basque Peace Frame impacted on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict?

The use of frame theory in the study of the Basque peace movement

In the previous section, I described the different methodological approaches that exist in the two main branches of social movement theory, *RMT* and *NSM* theories. In this section, I describe the approach I chose as most appropriate for this research, in understanding the mechanisms the Basque peace movement organizations use, or processes they pass through, to communicate their messages and ideas to other social organizations. To establish this, I decided to use a frame analytical approach. This approach gives me the analytical tools to identify the way the Basque peace movement organizations perceive the conflict and the solutions they propose. More importantly, defining the Basque Peace Frame provides me with an indicator that helps to understand the impact of the Basque peace movement on society. The main theoretical concepts are present in the theory chapter of this thesis (chapter 2). Here, I present the relevant methodological concepts. The idea of perception is important here. I describe how the Basque peace movement organizations perceive the conflict and I explain how this perception is influencing other social actors. The philosophical question forces us to take a stance and criticize the status quo present in Basque politics. Traditionally, these politics have been characterized for contentious actions reclaiming Basque nationalist rights (Casquette, 2003; Perez-Agote, 2008). The Basque peace movement offers a new way of doing politics: using the public space in a non-contentious way (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b). The epistemological assumptions present in this research are not only the description of the cultural

mechanism present in the social relations of the Basque peace movement organizations studied that enable their conceptualization of social action, but also how those mechanisms vary in space, time and social scenario; and more importantly, how those mechanisms could improve the social and political situation.

Frames are created by cultural perceptions based on personal ideas of reality and mainly, based on the different collective identity processes that the persons of these groups and the groups themselves pass through (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974; Snow & Benford, 2000). During the course of this research I found myself defining a rich and complex ontology where the different groups and individuals interact with each other. These interactions act on the collective identity processes that are the base for the frame described. This stance requires a critical realist position that advocates an in depth vision of the social relations present within the Basque peace movement organizations and between them. With this assertion, I lean towards Melucci's (1996) ideas of situational knowledge and the need for breaking the observer-actor barriers present in other methodological approaches (Melucci, 1996: 396). This is also the main characteristic of what Stones (1996) called a 'past-modern sociology' (Stones, 1996: 82). Frames, on the other hand, are interpretive tools, an artificial idea to codify patterns of behaviour by groups that share cognitive mechanisms (Johnston & Oliver, 2005: 189). These processes are different within an organization and outside it. Within, one has to negotiate between the different discursive ideas whilst to the outside, one has to create a firm message that overcomes other discourses (Rivas, 1998: 207). My

understanding therefore suggests the need for an analysis of interior and exterior processes.

Applying this approach

For the purpose of answering the research questions presented in the introduction, I devised a set of methods and ideas based broadly on the case study approach defended by Lofland (1996) and the participant ethnography approach (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 230). Although with its limitations, the ethnographic approach seemed more plausible for the ontological assumptions of this research. To map the different aspects of perceptions and discourse I used a participatory approach based on participant observation exercises and semi-structured interviews with members of the Basque peace movement organizations and members of other Basque Civil Society Organizations. These methods were helped with audio recordings of meetings, photographic evidence of events and the study of documents produced by the organizations or based on them. For the technical data please refer to appendix 1.

The approach to fieldwork presented a number of problems derived from the nature of the research. The main issues are presented by Robert Burgess (1984) as location, time, events and people (Burgess, 1984: 52). The research took me all over the Basque Country, so I based myself in the western part of Bizkaia. The reason for that was the relatively easy connection to other parts of the Basque Country. The time period of the fieldwork (interviews) was from May 2007 to February 2008. Finally, I decided to focus on the events hosted by the Basque peace movement organizations trying to find examples of collaboration between them and other Basque Civil Society Organizations. When I arrived to the Basque Country, peace activity was frenetic. The ETA bombing of Madrid

airport in December 2006 created a high level of peace activity trying to overcome distrust and maintain the process of the former negotiations in place during the ceasefire. However, the Basque peace movement organizations *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*, being two similar organizations, they are prone to maintain fierce differences that prevent them from working together, despite the fact that most of their members know each other and maintain good personal relations. At the beginning of fieldwork I was puzzled by this fact. This pointed me towards the idea that being a participant was the most advisable approach, enabling me to see the nature of the relationship between *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* first hand. For this I chose an ethnographic approach, becoming a member of a peace organization, in this case, *Lokarri*. The second ethnographic approach was the study of the influence of the Basque peace movement organizations on other Basque Civil Society Organizations. I tried to maintain as diverse and equitable approach as possible towards other Basque Civil Society Organizations. However, as the research advanced, I found that some organizations were very difficult to access, but working closely with particular individuals in these organizations solved that problem.

My personal background helped me a great deal to obtain information from the Basque peace movement organizations. I had knowledge of the area, the language and personal friendships with some members of the Basque peace movement organizations. These factors were invaluable during my research, but also created challenges for me. These issues, noted by Hammersley and Atkinson (2009), appeared during all the phases of fieldwork. I address these issues under the following subtitles: Methods, Access, Ethics, Risk and Subjectivity.

Methods

The main data collection methods involved in this research are interviews, direct observation, focus groups and content analysis.

Semi structured interviews

The in depth interview is a professional interview with the aim of obtaining information about the life of, a concrete process, or theme about a person. Through this data collection method it is possible to know what is important or significant for the interviewee, trying to understand how he or she sees, classifies or understands the world or the process the researcher wants to study. In the words of Olabuenaga and Ispizua (1989), the interviews are 'reiterative encounters, face to face, between the interviewer and the informants, aimed towards the understanding of the informants' perspectives about their lives, experiences and situations, where the researcher is not only a mere data collecting machine, but the main tool of the research, besides protocols or interview guides' (Olabuenaga & Ispizua, 1989: 126).

In this research, the main interview type was the *focused interview*. It was focused on the sense of belonging and the perceptions of the interviewee about his or her position in the organization and the organization's position in the social environment; how they see, feel, and interpret the actions of the particular organization.

Interviews are a very good data collection method when anonymity is crucial. It is easier for the interviewee to talk about sensitive matters during a confidential conversation. An interview allows the researcher to obtain very rich information about a particular issue and is a great tool for explorative research. Furthermore, the role of the interviewer is very important as they control the

interview and the informant. The behaviour of the interviewer determines what is important and what is not important. Finally, the influence of the interviewer can affect the validity of the results, as the way the interviewer participates in the interview directly affects the theme that is being analyzed.

For this research 18 interviews were conducted that have a duration from 45 minutes, which was the shortest, to 4 hours, the longest¹⁷. In the process I found myself dealing with the matter of subjectivity, how my role as a researcher, friend, male or Basque influenced the responses. I explain this issue later in more detail during the subjectivity section.

Direct observation

The direct observation method consists of observing in a controlled, systematic way the behaviour of a certain group of people, without any kind of manipulation. This method is not based on the perspectives of individuals, but on their behaviour. The observation was made in a natural environment, without any control over it or the stimulus the observed received. This method is very useful in studying the actions of social movements and their decision-making processes. The kinds of direct observation used in this research were participant observation and controlled observation. The first refers to the method where the observer participates in the daily lives of a certain group of people, during a relatively extended period of time, looking at what is happening, listening or asking questions. The second refers to the observation of concrete actions as an outsider.

¹⁷ For the interview technical data, questionnaire and informed consent protocol, see appendices 1 to 3.

In the case of this research, the observation was applied mainly to assemblies, marches or the decision making process within the Basque peace movement organizations, the aim being to uncover what is happening in the middle of a group, and trying to connect the actions of this group to the effects on other groups.

Content analysis

Content analysis is a method that analyzes social reality through the observation of documents that are created in these social realities. It is a method that combines observation and the analysis of documentation.

Content analysis is a useful method of understanding the intentions of the Basque peace movement organizations. Both *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* produce plenty of documentary resources, mainly press releases and campaign documents. These resources reflect the attitude of the Basque peace movement organizations in determined periods of time, as well as the answers to other inputs from other social actors. More importantly, these resources form the main discourse of the Basque peace movement organizations.

The main sources of documents were the organizations' websites. There they published most of the press releases and documents describing new initiatives. The case of *Lokarri* was particularly important because the organization gave lots of importance to the role of its website (Anton, 2009). The website was not only a source of documents, but also a forum of discussion between members. Apart from that, both *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* publish a hardcopy magazine, *Haritu* in the case of *Lokarri* and *Bake Hitzak* in the case of *Gesto por la Paz*. I had access to both magazines and the information in them was included in the fieldwork data.

Access

Access was one of the trickiest issues regarding my fieldwork. The fact that I had personal knowledge and previous contacts with members of the Basque peace movement organizations helped me to gain access to information, but in some ways prevented me from perceiving other important dimensions (see subjectivity section). The negotiation procedure described by Hammersley and Atkinson (2009: 40) was easier for me. Through various contacts and after deliberating the different options, I opted to negotiate access with a series of gatekeepers in both *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*. In the case of *Lokarri*, this was the main director and in the case of *Gesto por la Paz*, this was one member of the coordination commission, the governing body (see chapter 4). This process was different in the rest of the Basque Civil Society Organizations I researched. With them I adopted an *ad hoc* procedure depending on the closeness, personal contacts and sense of opportunity.

The gatekeeper method was chosen using personal knowledge of the Basque peace movement organizations. Basque culture and associations rely on a series of social rituals that entail recognition by the group into which you would like to be accepted. Basque social life is very intense with an underdeveloped tradition of public display, so in these organizations the sense of membership was something private that needed formal permission (Perez-Agote, 2008: 132). Trying to maintain extensive contact with members of the Basque peace movement organizations without the permission of the directing bodies would have been counter productive, perhaps causing more problems in terms of access to documentation and internal meetings. The gatekeeper approach was successful as I received extensive help from the Basque peace

movement organizations. I had to participate in a formal meeting with each gatekeeper. They used these meetings to assess my honesty and line of approach. I presented a copy of my research project and tried to answer as many questions as possible in a straightforward way. In the words of the *Gesto por la Paz* gatekeeper “I see that you are honest and know what is going on here. It will not be any problem to help you” (Fn. 10/04/2007). Here it is possible to see one of the nuances I encountered during my fieldwork. My condition as a Basque smoothed the way into the Basque peace movement organizations. The gatekeepers gave me the details of several people inside the organizations that could be interviewed. I tried to find out if the gatekeepers (as members of the organizations’ directing bodies) tried to discover the outcomes of the interviews, but there was no evidence of this happening. More importantly, the contacts they provided proved to be helpful as they provided me with new contacts or pointed me towards issues that otherwise I would have found difficult to discover. For example, the *Lokarri* interviewee 11, pointed me to the nuances of leadership inside *Lokarri* (see chapter 7).

With the data provided, I contacted the possible interviewees. I proceeded as follows: I tried to arrange a prior interview meeting where I gave them a copy of the research project, explained the nature of the interview and explained all the issues around the research. I explained then their status as interviewees and I made myself open to questions. It was explained that they had the right to withdraw from the research at any moment, with no reason required. If that meeting was successful, we arranged another date to make the interview. We tried to arrange a quiet and private place to do it. The outcome of this process was successful, with no person withdrawing from the process. This

process helped me to build a “reputation” of honesty inside the peace organizations. Subsequently, access to internal documents or publications was easy and it gave me several ways to access different types of meetings.

The approach to meetings was a bit different. Before undertaking this research I had attended some of them, so I was not a stranger. That worked in two ways. In one, I was seen as “one of them”, in the other they assumed some of my positions on several key issues. This is one of the issues that I describe in the subjectivity section.

The rest of the Basque Civil Society Organizations were approached in a slightly different manner. Organizations with strong institutional support, like the *EGK* or *Gernika Gogoratuz*, only required an appointment and a preliminary meeting. In the case of the *EGK* I discovered that the contact person was a former university colleague. Other kinds of organizations were more problematic. Victims of terrorism organizations were very suspicious of any research intention. Some of them, like *Covite* (Basque Victims of Terrorism Organization), gave me a late response apologizing for the inconvenience, but rejecting their participation in the research. Others, like the *Foro de Ermua*, a political pressure organization created in 1998, did not respond at all to calls, emails or fax. The only organization that defended victims of terrorism that accepted my offer to participate in the research was *Basta Ya*. The fact that the contact person was a philosophy professor who was sympathetic to the research nuances made the approach easier. It is important to note that I got limited access to the victims of terrorism organizations’ information and permission for interviews; the general response towards this research was not encouraging. The main factor for the problems I experienced here is the

ideological component of these organizations. The members are people that have been through processes of persecution with little institutional or public support. Moreover, they see the academic world more as a problem than a solution, as the researchers are not eager to take positions of absolute rights of absolute wrongs.

A similar problem appeared when I tried to approach organizations that were ideologically close to ETA. One of the organizations missing in this research is *Askatasuna*. This organization advocates the liberation of all ETA prisoners as they consider them political prisoners. *Askatasuna* is one of the radical organizations in the *nationalist left* political spectrum. Several contact attempts were made, but the organization was declared illegal before the fieldwork commenced. Members of sympathetic groups, like the *TAT* or *Etixerat*, tried to help me to make contact, but, as one member of the *TAT* told me “It is going to be very difficult, with the illegalization and things like that... they were in their own world before, but now... It is going to be very, very difficult” (Fn. 02/07/2007). Regarding the organizations contacted successfully, *TAT* was contacted directly as they have a public profile. *Etixerat* was more difficult. They never responded to emails or phone calls, so I tried to contact them directly when they were protesting as they were in a lock-down. As one of the members told me, “seeing my face” made it much easier to help me out (Fn. 23/12/2007). Again, the problem here was these organizations were largely closed to the outside world, even with the organizations close to them. My position as Basque with a discourse not very opposed to their ideals smoothed the way as I stated before. Close relationships are very important in the Basque social world and

seeing a face is much more helpful than hours of phone calls or hundreds of emails.

These problems with access prevented me from collecting data from the Basque Civil Society Organizations that are less sympathetic with the Basque peace movement. This could mean the absence in my research of a significant part of the Basque Civil Society Organizations. However, I had the opportunity to interview people from similar organizations. These interviews (*Basta Ya* in the case of victims of terrorism, and *TAT* and *Etixerat* in the case of the *nationalist left*) provided me with the insight needed. The fact that the Basque Peace Frame is present in these organizations, as explained in chapter 8, gives me the grounds to assert that the Basque Peace Frame is a master frame. I cannot say that the Basque Peace Frame permeates all the Basque Civil Society Organizations, but it is present in most of the social ideological spectrum.

Ethics

In this section, I describe the ethical issues that appeared during the fieldwork period, and how I dealt with them. Since the beginning of the fieldwork period there were three issues that appeared as the main ethical questions I had to deal with. They were informed consent and truth telling, privacy, and anonymity.

Informed consent and truth telling

Informed consent means that those researched have the right to know about why the research is being done, how, the status of that research, and, after the information is collected, to have the opportunity to comment on it.

Some authors believe that this is not good for the overall balance of the research (Reynolds, 1979: 95), however I believe this instilled confidence and openness in my interviewees. During the fieldwork period it was apparent for the members of the organizations researched that I was researching them. There was a clear distinction of roles between the researcher and the researched (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 10). Some of them did not understand my position clearly in informal situations, which I explore in the section about subjectivity. During my participant observation sessions, I found that the most important moments to gain an idea of the social relations inside an organization were the ones after the formal meeting. Having a beer with the group provided me with more data than the meetings themselves. The fact that most of the organizations' members drew a line that differentiated between the activist and the person made them believe that I did the same. This particular point arose during one of the last *Lokarri* meetings that I attended before finishing the fieldwork. After the meeting we went for a drink in a bar near the organization's offices. In this bar we found members of *Gesto por la Paz*¹⁸. During a relaxed conversation I suggested the idea of both organizations doing something together. This idea was received humorously and dismissed. I raised some questions about that issue and the responses were negative, but relaxed. The problem there was that I was not perceived as a researcher, but as "one of the team" (Fn. 10/09/2007).

During the interviews, the interviewee was presented with a form (see appendix 3) that described the role of the interviewee and the nature of the

¹⁸ This represents the most visible feature of the significance of identity in Basque society. *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* have their offices in the same building, on different floors. Despite this, they still have great problems in terms of working together.

interview. During that process it was clear that my role was as a researcher and no doubts appeared. The existence of the signed agreement gave the interviewees reassurance that they, in an extreme situation, could use that paper as a legal tool (Sieber, 1992: 33). Another problem that appeared was the groups being researched demanding information from me about the research, and specifically my sources of funding (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 87), (Robson, 2002: 74). This issue appeared strongly at the beginning, but disappeared as the fieldwork went on. The fact that I had a Basque Government scholarship did not make any difference in dealing with the organizations. All these issues were directly connected to one issue that was key to dealing with a Basque social organization: truth-telling. I would like to make a distinction between truth-telling and omission, although some authors put it in the same box (Burgess, 1984: 201). During my fieldwork I was questioned several times about my political beliefs and cultural position. In the preliminary meetings I avoided the questions, but finally I decided to be as honest as possible. This strategy gave me good results. Without being confrontational, honesty drew me closer to people, even in difficult situations. For example, confronted with a question about my opinion of the political status of a relative of a member of *Etxerat*, I answered that the status as a prisoner was not political (he was in jail for committing a crime), but the conditions he was suffering were political (see section devoted for *Etxerat*, chapters 5 and 8). This drew me closer to that person and gave me access to invaluable information that I would not have otherwise have had (Fn. 05/02/2008). Again, this was due to my knowledge of Basque culture, where expressing honesty is a valued trait in a person.

Privacy

As in any research conducted in areas of conflict, privacy was a major issue in this research. Within the privacy dimension, one of the most important aspects is the sensitivity of information (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 87). In Basque society, privacy is an important thing and disseminating facts disclosed privately is a serious matter. This issue connects directly with the issue of dissemination of information (Burgess, 1984: 203; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 212). This issue was tackled in the form presented to the interviewees. In the form, it was stated that the data collected would only be used for this research and in academic articles. Regarding other sources of data, I tried to maintain verbal agreements with members of the different organizations. The participants in this research were the owners of the data collected, and the idea of ownership appeared during the fieldwork period (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 213). That gave rise to the question of devolution of the results. Some of the participants, mainly the directing bodies of the two Basque peace movement organizations, stressed the idea of devolution of knowledge. It was agreed that a report relating the main findings of this research was to be sent and presented to the organizations for feedback. However, beyond the idea of devolution, the main aspect of privacy, and the most important for the participants, was the assurance of anonymity and the degrees of confidentiality.

Anonymity and confidentiality

During the fieldwork period, these two issues were very important. First of all, privacy arose as a deal breaker. In several conversations, not agreeing to these conditions of anonymity and confidentiality with the participants could

jeopardise the entire research (Sieber, 1992: 53). The breaching of anonymity or confidentiality could seriously endanger the researcher and the participants (Jamieson, 2000: 64; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 214). In this issue, the storage of information is vital. One method is to have several data archives (Robson, 2002: 360) with encrypted security. Another method is to make summaries, split from the main data, or to hold the data, but omit important categories, like names, places, and telephone numbers (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 90). The approach that I chose was to keep the data about the interviews in different files. I stored the audio recordings with the interviewer responses separately from the transcriptions, and omitted the names and personal data and only identifying the interviewees with an interview number and a few facts: gender, education level, age, and day of interview. In my field notes, no mention of names or physical appearances was made, with the idea of preserving the identity of the participants. However, particular individuals are easier to recognize on recordings. The directing body of the organization that hosted the meeting is an example. In most of the cases, that issue was raised in a private conversation and the people affected assumed that was the case. After all, they were prominent public figures. In other cases the persons affected stressed the importance of maintaining the identifying data at a minimum, but recognized the fact that in the final thesis that would be very difficult to achieve. During fieldwork, the building of trust and confidence were very important. One of the most difficult moments was the attempt of some members of *Gesto por la Paz* to find out the identity of some of the interviewees. I decided not to disclose any details. The episode happened in a relaxed environment and with no harm intended, but, as some of the interviewees pointed out to me after that, it could

have meant that some of them would withdraw from the research, hampering the outcome significantly (Fn. 14/07/2007).

Field relations or subjectivity

Finally, I would like to describe what Hammersley and Atkinson call “Field Relations” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 63) and I call subjectivity. As it is noted during the whole text, the cultural, physical and personal impacts were extremely important for the outcomes of my fieldwork period. It gave me advantages and problems. My position when I arrived was as a Basque male with higher education that had personal contacts inside the participant organizations. That gave me preferential insight into the nuances of the research. The perceptions I had from the participants were mostly positive. In most cases the interviewees and I shared common acquaintances that helped the relationship, and in most of the cases, the participants tried to find connections outside the research between themselves and myself. For example, the interviewee from the *EGK* decided to be part of the research after knowing that I attended some modules during my university degree that he had also attended (Fn. 21/05/2007). In one case, the interviewee was from my hometown, ‘So, you’re the grandson of X. Of course I know your family!’ (Fn. 14/07/2007). In other cases, a cultural connection was sufficient. The identification of my accent as Basque relaxed the atmosphere on more than one occasion. One fact that I encountered was the natural distrust of the participants to divulge their stories if you were not identified as Basque. For example, regarding a report written by two US authors about the conflict a year before my fieldwork period, some members of *Lokarri* dismissed it, using the fact that they were unable to understand the complexities of the conflict. They

assumed that I did. These perceptions about me brought several advantages. I was not looked upon with the typical mistrust that foreign researchers have to deal with and I had better access to information, but it brought me some disadvantages as well. The most important were the assumptions that the participants made about me. They assumed I already knew some of the answers because they thought I had the same ideas as them. During one interview with a member of *Lokarri*, I found myself hearing the answer 'you know' (Fn. 14/06/2007). To solve that issue I tried to engage in a controversial topic, which helped in most of the cases. In other cases, I tried to be honest and I told some of the participants that I did not know or simply not to assume that I had the same ideas as them. This is a dimension full of nuances that is explored more fully in the data analysis (see chapters 7 and 8).

CHAPTER 4 - THE NATURE OF THE BASQUE PEACE MOVEMENT

Which are the organizations that form the Basque peace movement? How many of them exist? How do they work? In this chapter I shed some light on these questions. First I describe the two main Basque peace movement organizations that are central in this research. These are *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. *Gesto por la Paz* was created in 1986 to answer the growing unrest in Basque society about the political responses to the conflict. In that period where democracy was consolidated in Spain the conflict trends were quite similar to those that dominated during the Franco dictatorship. The *nationalist left* parties and organizations that were relying on what is called the spiral of silence fiercely defended the image of the armed struggle (Funes, 1998a: 55). The change of the Political Opportunity Structure in the early 1980s alongside the consolidation of a nationalist political option in power created the conditions for the appearance of a peace movement. That does not imply that the peace ideas were not there before, rather that they were a submerged network (Melucci, 1989: 60) with limited access to the public protest space. This limitation disappeared with the arrival of democracy. The peace submerged network rejected the role of violence to achieve political outcomes that have been intrinsically associated during the Dictatorship years (Perez-Agote, 2008: 140). This process is revisited when the Basque Peace Frame is explained in chapter 6. The moment and political atmosphere at the arrival of democracy created the perfect combination for peace values to emerge. As is described later in this chapter, the use of the public space by *Gesto por la Paz* was a huge

success that allowed other forms of social protest to flourish. A direct consequence of that was the creation of *Elkarri*, a peace organization that in 2006 became known as *Lokarri*. *Elkarri* was created from a network developed to respond to local environmental issues. The solidarity involved in that network combined with a moment when the democratic values were consolidated and the Basque peace movement, directed by *Gesto por la Paz*, was at its peak, to evolve a new way of breaking the spiral of silence. *Elkarri* brought a new dimension to peace mobilization, giving not only a response against violence but proposing a specific political conflict resolution scenario based on the idea of dialogue between parties. Since the beginning, the two organizations had a bumpy relationship. The idea of proposing political scenarios was against the *Gesto por la Paz* ethos and for *Elkarri*, *Gesto por la Paz* lacked a purpose. However, the two organizations tried to reach common ground, acknowledging their similar purpose. Soon, it became clear that each organization would be in charge of one aspect of the social movement, with *Gesto por la Paz* dominating the social protest and *Elkarri* adopting a more pressure group type behaviour. This “division of labour” helps to explain the success of the Basque Peace Frame as the Basque peace movement organizations devoted resources to promote their particular issues. The evolution of the Basque peace movement organizations was affected as well, in particular, the collective identity processes. These collective identity processes are the outcome of these two specialisations. This fact is explained in chapters 6 and 7.

Gesto por la Paz. Basque Country Peace Groups Coordinator¹⁹

Gesto por la Paz is the Basque example of a more ‘traditional’ peace organization. As I explain later, *Lokarri* is an organization with a more ‘institutional’ approach, resembling more a pressure group than a social organization (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 85). Along with *Lokarri*, *Gesto por la Paz* is one of the most important Basque peace movement organizations, with a rich and long history and several outstanding contributions for peace mobilizations.

History

Gesto por la Paz was created in 1986 as a coordinator of several local peace groups in the Basque Country. These groups started to unite as a result of killings associated with the political violence. *Gesto por la Paz*’s primary intention is to protest against the political violence and to motivate the Basque society to mobilize against that violence (Funes, 1998a: 39). *Gesto por la Paz* also promotes the idea that Basque Society has to do something about the political violence. Yes, the society is the main sufferer, but it is also the supporter of the political violence and the creator of a solution (Funes, 1998b: 496). The creation of *Gesto por la Paz* was a breakthrough in the history of political mobilization in the Basque Country. The Basque Country is a place where mobilization in pursuit of political objectives is accepted by society. However, mainly, these mobilizations were of a contentious nature, that is, large marches with aggressive mottos and a display of symbols that recall a violent struggle. More importantly, these demonstrations were monopolized by the

¹⁹ The full name in Spanish and Basque is *Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria/ Euskal Herriko Bakearen Aldeko Koordinakundea*.

nationalist left sectors of Basque society, leading, in most cases, to episodes of urban violence (Casquette, 2005: 108). *Gesto por la Paz* brought a new way of mobilization, the silent mobilization. The main driving force behind the local peace groups is the *Gesto*, the Gesture, a 15 minute silent stand to protest against every killing the day after it happens. This evoked an incredible response, mainly based in youth parochial groups, but it immediately garnered wider support in Basque society. This new way of mobilization took over the public space from the violent marches and was a point of inflexion in the history of social mobilization in the Basque Country (Tejerina, 2001: 53). The *Gesto* is well explained by *Gesto por la Paz*:

‘The silence is the pacifist way of expression, and the way of our organization. Silence is not passive, nor compliant with violence. It can mean only the defence of democratic values²⁰’.

The *Gestos* became part of the landscape in the Basque Country, most of the time with the help of the mass media (Funes, 1998a: 41). The *Gesto* is very important in understanding the impact of *Gesto por la Paz* in Basque society. It is further explained later in this chapter.

The history of *Gesto por la Paz* is one of highs and lows. Starting from the local groups, its social support grew gradually. The most important event in its growth was the signature of the *Pacto de Ajuria Enea* (The Ajuria Enea Pact) by most of the Basque political parties, without the *nationalist left* parties. The agreement, signed in 1988, relied on the confidence in the elected political institutions; the support for the recently signed *Estatuto de Gernika* (Statute of Gernika, a charter of competences of the autonomous community of the

²⁰ *Gesto por la Paz* rules for mobilization: <http://www.gesto.org/movilizacion.htm> (24/11/2009)

Basque Country²¹), and; the total rejection of political violence²². Under this agreement, *Gesto por la Paz* enjoyed support from the Basque political institutions and some of the most prominent Basque politicians took part in some *Gestos*. It was in this period when the protest against kidnappings²³ in the late 1990s took place, and this is when *Gesto por la Paz* reached its peak. The period of the kidnappings was critical for the organization. The *Gesto* was an impressive way to demonstrate the rejection of those acts. The symbolic power of the *Gesto* gave a sense of support, and support was what Basque society lacked to protest against violence (Funes, 1998a: 39). It was also the moment of the creation of the *Lazo Azul* or Blue Ribbon in one *Gesto por la Paz* workshop. It is not, in fact, a ribbon; it is a piece of blue cloth making the shape of an “A”, meaning *Askatasuna* or Freedom. The *Lazo Azul* was a symbol for demanding the freedom of the people kidnapped. After the first kidnapping, *Gesto por la Paz* suffered a counter attack from the social sectors of the *nationalist left*. They argued that for every *Gesto*, there would be one demonstration asking for the liberation of ETA prisoners in the same place and at the same time of the *Gestos* (Funes, 1998a: 141). In some places, everything went peacefully, while others experienced violence. In most places, the police had to form a line between both demonstrations. Finally, in 1997, after giving a deadline, ETA kidnapped and killed a local politician of the Popular Party called

²¹ Quick note about Spanish legislation: the central law is the Spanish Constitution, from which the entire law body emerges, below it is the different Statutes or charters of competences of the different autonomous communities.

²² The document can be consulted in <http://www.filosofia.org/his/h1988ae.htm> (24/11/2009)

²³ The kidnappings was a tactic used by ETA to raise money. The usual tactic was to kidnap a prominent member of the Basque bourgeoisie and ask for a huge ransom. Between 1993 and 1996 Julio Iglesias Zamora, Jose Maria Aldaya and Cosme Delclaux were kidnapped. The big change came when, in 1996, a prison civil servant, Jose Antonio Ortega Lara was kidnapped. He was not a prominent business man and ETA made no claims of ransom. It was the longest kidnapping in the history of ETA.

Miguel Angel Blanco, of the Spanish right wing party. The social response was overwhelming. The Popular Party used the situation to take over the social response and became the major protagonist, pushing aside *Gesto por la Paz*. Since then, *Gesto por la Paz* has lost some prominence to political parties (Funes, 1998a: 188). In 2000, the *Pacto por las libertades y contra el terrorismo* (Pact for liberties and against terrorism) was signed in Madrid, supporting the police actions and giving no recognition to the national claims in the Basque Country. New social organizations supporting this position were created, like *Foro de Ermua* (Forum of Ermua) and *Basta Ya* (Enough), mostly by people who had belonged to *Gesto por la Paz* in the past. *Basta Ya* is described in the following chapter as it is one of the organizations that represents the social position that rejects any Basque nationalist claim and defends the victims of terrorism rights.

Since that moment, *Gesto por la Paz*, without abandoning the *Gestos*, focused on other initiatives. These are the recognition of victims of violence, the creation of spaces for peace education, the rejection of every kind of violence (not only violence attributed to ETA), the situation of the prisoners convicted for terrorism crimes, calling for mutual understanding between political parties, and supporting of the idea of separation of conflicts. The ceasefire declared by ETA during 2006 created a moment of reflection for *Gesto por la Paz*. One side of the organization advocated for the dissolution of *Gesto por la Paz* if ETA rejected violence (Anton, 2007: 64). Finally, this did not happen, making the organization refocus on their main goals. This process is addressed in chapter 7.

After the ceasefire, *Gesto por la Paz* started to focus on its traditional ethos, trying to mobilize people and change people's perceptions around some particular issues of the conflict. Its latest initiative is to stress the importance of delegitimizing violence²⁴.

Still, *Gesto por la Paz* maintains an important presence in Basque social life. Once a year, the organization calls for a march for peace in January, celebrating the international day for non-violence. This march is widely supported and has a great mobilization capacity.

Nature of Gesto por la Paz

Since the beginning, *Gesto por la Paz* has defined itself as a pacifist organization with direct reference to the ideals and philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi²⁵. *Gesto por la Paz* was created around particular characteristics stressing its popular and plural nature and its pacifist ethos. The organization also stresses the importance of advocating for global peace, but its focus is on the political violence originated in the Basque Country²⁶. This makes *Gesto por la Paz* a peace organization that focuses on one specific conflict (Carter, 1992: 15; Overy, 1982: 2), and is different from other kinds of peace movements, for example peace movements that seek demilitarisation, that are very strong in the Basque Country (Ajangiz, 2002; Barcena et al., 1998; Gordillo, 2007).

Gesto por la Paz is a direct product of the identity creation processes that were in place during the Franco dictatorship. During that time, the political

²⁴ They published a document about it: <http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/DESLEGITIMACION%2008-06-17%20def.pdf> (24/11/2009). See *Bake Hitzak* magazine, 61 and 70.

²⁵ Definition of *Gesto por la Paz*: <http://www.gesto.org/definicion.htm> (24/11/2009)

²⁶ *Gesto por la Paz* declaration of principles: <http://www.gesto.org/principios.htm> (24/11/2009)

identities against the regime's centralist vision had to rely on private means of propagation. The reproduction of the nationalist identity became a contentious issue that was associated with the use of violence as a political tool. The peace identity was a rejection of that, but during the Dictatorship, it did not have access to the public space. Family and friends became central. Social meetings and casual association were the main means through which those political identities grew, resulting in the creation of highly active and solid social bonds. This was termed the 'collective clandestine' (Perez-Agote, 2008: 103). That mechanism helped in the creation of ETA, for example. The nationalist identity created during the Dictatorship was challenged during the transition to democracy, especially the perception of the use of violence to achieve political means. Two main trends appeared, one legitimizing the new political scenario, which rejected violence; and the other delegitimizing it, and accepting violent action. The trend rejecting violence provided the main source of *Gesto por la Paz* members (Funes, 1998a: 38). Two groups played a central role in the creation of *Gesto por la Paz*: followers of *Euskadiko Ezkerra*²⁷ and groups of young catholic people.

Gesto por la Paz developed an pacifist identity. Most of its membership comes from cooperation and volunteering environments, highly committed to different charitable initiatives and with high political involvement. Within the organization, there is a strong sense of belonging. This sense of belonging is strengthened by the participation in different rituals, like the *Gesto*, or the

²⁷ *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (*EE* 'Basque Left' in Basque) was a political party created from a ETA split in the late 70s. In that moment ETA found itself with the dilemma of whether to keep using violence or not. The people that decided to use legal methods of action formed *EE*. Later on they fusioned *EE* with the Basque Socialist Party (Basque branch of the Socialist Workers Spanish Party or PSOE, now governing Spain) to form the Partido Socialista de Euskadi – *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (*PSE-EE* 'Basque Socialist Party – Basque Left').

wearing of the *Lazo Azul* (Blue Ribbon). The importance of the *Gesto* became paramount at the end of the 1990s when the *Gestos* were contested with expressions of aggression from supporters of the *nationalist left*, and the love-hate relationship was as high. A clear division between 'them' and 'us' was drawn (Melucci, 1996: 83). In this respect, it is pertinent to say that the three mechanisms described by Blumer (1957) apply in that division. First, the formation of an adversary or a 'them' is described fully; second, the idea of comradeship is built on the idea of endurance and penitence. I use the word penitence consciously, having said that the catholic organizations had a substantial role in the formation of the local peace groups and creation of *Gesto por la Paz*. Finally, the particularity of the performance, the ownership of the *Gesto*, and the *Lazo Azul* is key in understanding that nature of *Gesto por la Paz* (Blumer, 1957: 206-208; Casquette, 2006: 43-44).

This mix of people gave the organization its main ideals and explains the broad array of issues that it addresses. From their basic points of right to life and rejection of all kinds of violence, they engaged in other important issues, like the problem that exists following the policy of isolation of the *nationalist left* and their concern around the different denouncements of torture every year. However, the main point of creating the identity and image of *Gesto por la Paz* comes from the particular use of symbolic communication, particularly the creation of the *Gesto*. I describe more fully the *Gesto* and other initiatives later in this chapter.

Organizational model

The backbone of *Gesto por la Paz* is the unity of its diverse groups. Currently, there are more than 85 groups in the Basque Country coordinated by

Gesto por la Paz. One important thing to say before going on, is that these groups are not the only local peace groups operating in the Basque Country. Other groups exist that did not decide to be coordinated by *Gesto por la Paz*. These other groups are local independent groups or groups that were organized under other peace organizations like *Bakea Orain* or *Denon Artean*²⁸.

Gesto por la Paz groups are based locally in towns or villages and in the neighbourhoods of the big cities. They are groups of volunteers who perform the most important act of *Gesto por la Paz*, the *Gesto*. These groups are defined by the organization as 'concerned and sensitized people'²⁹, who, after participating in the *Gestos*, identified with and came to support *Gesto por la Paz*'s work. The local groups are important because they created *Gesto por la Paz* a local groups coordinating organization. They control and lead activities in their immediate area, and coordinate with other groups between the different bodies that form the organization. These bodies are:

- The Ordinary General Assembly: It meets once a year. At the meetings, the work of the groups is evaluated and the roles of the Coordinator and the working commissions are discussed. It is where new proposals are presented and the new guidelines are decided. This is the most important decision-making body of *Gesto por la Paz*.
- The Coordinator³⁰: *Gesto por la Paz* meets at different levels. The Coordinator (a body that coordinates activities within the organization)

²⁸ *Bakea Orain* was an organization that split from *Gesto por la Paz* due political differences with the main principles of the organization. They were active during the 1990s, but disappeared finally in 1998. *Denon Artean*, on the other hand, is a group that works directly with victims of terrorism in San Sebastian. At the beginning, they worked closely with *Gesto por la Paz*, but now the organization is involved in the Basque victims of terrorism association, *Covite*.

²⁹ *Gesto por la Paz* organizational model: <http://www.gesto.org/organigrama.htm> (24/11/2009)

³⁰ In Spanish: *La Coordinadora*.

meetings are frequent meetings to discuss organizational issues. Members of the Permanent Commission usually attend these meetings. The main difference between the Coordinator meetings and the General Assembly is that the Coordinator offers support and quick decisions about the ongoing initiatives. The Coordinator also works as a meeting point between initiatives designed to be carried out by *Gesto por la Paz* in general, or by the local groups.

- The Permanent Commission: This is the executive body of the organization. It consists of twelve members of the organization who are elected annually by the General Assembly. The Permanent Commission is in charge of applying all the decisions taken in the General Assembly or the Coordinator. This means closely following the implementation of the initiatives that are ongoing. The Permanent Commission is the public relations body, in charge of the message to the media, to the public, and to the local groups. The twelve members of the Permanent Commission are volunteers and, usually, are the public face of *Gesto por la Paz*³¹.
- Debate Forums: These are ad hoc forums to debate particular issues in the organization. These are the channels that *Gesto por la Paz* members have to express their opinions around different issues. The Debate Forums have been created around numerous issues like Human Rights, Concept of Pacifism, Peace Education, and Political Pluralism, just to give some examples.

³¹ All members of *Gesto por la Paz* are unpaid volunteers, except for one paid administrator.

- Work Commissions: The Work Commissions are the practical field where the different initiatives are defined and implemented. Two kinds of Work Commission exist, temporary and permanent.
 1. *Temporary*: This deals with one temporary issue. The most important of the temporary Work Commissions is the one created and dissolved around the 30th of January every year to organize the annual march for peace. The temporary Work Commissions were very important between 1995 and 1997 to deal with the intensive work in demanding freedom for the victims of kidnappings. Other important temporary Work Commissions are the ones created to coordinate different activities in universities and other educational centres.
 2. *Permanent*: There are currently six different permanent Work Commissions; some more relevant than others:
 - a. Solidarity with victims of violence. It deals with the recognition and solidarity with victims of terrorism and therefore designs and creates the different initiatives devoted to that goal. Currently, this is the most important Work Commission.
 - b. Commission against violence of persecution. Gives recognition to the victims of political extortion and harassment.
 - c. Human Rights and prisoners. This commission deals with issues related to beatings, torture, assassinations and

everything that undermines the right to life and moral integrity.

- d. Peace Education. This commission deals with the Peace Education plan. This plan is based on two main pillars: the search for a positive peace and the creative perspective of conflict. The objectives are to create pedagogic material and to spread these ideas to the public.
- e. Relations with other organizations. It decides the different strategies to communicate with like-minded groups. The main goal is to share ideas and engage in constructive debate.
- f. *Bake Hitzak* (Peace Words). This Commission deals with everything related to the creation and publication of *Bake Hitzak*, the organization's magazine.

Finally, it is worth dedicating some space to explain how *Gesto por la Paz* is funded. *Gesto por la Paz* secures funding from four main sources: public funding, awards, funding campaigns, and donors. The main source of funding is the public funding that accounts for almost 50% of the organization's funding³². Donors provide almost the 25%, with the rest coming from awards and campaigns. Only when the funding situation is critical does the organization initiate funding campaigns, like a lottery. In recent years, due to the political situation and the ever-decreasing support from public institutions, the funding

³² *Gesto por la Paz* finances and budgeting: <http://www.gesto.org/financiacion.htm> (24/11/2009)

has been diminishing, which has led to a significant reduction in the action of the organization and some structural changes³³.

Repertoire of action

Symbolic communication is a key factor in understanding the social action in the Basque Country (Funes, 1998a: 39). As I show in this section, the use of symbols is one of the most successful points in *Gesto por la Paz*'s history. The highly valued use of symbols in the Basque society and the coming of democracy made symbols very important in understanding the peace mobilization there (Benedicto & Moran, 1995: 261). The communication adopted by *Gesto por la Paz* is very expressive and highly emotional. Within this idea of communication and action are two initiatives that are very important for their great success and their enormous impact on peace mobilization in the Basque Country. Without these two initiatives, it is impossible to understand peace mobilization there. These are the *Gesto* (Gesture) and the *Lazo Azul* (Blue Ribbon).

The Gesto

The most characteristic trait, from which the name *Gesto por la Paz* is taken, is the *Gesto*. The *Gesto* consists of a silent gathering in a prominent part of a town, city, village or neighbourhood³⁴. This gathering takes place the day

³³ The most significant is the change of headquarters. Before 2006, the headquarters was a large flat in Bilbao city centre owned by the Bilbao Bishopric. In 2006, the Bishop decided not to let the flat to *Gesto por la Paz*. As a result, the organization sought a small office not far away. After a year, the organization relocated to a larger studio in the same building. Coincidentally, this is the same building where *Lokarri* has its headquarters. *Gesto por la Paz* is located on the third floor, and *Lokarri* on the first floor. However, their proximity to one another did not improve communication between the two organizations.

³⁴ *Gestos* normally take place in a main square or park, public space, in front of the city hall or any other public building. More unusually, they take place where a violent act happened or

after a politically motivated killing and lasts for about 15 minutes, after which people disperse. Between 1995 and 1997, the *Gestos* were also used to demand the release of the people kidnapped and took place every day a person remained kidnapped by ETA. As I explained before, the *Gesto* is highly symbolic. The people gather silently and display a poster denouncing the killing and the violence. That is to 'do the *Gesto*', making it a kind of rite of passage. The significance behind the *Gesto* is deeply rooted in the way violence is perceived and lived in the Basque Country. The way of calling for the *Gesto* (noone calls the *Gesto*; people know the time and place to meet when there is a killing) is creating a routine, which counters the way violence is perceived to be part of Basque daily life. The idea is to create a peace image in contrast to the violent image (Funes, 1998a: 41). The way of making it routine answered two of *Gesto por la Paz*'s problems: scarcity of resources, and impact. Making the *Gesto* routine and easy to access provided a very cheap way of protesting, and, against a model of large marches, *Gesto por la Paz* proposed a model of small, but numerous gatherings to maximise impact. In the beginning, the *Gesto* was used mainly to denounce the violent killings carried out by ETA. With the appearance of the GAL³⁵, the *Gestos* started to be used to denounce all politically motivated killings, not only the killings by ETA. This created some tensions inside the organization, but finally the decision was made to protest against all killings. *Gesto por la Paz* always tried to stress this point, arguing

home of victims' relatives. The number of groups and places for the *Gestos* can be consulted here: <http://www.gesto.org/gestos.htm> (24/11/2009)

³⁵ GAL or *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion* (Antiterrorist Freedom Groups) were groups of mercenaries hired by the Spanish government in a covert operation to fight ETA. This was the most important case of state sponsored terrorism in Spain. In 1996, several key figures of the socialist government during the 1980s were tried and sent to prison. For more information about this episode refer to LETAMENDIA, F. (1994) *Historia Del Nacionalismo Vasco Y De E.T.A.*, Vol. 3, San Sebastian: R&B Ediciones, or WOODWORTH, P. (2001) *Dirty War, Clean Hands: Eta, the Gal and Spanish Democracy*, Cork: Cork University Press.

that not protesting against all killings meant accepting the logic of violence³⁶. In 2004, they published several articles stressing this point, linking the rejection of violence to other fields, like the rejection of the death penalty or the decision to support only non violent means of conflict resolution (Calleja, 2004).

The impact of the *Gesto* is very important in explaining the nature of peace mobilizations in the Basque Country. The *Gesto* was the first initiative to reclaim the public protest from the traditional sectors, notably the *nationalist left*. Most importantly, the *Gesto* broke the cultural routine of remaining silent against a violent act. Paradoxically, silent action broke the traditional idea of not speaking publicly about the political violence. With the appearance of the *Gesto*, the social mass that rejected violence and were not politically aligned with the nationalist parties found their means to 'reclaim the streets' (Funes, 1998a: 42). During the time of the kidnappings, the *Gesto* showed its most heroic image. To confront the success of the *Gesto*, the *nationalist left* decided to make counter *Gestos*. However, those *Gestos* were not similar in nature. Against the silent gathering, the counter *Gestos* used noise and heavily offensive slogans. As in *Gesto por la Paz*, the symbolic dimensions of communication were very important for the *nationalist left*. As I said earlier, *Gesto por la Paz* took over the spaces that, traditionally, the *nationalist left* had monopolized. This, coupled with the fact that the peaceful protest altered the social mechanisms for how the conflict is perceived, provoked a change in the strategies³⁷. Two lines of action affected *Gesto por la Paz* members. On one side, the aggression against people wearing the *Lazo Azul* increased. On the

³⁶ Manifest against violent death: <http://www.gesto.org/pdf/contramuerte.pdf> (24/11/2009)

³⁷ In 1994, *Herri Batasuna* (People United) the *nationalist left* party signed the *Oldartzen* chart, with the acquiescence of ETA. In that chart one of the guidelines was to "socialize the suffering" and to "be united in the struggle in all fronts".

other, they started the *Contra-Gestos* (counter gestures). The aim was to instil fear in the members of the Basque peace movement (Funes, 1998a: 141). During the subsequent years, tension was the norm in the *Gestos*. On most occasions, the police had to be placed in the middle of the two groups to avoid aggression, mostly from the *nationalist left*. The *nationalist left* movement did not expect the following consequences: first, the social conflict was no longer Basques against the Spanish state. The image was a conflict between Basques. This was entirely opposite to ETA strategy, which conceptualized reality as an oppressed people against and oppressor state in ETA's action-repression-action strategy (Ibarra, 1987: 127)³⁸. Second and most importantly, that situation made *Gesto por la Paz* heroes in the social perception of the conflict. They were normal people against the image of violence, making them a reference in social action.

The Lazo Azul

The *Lazo Azul* or Blue Ribbon is an important visual symbol created by *Gesto por la Paz*. Any person, institution, organization that wear the *Lazo Azul* are automatically part of *Gesto por la Paz*'s message. The *Lazo Azul* is entirely identified with *Gesto por la Paz* discourse: tolerance, freedom for the kidnapped, the search for peace, the rejection of violent killings (Funes, 1998a: 40). The *Lazo Azul* appeared in 1993, from the ideas of four different local peace groups, to protest against the kidnapping of Julio Iglesias Zamora³⁹.

³⁸ In the first days, the objective was to achieve military victory. This evolved into the aim for political negotiation. More information in IBARRA, P. (1987) *La Evolucion Estrategica De Eta*, San Sebastian: Kriselu, and LETAMENDIA, F. (1994) *Historia Del Nacionalismo Vasco Y De E.T.A.*, Vol. 3, San Sebastian: R&B Ediciones.

³⁹ Julio Iglesias Zamora was a Basque businessman kidnapped by ETA on the 6th of July, 1993. He was released after 117 days and the payment of a ransom.

When the *Lazo Azul* was launched, it was a symbol offered to the people to wear it to denounce the damage that ETA was doing to civil rights in the Basque Country, most importantly, life and freedom. The *Lazo Azul* actually is not a ribbon; it is piece of cloth that shapes the letter A of *Askatu* (Freedom).

The *Lazo Azul* was used again in subsequent kidnappings until 1997, its use finishing with the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel Blanco, and the dominance of political parties in the public space. During the kidnappings, between 1995 and 1997, the *Lazo Azul* was one of the most identifiable images of the rejection of violence. Its simplicity and visual impact made it one of the most used symbols. After 1997, the symbol was taken by new social groups, like *Basta Ya* o *Foro de Ermua* to represent their opposition to the violence of ETA and their opposition to any Basque national project. *Gesto por la Paz* rejects the use of the *Lazo Azul* beyond the rejection of violence:

‘[...] We would like to ask the people for a minimum of common sense, who, rather than fighting against the serious problem of terrorism, focus their fight against against their political adversaries. The political discrepancies are legitimate, but the experience told us that the use of antiterrorist policies as political weapons against parties has been disastrous for the whole society⁴⁰.

The impact of the *Gesto* and the *Lazo Azul* is impressive. However, the action of *Gesto por la Paz* includes more than these two symbols. Other lines of action are the campaign to make people more aware of particular problems related to the conflict, and to change the perceptions of several aspects around it. These campaigns are Peace Education, Violence of Prosecution, and awareness towards victims of violence. However, the most important campaign

⁴⁰ Reclaiming the use of the *Blue Ribbon*: <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-03-07%20NP%20Lazo%20azul.pdf> (24/11/2009)

is the Separation of Conflicts. I devote some words to that campaign, as it is one of the most important pillars in *Gesto por la Paz*'s philosophy.

The Separation of Conflicts

Gesto por la Paz understands that the Basque Conflict can be understood using two different dimensions: the political and the violent. *Gesto por la Paz* believes these two dimensions can and should be treated differently. However, before I go into how these dimensions have to be treated, I explain them:

- *The political side:* the Basque conflict has political roots based in the conflict between one nationality, the Basque, and two established nation states. This conflict comes from the nineteenth century, with an historical disagreement between Basques, and the Spanish and French about the rights and the territory of the Basque Country. *Gesto por la Paz* recognizes this fact and defends the idea that this conflict must be resolved within legitimate democratic institutions, like parliaments and the conversations between democratically elected governments. The society in this case has the right and the duty to give its opinion about how to resolve this conflict using all the means necessary, like demonstrations, acts, petitions or marches. Both these ideas, the political struggle and the social action, must be conducted with a total rejection of violence.
- *The violent side:* the political violence in the Basque Country, as it is understood by *Gesto por la Paz*, is a consequence of the image of the conflict. It is an issue that came from the Franco dictatorship. The

political violence transforms the social and political environment, denying normal, non-violent, means of resolving conflict.

Gesto por la Paz believes that the political conflict has to be treated differently from the violent conflict. While, in the political conflict, dialogue and concessions are the norm to reach a consensus, in the violent conflict no concession are to be given. Within this rationale, for example, *Gesto por la Paz* defends the idea of a legalization of the *nationalist left* parties, but rejects the idea of giving any concessions to ETA. This is one of the messages that *Gesto por la Paz* tries to convey to the whole of Basque society: confidence in the democratic institutions and a total rejection of violence. The main idea behind this is that there is no indissoluble association between the identity conflict and the use of terrorism and violence in the Basque Country⁴¹.

Gesto por la Paz is trying to reach the greatest number of social agents possible, using a series of speeches open to everyone, as well as in every communication *Gesto por la Paz* has created. This idea has been very successful, being one of the main reasons for the growing delegitimization of violence that appeared in Basque society over the past years. These speeches are called on a regular basis, and attract audiences that encompass members of different political sensibilities, including members of the *nationalist left*. This is one indicator of the success of this initiative.

Lokarri. Network for the accord and the consultation

Lokarri ('Bond' in Basque) was established in March 2006 after a long process. That process started in September 2005, with *Elkarrri's* VIII Assembly.

⁴¹ <http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-09-25%20NP%20Charla%20y%20atentado.pdf> (24/11/2009) and *Bake Hitzak* magazine, No. 58.

***Elkarri* and the VIII Assembly. The end that started a new beginning**

*Elkarri*⁴² (Dialogue, in Basque) was born in 1992, six years before the appearance of *Gesto por la Paz*. The creation and expansion of *Elkarri* was not a coincidence and one factor was the existence of *Gesto por la Paz*. In the beginning, *Elkarri* was not defined as a pacifist movement, but an organization that worked for dialogue and mediation (Funes, 1998a: 47). Its origins are in the social networks created during the opposition to the *Leizaran* highway, represented by the *Lurraldea* collective⁴³ (Barcena et al., 1995; 1998). These networks were a mix of people with different backgrounds, from the *nationalist left* to those with a religious background. If *Gesto por la Paz* defended the idea of the complete separation of political conflict and violence, *Elkarri* took the opposite approach. Its main objective was to work with social and political agents to find a solution. It analyzed the conflict in two stages: a political conflict, with two clear parties, and a social conflict, derived from the first stage. *Elkarri*'s first objective was to make Basque society see the conflict, and its second objective was to create the tools to promote dialogue on two levels, political and social. For *Elkarri*, any previous factors to initiate dialogue were a problem. For example, in *Elkarri*'s opinion, asking ETA first to stop violence is giving ETA the key to start a dialogue process (Funes, 1998a: 48).

⁴² The history and description of *Elkarri* is brief in this document as my analysis is focused on *Elkarri*'s successor, *Lokarri*. For a much more detailed history of *Elkarri*, as well a full description of its organization and methods, refer to FUNES, M. J. (1998a) *La Salida del Silencio. Movilizaciones por la paz en Euskadi 1986-1998*, Madrid, Akal. And the *Elkarri* papers www.elkarri.net (20/01/11)

⁴³ The *Lurraldea* collective was a civic platform created to organise social action against the construction of the *Leizaran* highway. The *Leizaran* conflict was an environmental struggle created to oppose the construction of a highway that connected Pamplona in Navarre with San Sebastian in Guipuzcoa. It took that name from an ecological protected area endangered by that highway. Quickly, it became a conflict between the political parties and the alternative movements, mostly conducted by the *nationalist left*. For more information see LETAMENDIA, F. (1994a) *Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A.*, San Sebastian, R&B Ediciones. pp. 344-377, Appendix A.

Since the beginning, *Elkarri* made a huge effort to spread itself in the Basque territory and to promote its ideas. The structure and organization was solid, with four centres well identified and a planned worksheet divided in periods. Unlike *Gesto por la Paz*, *Elkarri* did not avoid political commitment. Instead they tried to achieve accords and agreements with different political parties, that led to a high specialization of their members, with a clear divide between the full time members (people who get paid for their work in the organization) and the activists, most of them volunteers. In its 14 years of existence, *Elkarri* was able to start three different 'Peace Conferences' meetings between different political parties to achieve a final document towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict, numerous workshops in neighbourhoods and towns and a meaningful impact on the collective imagination. They made the word 'dialogue' part of the political discourse and a social issue.

Finally, the end of *Elkarri* came, as is usual in this kind of organization, from its own success. In 2005, after two years without killings in the Basque Country, and with a moderate left wing government in Spain that was willing to explore pacifist ways to end the conflict, *Elkarri* felt the need to change. In this atmosphere, the VIII Assembly was started.

On the 26th of September 2005, *Elkarri* published the brief that detailed the VIII Assembly that ended in December of the same year. In that brief, five main questions were formulated, divided between five different documents. They were: the completed activities, the current situation, an evaluation of *Elkarri's* activities since its beginning, the alternatives that *Elkarri* was able to offer, and the way to carry out all these initiatives. These points where

summarized in five questions: 'what have we done?', 'where are we?', 'where have we come from?', 'where are we going?' and 'which way?'.

Following that reasoning, *Elkarri* reached the conclusion that the situation was very different from 1992. The violence from ETA was almost nonexistent and that made *Elkarri* think that a ceasefire was near. As *Elkarri* noted:

'However, the most determinant factor is the evidence that the only viable alternative that ETA has is to stop violence. In fact, its only alternative is to start a process of nonviolence and dialogue'. (Elkarri, 2005a: 2)

As they noted in the document 'Where we come from', the position of *Elkarri* was key to understand the new situation and to break what they called the 'definitive tie'⁴⁴. *Elkarri* understood that the majority of the popular opinion was towards non violence and dialogue (Elkarri, 2005b: 4). As a result of this conclusion, the opinion was reached that the organization model of *Elkarri* was redundant. The options were now to change or to disappear. Finally, it was decided that a new proposal for the future, based on a new organizational model, had to be created. That decision was taken to face the challenge of a new kind of society, with new ways of mobilization and with a new perception of the political situation. The idea of the creation of a network devoted to the consultation and the agreement was there. Later on, that idea was christened as *Lokarri* and its main objective was to promote negotiation between all the political parties before March 2006.

That moment marked a turning point in *Elkarri's* history. Not only a change of ways of action and objectives was decided, but a total image and personnel change as well. The old organization was abandoned, with new

⁴⁴ 'Empate definitivo' in Spanish.

faces, lower budget and lower cost. A new organization to work in a peaceful environment was created.

The VIII Assembly process created problems for *Lokarri* as well. The *Elkarri* director was a very charismatic media figure. When he stepped down, some people saw a problem and a lack of will in the new director.

History

On the 12th of March 2006 *Lokarri* was created with a constitutive document designed to lead the organization through a hypothetical peace process. *Lokarri* aimed to achieve two objectives: conciliation and reconciliation, defined by *Lokarri* as social priorities. For that, *Lokarri* developed two hypothetical scenarios, one positive, with a peace process in place and the other negative, with a situation worsening. To achieve the two priorities; *Lokarri* defined its own basis, its organizational model and its acting guidelines⁴⁵ these points are developed below. After the creation of *Lokarri* it was immersed in the most favourable situation. Ten days after the official start, ETA announced its 'permanent' ceasefire on 23rd of March 2006.

Lokarri took the ceasefire announcement with optimism. On the 22nd of March *Lokarri* described it as the 'most awaited moment for the Basque society'⁴⁶. Elsewhere in that press release, *Lokarri* did not hide its concern about the situation and showed its intention to work harder than ever to establish and develop a process to lead to a peaceful resolution. For *Lokarri*, the "day after" was there.

⁴⁵ *Lokarri* foundational document: <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri>, page 2. (24/11/2009)

⁴⁶ The opportunity to open a normalization and peace process: <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-oportunidad-de-abrir-un-proceso-de-paz-y-normalizacion> (24/11/2009)

During the peace process *Lokarri* concreted its objectives. After six months of peace process, *Lokarri* launched its evaluation and action plan for 2006-2007 (Lokarri, 2006b). In this document, it is possible to see the challenges that the peace process was facing. The most important problem for *Lokarri* was the lack of movement in the negotiations. This was based on a series of problems. The first was the proximity of elections. Here, *Lokarri's* diagnosis was critical of the political parties that used that momentum for electoral benefits. Another factor was the delay in organising the negotiating table for the political parties. Another important issue was the lack of a recognized political voice inside the *nationalist left*. *Lokarri* supports the creation of formulas to allow *Batasuna* or any other political voice from the *nationalist left* to be able to be part of the process. For that purpose *Lokarri* created its first 'campaign book' called '*Three objectives that unite us*⁴⁷'. These three objectives were classified as the *accord*, the *consultation*, and the *reconciliation*⁴⁸. Before the re-appearance of violence, *Lokarri* was only able to develop the *accord* initiative, giving ideas of how an agreement has to be reached between the different political and social actors in the conflict⁴⁹. During the peace process, *Lokarri* started different campaigns, like creating a mailbox to collect people's opinions about the peace process, or the creation of an academic report aimed at international actors and institutions (Chapman, 2006). In the last days of the peace process, all the efforts were aimed at not losing the opportunity of peace and not letting the situation become irreversible. However, the bombing

⁴⁷ *Tres objetivos que nos unen*, in Spanish.

⁴⁸ Press release announcing the first step of the '*Three objectives that unite us*' campaign: <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/tres-objetivos-que-nos-unen-promover-el-acuerdo> (24/11/2009)

⁴⁹ '*The Agreement. Reflections and proposals to build a coexistence agreement.*': http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/El_acuerdo.pdf (24/11/2009)

in Madrid airport in December 2006 meant that *Lokarri* had to change its strategy. Caught between an organization that was saying that the peace process was still on, but had no problems with using violence, and political parties that were saying that everything was over, *Lokarri* decided to delegitimize ETA as a political actor. All these efforts were in vain, as on the 5th of June 2007, ETA declared the ceasefire over.

After the ceasefire, *Lokarri* focused for the first time on bringing the situation to another political agreement, with little success. The objective was to try and solve the conflict using non-violent means, trying to avoid past situations. The main objective here was to confirm that the society was mature enough to face a political settlement. As *Lokarri* said in its first press release after the end of the ceasefire, the most important danger of the political and social situation is a return to the past, giving the government the excuse to use any means to end violence. *Lokarri* made clear its support for the use of Human Rights and civil rights in the pursuit of peace. In that press release, *Lokarri* announced its main initiative for the time post ceasefire: the popular consultation⁵⁰. This campaign was intended to be the second step in the '*Three objectives that unite us*' campaign and was presented shortly before the end of the ceasefire⁵¹. *Lokarri* announced in its campaign book for the end of 2007: 'To offer to the whole society the initiative to call off a popular consultation as a concrete, viable and solid alternative to unblock the situation and to walk towards a peace process' (Lokarri, 2007b).

⁵⁰ 'The response to ETA is more democracy' press release:
<http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-respuesta-a-eta-es-mas-democracia>
(24/11/2009)

⁵¹ For a Political Consultation: <http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/consulta.pdf> (24/11/2009)

During 2008, *Lokarri* worked to consolidate the consultation and gave its opinion about the conflict situation. It published a handbook about the participation and the reasons for a consultation. There, the organization made a point about the main ideals of *Lokarri* to encourage people to participate in the conflict resolution, and to put some pressure on the political parties. In that regard, *Lokarri* tried to focus on action through the internet (Anton, 2009).

Nature of Lokarri

Lokarri defines its nature through four basic principles: the defence of the non-violence approach; life and Human Rights as ethical absolutes; the option of dialogue without exclusions; and the respect for the popular will. These principles are not very different from the ones that *Gesto por la Paz* defends. Through these basic principles, *Lokarri* developed its four main goals:

- The vindication and promotion of a plural accord and a popular consultation. For *Lokarri*, this is the central axis for the promotion of conciliation.
- The contribution to help build a reconciliation process.
- Promote and facilitate the people's participation in the peace process.
- To 'defend the conquered'. That is to promote all the factors not lose a non-violence and dialogue scenario.

To reach these goals, *Lokarri* developed a series of functions or strategies: to analyze and to make proposals; to inform and to opine; to vindicate and denounce; and to take the initiative and to mobilize. All these

strategies were created to achieve the objectives described above, following the basic principles that are described at the beginning of the section⁵².

The identity tied with *Lokarri* is very similar to the identity that *Elkarri* created. As with *Elkarri*, *Lokarri* is difficult to identify as a pacifist organization in the same sense as *Gesto por la Paz*. *Lokarri* identifies itself with the defence of human dignity, but its goals are more aimed towards facilitating or forcing the negotiation and to create new conditions of perception about the conflict. If we take its nature and its actions together, it is clear that *Lokarri* is a peace organization. The difference between *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* is evident, but this does not happen without a reason. As I argued before, *Elkarri* did not appear totally apart from *Gesto por la Paz*. *Gesto por la Paz* was created from the social frustration and the social need to provide an answer to violence, but this answer, very symbolic, was a blunt answer. *Elkarri* tried to bring some structure to the action, to give some results. The experience of the *Lurraldea* platform gave the impression that a change in public policy was possible. *Lurraldea* was an environmental issue, but with the meddling of ETA during the protest, it became a political issue. That meant the use of institutional means of action. Between some scholars, for example, the difference between a social movement and a pressure group in *Elkarri* never was very clear. Some even characterized it as an interest group coming from a social movement (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 85). This kind of philosophy of action was inherited in *Lokarri*. The existence of *Gesto por la Paz* is not apart from this decision. As

⁵² Foundational Document: <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri>, page 3 (24/11/2009)

some members of *Lokarri* opine, *Lokarri* do the things *Gesto por la Paz* does not do and vice versa.

Lokarri's membership is widely dispersed and varied. At first glance, it is common to make the mistake of thinking that *Lokarri* is a nationalist organization. However, within the organization, it is possible to find people from different political persuasions. Most of the people are nationalist in the sense that one of the main points the organization defends is the right for the Basque people to decide what to do with the conflict. However, the most important feeling within the organization is the rejection of violence: ETA should stop its strategy and should negotiate. That is a central motivation of *Lokarri* members. Another point that comes from *Lokarri's* actions is that they are much more critical towards policies applied to solve the conflict. The action of sending political messages makes *Lokarri* a good organization to criticize the political process. Press releases or reports about the banning of political parties or the action of the police are everyday actions for the organization.

The members of *Lokarri* define themselves as convinced, committed and good willed people. They have their rites of acceptance, as in *Gesto por la Paz*. If in *Gesto por la Paz*, to do the *Gesto* was the rite of passage, in *Lokarri* it is to take part in a petitioning campaign. This comes from the times of *Elkarri* when gaining signatures for petition was the most important visible part of *Elkarri's* action.

Organizational model

Lokarri's organizational model is defined as 'new', with the idea of adjusting to the contemporary social situation. This organizational model is

based on two parties: the participants, and the decision-making bodies or the board of directors⁵³:

- *Participants*: This level is divided into three categories:
 1. The *friends* (*Lagunak*⁵⁴). These are the people who are nominally part of *Lokarri*, but do not give any particular commitment
 2. The *collaborators* (*Erkideak*). These are people who want to take an active part in any of *Lokarri*'s initiatives.
 3. The members of the *forums*⁵⁵ (*Foroak*). These are meeting points created by *Lokarri* to discuss different objectives at any level, geographical or thematic. The members who decide to create a forum coordinate directly with the *Coordination Commission*.

These three groups encompass the total membership of *Lokarri* (*Bazkideak*). All members pay a monthly fee and receive *Lokarri*'s magazine, *Haritu*. They are invited to the tri-monthly provincial assembly and to the biannual meeting, as well as to all the public acts that *Lokarri* organizes.

- *Decision making and organizational bodies*: *Lokarri* has two main decision making bodies and one executive organ:
 1. *General Assembly*. This is the ultimate decisive organ. It is called every two years or when the *Coordination Commission*, the *Provincial Assemblies* or the members require. The *General Assembly* approves the budget and the main lines of action. Any

⁵³ Foundational Document: <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri>, page 5 (24/11/2009)

⁵⁴ *Lokarri* is a bilingual organization; the everyday language is Basque or Spanish. For that reason, I will write the names in Basque when those appear in *Lokarri*'s documents.

⁵⁵ These *forums* are both physical and electronic. Although participation is open to anyone, usually only *Lokarri* members attend or post. To access the online forums (in Spanish or Basque): <http://lokarri.org/es/participa/en-los-foros/> (24/11/2009).

change in *Lokarri's* basic principles has to be approved with the absolute majority of the *General Assembly*.

2. *Provincial Assemblies*. Four exist, divided territorially between the three Basque Provinces and Navarre. They develop the guidelines for the *General Assembly*, the annual budget and the three monthly action plans. It is called every three months or when the *Coordination Commission* or the members decide.
3. *Coordination Commission*. This is the permanent executive organ. It develops plans to solidify the *General Assembly's* guidelines and proposals. These plans have to have the approval of the *Provincial Assemblies*. A reduced body six of people carry out the everyday management of *Lokarri*. This body meets every two weeks or as necessary.

With this organizational model, *Lokarri* defined three complementary structures that articulate their actions. These are the *Peace Process social watch*, *foreign network of support for dialogue*, and the *popular network for the accord and the consultation*⁵⁶. The main work is done in the *Network*, but *Lokarri* is trying to revitalise the other two structures.

The *Peace process social watch* is a group of intellectuals, approached by *Lokarri*, with the task of creating documents describing the Basque society's perception of the conflict. To date, they have only created one document, in December 2007⁵⁷. The *foreign network* was the direct evolution of a network of groups that *Elkarri* had outside the Basque Country. As far as *Lokarri* is

⁵⁶ Foundational Document: <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri>, page 4 (24/11/2009)

⁵⁷ The document can be consulted online: <http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/observatorio.pdf> (24/11/2009)

concerned, only two groups have regular meetings, one in Madrid and another one in Barcelona. These groups are mainly created by Basques working or living in those cities, and the amount of work engaged in by these groups is significantly low.

The members are mainly volunteers. The organization has six employees, one being the coordinator. The coordinator and the rest of the employees form the *Coordination Commission*. At the same time, some positions are filled with part-time jobs.

Lokarri has an average annual budget of 450,000 Euros, used mainly to pay the employees, the headquarters, the different campaigns and *Lokarri's* own magazine *Haritu*. The main sources of funding for *Lokarri* are the monthly payments from the members, the different support received by the institutions, and the revenues from different campaigns. Of these sources, the most important is the monthly payments, which amounts to two thirds of the money received. This fact makes clear that, even with close ties with the public institutions, *Lokarri* is not economically dependant on them.

Repertoires of action

Lokarri uses a more institutional approach than *Gesto por la Paz*. The main aim of *Lokarri* is to change perceptions of the political actors towards the conflict. This means the use of campaigns aimed at political parties to take a specific approach towards the conflict. However, before getting into specifics, it is worth recounting the basic objectives that *Lokarri* adopted in their foundational document:

- To promote a plural accord and a popular consultation. This objective is the most important one. *Lokarri* feels this is the central point to achieve a conciliation process within the Basque society.
- To prepare the reconciliation with the use of a uniting discourse.
- To promote the popular participation in the peace process.
- To defend the conquered: the non-violence and dialogue as basic conditions for the conciliation.

The main difference from *Gesto por la Paz* in this point is that *Lokarri* specifically announces that the main receptors of its message are the political actors. On one side are the different political parties. *Lokarri* demands several commitments from them; the most important being to respect society's opinion regarding the conflict. Besides that, they urge parties to negotiate and put aside political differences and other internal demands in order to tackle the conflict. On the other side is ETA, from whom *Lokarri* demands the complete end of violence and the need to start a negotiation process. Therefore, the action and initiatives are more focused to achieve something, more than to express the discontent about the situation. This focus on concrete initiatives made the way of action much more structured and objective oriented. The word that can describe *Lokarri's* action could be 'achievement'. *Lokarri's* different campaigns have titles or names describing objectives and solid goals. Here are some examples: "To get 50,000 signatures", "Participate in the consultation", "The priority is to reach an agreement and to call a consultation".

This focus on the "practical" dimensions of action makes the symbolic component in *Lokarri's* action much less important than in *Gesto por la Paz*. In fact, the campaigns are presented in a much more practical way, with a clear

route and objectives. This makes *Lokarri* much more efficient in exploiting the opportunities the political system presents, and gives a clear message to the members within the organization's schemata. The campaigns have a beginning, a middle and an end, making them significantly easier to follow and much more efficient in resources. As I said before, the goal is not to provide an avenue for protest, but to impact on the political actors. However, one crucial aspect about this is that it is based on a clear conception of society itself. *Lokarri* has its opinion about what society believes about the conflict. Society is protracted, tired of violence, and demands a space to speak about the conflict. In the end, *Lokarri's* objective is one old ideal, also shared by *Gesto por la Paz*: the socialization of the conflict resolution⁵⁸.

Lokarri perceived a change in society. This meant a change in the channels of communication between the organization and the society. That is why *Lokarri* is focusing most of its action through new technologies. *Lokarri's* website (www.lokarri.org), alongside a series of email lists, provides a central point to communicate their ideas and initiatives to the public and to communicate with the organization's members. This is ideal in showing the principles and the way of action desired by *Lokarri*.

Now, I explain the different initiatives that *Lokarri* has spearheaded since its creation. Of the three initiatives that are explained, the first has the aim of changing cultural perceptions of the society about the conflict and the second has a clear, concrete political goal.

⁵⁸ One of the most denounced issues from peace activists and political academics in the Basque Country is that the political parties and ETA never had a problem to socialize the conflict and the violence (at the beginning this issue was key to understanding ETA's strategy, for example), but they are extremely reluctant, if not totally opposed, to socialize a conflict resolution process.

The Agreement

The agreement is one of the three steps that *Lokarri* identifies to achieve comprehensive conflict resolution. The main idea is to reach an agreement in the general guidelines about the political coexistence in the Basque Country. As *Lokarri* says in its report about the agreement, the Basque history was a history of problems of coexistence between the Basque nationalists and the Spanish nationalists. This conflict shaped every level of social life and needs to be addressed. For that, it is important to start a process of negotiation between the different political parties, without any exclusions (Lokarri, 2006a). More importantly, *Lokarri* uses that report to make a statement about the role of the organization in a Basque peace process:

'Lokarri has to work to unite, without exclusions and without winners or losers in a resolution process. Therefore, *Lokarri's* mission is to be what unites, specifically, to make the proposals of agreement, consultation and reconciliation tools of union and social and political integration⁵⁹.

Lokarri uses different international examples to show how political coexistence is possible⁶⁰. At the end, the agreement is a divulging campaign without real action by the *Lokarri* members, and the success of this campaign

⁵⁹ *'The Agreement. Reflections and proposals to build a coexistence agreement.'*: http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/EI_acuerdo.pdf (24/11/2009)

⁶⁰ The most important are Belgium and Northern Ireland. The first one is very unfortunate. In 2008, Belgium suffered a major political crisis between communities that showed that the coexistence is far from perfect. The second is the referent to *Lokarri* of how a violent conflict can be solved. However, the differences between Northern Ireland and the Basque Country are far more than *Lokarri* can accept. The scope of the Northern Irish context is far from this paper's objective, but just to note two major differences: the segregation that exists in Northern Ireland does not exist in the Basque Country and neither does the Basque Country have a political party that defends independence and is recognized from other political forces, unlike in Northern Ireland. In the Basque Country, the major political parties that defend independence are banned.

is far from perfect. *Lokarri* decided to use the agreement document to take the next step; to start campaigning for the consultation.

The Consultation

Lokarri publicly presented the initiative for a popular consultation on the 19th of March 2007. At that moment, the peace process was at its worst. It was characterised by a divided political arena, which ultimately resulted in ETA carrying out two killings in December 2007. In their presentation, *Lokarri* explained that the initiative would be carried out either if ETA does not renounce violence, or if the situation degenerates and dialogue becomes impossible between political parties, to find a solution. Ultimately, both two scenarios occurred.

The main objectives of the initiative were to impel the calling of a popular consultation through a petition to the Basque and Navarre parliaments and to mobilize society for increased activism about peace, dialogue and agreement. These are the main characteristics of the initiative:

- The call for a consultation was carried out under the right to petition, stated under the 29th Article of the Spanish constitution⁶¹. This right gives the opportunity to citizens and social organizations to make petitions to the institutions. The institutions have to process and answer these petitions.
- *Lokarri* attempted to collect 50,000 signatures to support this petition.
- The petition was presented in both parliaments on the 31st of October 2007. Before that, *Lokarri* tried to find as much support as possible between the political parties.

⁶¹ http://www.constitucion.es/constitucion/castellano/titulo_1.html#1b (24/11/2009)

- The main tools for this initiative were leaflets asking for signatures, the *Lokarri* website and the arranging of a series of vans that crossed the Basque Country.

The initiative started with the van campaign, and later focused on the collection of signatures by the members. Towards the end, this initiative encountered two problems. First, it was the intention of the Basque President to arrange a consultation about the political future of the Basque Country. This initiative tried to shape the public opinion, in order to understand the difference between *Lokarri's* initiative and that of the President. The President's initiative was a consultation about the political future of the Basque Country, and *Lokarri's* initiative was about what the people want in terms of conflict resolution. Second, the members of *Lokarri* had doubts about the Consultation. In the General Assembly on the 24th of September 2007, *Lokarri* members expressed the need for a reflection period to know if this initiative was worth the work done, or if other initiatives were required (Fn. 24/09/2007). Finally, the Basque government changed the nature of the consultation and made it a type of conflict perception. This, effectively, co-opted the initiative from *Lokarri*. The response from the organization was to support the Basque government initiative. In its last document, *Lokarri* urged Basque society to participate in the consultation⁶².

⁶² A proposal to inform and participate in the consultation:
<http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/informar-participar-consulta.pdf> (24/11/2009)

Social Participation

Finally, *Lokarri* tried to focus its attention on promoting participation using the Internet, and different publications. Here, I explain two different initiatives, the *peace process* blog and the *peace observatory*.

- *Peace process* blog: In its idea of promoting participation using the Internet, *Lokarri* started a blog to condense the different opinions around the themes the organization defends. The main objective is to post different texts produced by prominent social and political figures in the Basque Country, and follow closely the debate these texts generate.
- *Peace Observatory*: The peace observatory was created in 2006, but it has been left abandoned until recently. It consists in a periodical document elaborated by Basque intellectuals describing the social and political current situation related to the conflict. This document is presented publicly and organises the main trends for *Lokarri* to follow in the subsequent months.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I described the social organizations involved in this research. First, I described *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*, the two main Basque peace movement organizations. These organizations constitute the main focus of this research because they are the main agents that the Basque peace movement possesses in order to influence other organizations. In their descriptions, I explained their history, nature, organization, goals and repertoire of action. From that, two important points emerged: first, *Gesto por la Paz* was the spearhead that allowed peace mobilization to be widely known in the

Basque conflict context; second, using symbolic action and methods *Gesto por la Paz* created an environment that allowed Basque people to mobilize openly against violence. These symbolic actions were described: first, the *Gesto*, which is a silent gathering to protest against a killing or violent act. This action was simple in its execution and incredibly powerful in communication. The *Gesto* was so powerful that it became the most important way to commit to peace in the Basque Country; second, the *Blue Ribbon*, a piece of cloth that identifies a person as committed to peace ideals. The combination of those two, with marches and public appearances, made *Gesto por la Paz* a widely known organization. *Lokarri* (as *Elkarri*) used the mobilization scenario enforced by *Gesto por la Paz* to propose a political resolution to the conflict. The political proposal defended by *Lokarri* shapes the organization's mobilization model. *Lokarri* uses tactics and methods that try to convince political parties, so it needs an institutional approach. *Lokarri* is more keen than *Gesto por la Paz* in using experts to support its claims and has developed a more extensive use of new technologies. The final result is two organizations that complement each other and that created and enforced a very powerful peace frame in the Basque Country. Paradoxically, this issue does not make them more prone to working together. Part of their ethos is a powerful sense of identity independence. Ironically, it is this sense of independence that made the two organizations focus on the issues they each feel closer to and, thereby, improve their impact.

CHAPTER 5 - THE NATURE OF BASQUE SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

In this chapter I describe the different social organizations approached during this research. The criterion for deciding which organizations were used was their qualitative importance in the Basque social environment, though I tried to cover most of the social groups present in the Basque Country. The final selection included youth groups, religious groups, groups against state violence, victims of terrorism and peace think tanks. The organizations included are:

- Bakeola: A catholic peace group focused on social and educational work.
- Baketik: A peace think tank created and directed by the former director of *Elkarri*.
- Basta Ya: A victims of terrorism organization with political objectives that rejects any Basque nationalist claims.
- EGK: An institutional platform that coordinates youth groups.
- Etxerat: An organization that defends the rights of family members of prisoners associated with ETA.
- Gernika Gogoratuz: A peace research institute with many years of experience in the Basque conflict.
- TAT: An organization that provides help to victims of torture.

The organizations are divided into four categories for this research, according to the issues they address. This categorization is maintained during the research and it is fully explained in chapter 8. The categorization is an outline of the identity differences that exist between organizations. However, it

is important to note that this categorization does not try to deny the underlying complexities that exist inside the social interaction in the Basque Country. Members of *Bakeola*, *Baketik*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* are part of some of the Basque peace movement organizations and have strong personal ties with some members of the *nationalist left* organizations. This web of complex relationships shape their collective identity processes and the collective identity processes of the persons in contact with, but for the purpose of this research it is useful to differentiate between organizations. It is important, however, to not forget that underlying dimension.

First, are the peace organizations that share identity bonds with the Basque peace movement organizations, but their objectives are not social mobilization, but peace research or charity work. These organizations create cultural and intellectual goods that are used later by the Basque peace organizations as explained in chapter 8. The organizations in this category are *Bakeola*, *Baketik*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*.

Second, the *nationalist left* organizations come from networks closer to ETA and share the same political goal. These organizations share a collective identity that does not question the use of violence as a political tool, but rather accepts it (Mata, 1993; Muro, 2008: 10). The organizations that belong to this category are TAT and *Etixerat*.

It is important to explain briefly the concept of the *nationalist left* that appears in the Basque narrative about the conflict and is used to unite all organizations that share a common ideology with the armed group ETA. A common understanding of this group is that it works as a pyramid with ETA at the pinnacle. That was a working hypothesis entertained at the beginning of this

research, but was subsequently discarded. It was noted that the solidarity bonds between organizations with the same ideological background were stronger and, in this case, those bonds were critical for their survival, for two reasons: first, the overlapping of population, that is, people who defend independence were more likely to have a relative or friend in one of those organizations, and second, the siege effect from the aggressive policies by the government strengthened those bonds. However, it is not pyramidal at all. The differences are critical and the organizations rely on their own resources to survive. The problem is these resources are, in most instances the same. This issue is revisited in chapter 8, where the relationship between the Basque peace movement organizations and the *nationalist left* organizations is explained.

The third category is the exact ideological opposite of the *nationalist left*. *Basta Ya* was created to defend the political status quo and the victims of terrorism rights. I use the term Constitutionalist Movement because they defend the application of the Spanish constitution, therefore rejecting any Basque nationalist claims. It is a network that was created in 1998 after the kidnapping and assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco, a councilman from Ermua, a small town in Bizkaia. Most of its members moved from *Gesto por la Paz*, as they felt the organization was not doing enough to end the conflict (Chapman, 2006: 14).

Finally, I included one institutional organization, the *EGK*, a youth group coordination organization that is useful in demonstrating the need for shared identity traits to understand the frame diffusion. The *EGK* is in contact with almost all youth organizations in the Basque Country, providing help as a consultant body. Using these contacts, the *EGK* tried to implement peace

programmes inside the youth organizations with little success. The reasons for this are explored in depth in chapter 8, but it is important to say now that the *EGK* lacks a shared identity network with the youth groups.

Another kind of peace organizations: Bakeola, Baketik, and Gernika Gogoratuz

Bakeola

Bakeola is a Basque Christian organization specialized in dealing with different aspects of social conflict in a peaceful way. It is framed inside the Biscayan catholic diocese⁶³. It was created in 2003 in response to social agents inside the catholic community asking for a more direct approach in dealing with social problems. *Bakeola* is not only devoted to the consequences of political violence, but social exclusion issues as well. Its main objectives are to develop different initiatives devoted to peace education; to create local experiences to promote culture of peace values, and; to promote understanding between organizations related to reconciliation in the Basque Country. The inclusion of this organization satisfied the need for a Christian point of view, to see how the Basque peace movement organizations affected the catholic environment. As stated earlier, one of the most important cultural pillars in the Basque Country is religion, and both *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* started as Christian catholic-based groups.

⁶³ Spain is a catholic country divided into dioceses that, geographically, match with the provincial division. These dioceses are centred on bishoprics and are led by a bishop. The Biscayan diocese is based in Bilbao with the Bishop of Bilbao as leader.

History and nature of *Bakeola*

Bakeola was established in 2001, but the different issues that *Bakeola* is working on were in place before that. In 1983, the *Ahimsa Lan Taldea* (Ahimsa Work Group) was created, with a clear focus on education, more precisely, education for peace⁶⁴. *Bakeola* sits within the EDE foundation, a catholic group devoted to social issues. This foundation is directly linked to the Biscayan catholic diocese and the Bishop of Bilbao appoints its director, however, this does not mean that *Bakeola* is a catholic organization. In fact, none of its members are part of the clergy nor does the Catholic Church dictate its issues. As the *Bakeola* interviewee stated:

“We are a diocese organization in the sense that we are not a 100% church organization, but we are in the border between church and society. We have a bond with the Christian approach, but we work with society. We are not a catholic movement. We are a movement whose issues are not dictated by the Church; we work autonomously.” *Bakeola* Member. Interview 1.

Bakeola is not a proper social organization in the sense that ordinary members of society do not form it. *Bakeola* consists of a group of professionals who work in social projects and with social organizations on the ground, most of them Christian charities. The projects that *Bakeola* is working on are educational, but it touches as well upon the different aspects of social empowerment, confidence promotion and reconciliation, for example:

- Training of education professionals (mainly teachers) about social conflict prevention. These training programmes are open to members of social movements and local non-governmental organizations.

⁶⁴ www.bakeola.org (15/05/2010)

- Elaboration of coexistence plans in schools and in local areas.
- Elaboration and implementation of programmes aimed at children to teach them about conflict identification and prevention. These programmes are mainly based on games with a pedagogic approach.

The importance of *Bakeola* in this research

Bakeola is not a social organization, but has considerable social influence. It is a powerful agent in developing programmes in schools and among youth in the Basque Country and is involved in almost all social projects about peace education. Furthermore, *Bakeola*, among other organizations mentioned in this research, has been one of the most important social agents involved in the creation of the *Social Associations Forum*, a forum that tries to bring together several social organizations in the Basque Country. One important fact is that most of the members of *Bakeola* were in contact with or were part of either *Gesto por la Paz* or *Lokarri*. During the fieldwork period, the importance of the two Basque peace movement organizations within the *Bakeola* philosophy was clear.

About personal involvement:

"[...] with time I was in contact with *Elkarri*. [...] in some talks that I made with the local peace group, well, there I changed a bit my trajectory in these issues because I was involved in the "Basque Conflict." *Bakeola* Member, Interview 1.

About the opinion about *Lokarri* and *Elkarri*:

"*Gesto por la Paz* had a group working about peace education that has been growing progressively. [...] *Lokarri* now I believe has made an effort to educate about participation, not

only to mobilize and to reflect and encourage participation, but to create a methodology and the pillars needed for that. And, for example, its strategy in communications, publications. I believe that they have the peace education explicit in it. They have been created very good materials, very good publications” *Bakeola* Member, Interview 1.

It is important to highlight the connection between *Bakeola* and the Basque Catholic Church. As stated, the Catholic Church is a very potent social agent in the Basque Country that needs to be included in this research. To fill that gap, *Bakeola* is involved in almost all social projects about peace education. It is a good indicator of the Catholic Church position on the Basque peace movement. Finally, *Bakeola*, among other organizations mentioned in this research, has been one of the most important social agents involved in the creation of the *Social Associations Forum* a forum that tries to get closer several social organizations in the Basque Country.

Baketik

Baketik (In Peace) is an interesting project founded in 2006 by the former leader of *Elkarri*, Jonan Fernandez, with the support of an important Franciscan community, with the aim of linking peace with ethics⁶⁵. Regardless of its Christian support, *Baketik* defines itself as a non-religious entity. The main ideas defended by *Elkarri* are present in *Baketik* ideas. The most important issue for this research is the continuous flow of information and ideas between *Baketik* and *Lokarri*.

⁶⁵ www.baketik.org (15/05/2010)

History and nature of *Baketik*

Jonan Fernandez felt motivated to use his knowledge, gained as leader of Elkarri, in support of peace building efforts. With the help of the Franciscan friars, Fernandez was able to open a centre in a Franciscan Sanctuary⁶⁶ in the Basque Country. By linking peace and ethics, *Baketik* seeks to deepen the role of ethics in the conflict resolution process and to disseminate the project's experiences to inform the conflict resolution field. *Baketik* also works to promote reconciliation within Basque society, and actively participates in the promotion and discussion of issues related to conflict environments around the world.

More recently, *Baketik* has been involved in several initiatives to encourage a new approach to peace education. These initiatives include workshops, the publication of a book, and the opening of a new course teaching how to approach peace education in an ethical way. However, perhaps *Baketik's* most important achievement is the contribution to the Basque Government initiative to modify the existing plan for Peace Education and Human Rights. This contribution stresses the importance of focusing on reconciliation and acceptance between social groups in the Basque Country⁶⁷.

The Importance of *Baketik* in this research

The main motivation for including *Baketik* in this research was due to its director being the former leader of *Elkarri*. At the beginning of the fieldwork period, *Baketik* did not appear to be a significant element in this research, but preliminary interviews with *Lokarri* members raised the importance of the figure

⁶⁶ Santa Maria de Aranzazu, in Guipuzkoa.

⁶⁷ <http://www.baketik.org/es/red-social/632-dos-aportaciones-de-baketik-al-documento-convivencia-democratica-y-deslegitimacion-de-la-violencia-2010-2011-reformulacion-del-plan-vasco-de-educacion-para-la-paz-y-los-derechos-humanos-2008-2011> (15/05/2010)

of Jonan Fernandez. When asked about the differences between *Lokarri* and *Elkarri*, a member of *Lokarri* said:

“[...] with all due respect to everybody in *Lokarri* and I don't want to harm them but, to me, the figure of *Jonan Fernandez* is irreplaceable. To me, Jonan Fernandez is irreplaceable because of his ideas and work capacity..” *Lokarri* Member, Interview 11.

The reputation of Fernandez, and his contacts at *Lokarri*, made a visit to the *Baketik* offices important. *Baketik*'s work in itself is also valuable for this research. *Baketik* workshops are participated in by members of *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*, and some of the interviewees mentioned *Baketik* as an important actor on the Basque peace scene.

Gernika Gogoratuz

Gernika Gogoratuz (Remembering Guernica) is a peace research institute established in 1987 in commemoration of the bombing of Guernica, a small Basque town, by the German air force in 1937, during the Spanish civil war. As a research institute, it is the most important generator of peace and conflict knowledge in the Basque Country. Its main objective is to work in the different peace areas of research, education and community projects. The objectives followed by the organization were taken from ideas generated by the different Basque peace movement organizations in the field. *Gernika Gogoratuz* was chosen for this research for its impact on society and its academic base in the Basque region.

History and nature of *Gernika Gogoratuz*

The idea of the *Gernika Gogoratuz* research institute is to create an ethos of reflection about the future by looking at the past⁶⁸, and to take this in a number of directions. One is to protect the legacy of the past created by violence, to inform reflection. Another is to apply these ideas locally and globally to promote reflection on past violent events to prevent them being repeated in the future.

In its primary function as a research centre, *Gernika Gogoratuz* focuses on the role of symbolism in conflict and the role of culture in violent environments, researching the role of arts in conflict resolution environments. Another main objective of the institute is to create networks and collaborations, locally and internationally. *Gernika Gogoratuz* has been involved in almost all endeavours to create collaborative groups in the Basque Country related to peace. During my fieldwork, *Gernika Gogoratuz* was emphasising its role in the *Peace Education Forum*, a group of social organizations focused on issues related to bringing peace education to children. It is important to note that *Lokarri* and *Bakeola* are members of this forum.

Importance of *Gernika Gogoratuz* in this research

Gernika Gogoratuz is the most important peace research centre in the Basque Country. The different methodologies adopted by the different peace groups in the last 20 years originated from, or were part of, methodologies developed by *Gernika Gogoratuz*. In almost every conversation I had about peace initiatives, the name of that peace institute was mentioned. Since the beginning of my research, it was clear that the level of influence of peace

⁶⁸ www.gernikagogoratuz.org (11/05/10)

groups was in some part demonstrated through their ability to influence an organization like *Gernika Gogoratuz*. Most of the members of *Gernika Gogoratuz* are, or were, part of either *Gesto por la Paz* or *Lokarri*. They are involved in different projects with *Lokarri*, like the *Peace Education Forum* and regularly attend the events and marches organized by *Gesto por la Paz*. These continuous contacts with the Basque peace movement organizations affect which projects *Gernika Gogoratuz* becomes involved with.

The nationalist left organizations

Etixerat

Etixerat (At Home) was created to defend the interests of family members of ETA prisoners. Since 1977, the Spanish governments have used what is called 'rule of dispersion' with ETA prisoners, dispersing prisoners to different prisons all around Spain, far away from the Basque Country. The organization situates itself in the *nationalist left* ideological position and is closer to organizations like TAT. *Etixerat* was part of the *pro amnesty association group*, before the group was declared illegal by the Spanish government and banned in 2002, under the new Political Parties Law. It split into two associations, *Etixerat* and *Askatasuna*. The latter supports and advocates for the freedom of all ETA prisoners, as *Askatasuna* considers them political prisoners. This organization is currently banned and its leaders are in jail.

History and nature of *Etixerat*

Etixerat was created in 1998 with the union of two associations that pursued the same goals: *Senideak* (Parents) and *Gureak* (Ours). *Senideak* was based in the Spanish Basque Country and *Gureak* in the French Basque

Country. The centralization of resources in one association was in response to the ideological assumption that the Basque Country is a single entity divided between Spain and France. Another reason was to share methods of lobbying the Spanish and French governments regarding ETA prisoners. Both countries' governments have used the tactic of dispersing ETA prisoners, forcing prisoners' families to travel long distances to visit their relatives, causing several problems, including finance and psychological stress.

Etixerat states its objectives in the Basque phrase *Etxean nahi ditugu*⁶⁹ (We want them at home). The main objective is, therefore, the literal application of prison law to bring the prisoners to prisons near their places of origin. To achieve this, *Etixerat* acknowledges the need for a conflict resolution scenario that involves political decisions. Finally, *Etixerat* has five different approaches towards action: fight for the rights of imprisoned family members; denounce any action against those rights; denounce the violence from the Spanish and French states against the Basque people; stress the political nature of their imprisoned family members; and work with social organizations to achieve the political conflict resolution *Etixerat* defends.

Importance of *Etixerat* in this research

Etixerat is, perhaps, the most active legal organization that works to defend the rights of ETA members. It is proactive in the way that the situation it is denouncing is an ongoing one, unlike the TAT, that works on a case-by-case basis. *Etixerat* is also in regular contact with *Lokarri*, though it does not necessarily agree with *Lokarri's* work. *Etixerat* does not have a very positive

⁶⁹ <http://www.etxerat.info/index.php?lang=es> (15/05/2010)

opinion about the work of the Basque peace groups, but recognizes some aspects of it:

“It is true that sometimes, a short time ago, with the case of two detainees, for example. When they have to go to the hospital after being detained, we knew that they felt obliged to give an opinion. A representative of *Lokarri* came the day we called the social groups. And yes, they are in favour of prisoners rights and they always were, when we proposed them to adhere to the 31st of December calling against the dispersion they signed it. But we know that their conflict resolution proposal without themselves as protagonists is not existent. It is true that when we arrange any meeting they come, but sadly, they are driven by personalism...” *Etxerat* Member. Interview 5.

T.A.T. (Torturaren Aurkako Taldea)

TAT, the acronym for Torturaren Aurkako Taldea (Group Against Torture), is a social organization created to denounce the torture practiced by some members of the police and to provide legal and psychological support for the victims of those practices. The organization's ideology is very pro independence, with serious ties to some banned groups, like the groups that defend amnesty for ETA prisoners. This is one of the most important *nationalist left* organizations.

History and nature of *TAT*

The *TAT* was created in 1992 as a Basque non-governmental organization to eradicate the use of torture. It provides legal and psychological assistance to victims of torture in the Basque Country⁷⁰. The main work carried out by the *TAT* is directed towards the denouncement of the practice of torture.

⁷⁰ www.stoptortura.com (15/05/2010)

That entails the recording of testimonies of torture and the denouncement of those practices, the providing of legal and psychological assistance to victims of torture, advocacy in international institutions, and working towards an end to those practices.

The *TAT* is part of an initiative called *Behatokia* or Basque Human Rights Observatory. Other associations in this initiative are *Etxerat*, *Gurasoak* (an association of parents of prisoners) and several others. This initiative was created to denounce the practices of the different national governments towards Basque people.

The *TAT* suffers a tremendous distrust from several sectors of society due to its ideological closeness with ETA. This has placed it in difficulties on different occasions and it is widely believed that all of the organizations in the initiative are part of a large network directed by the armed organizations. The links between members of these grassroots organizations are not denied, but they reject the notion that ETA controls them. Moreover, while the ideological closeness between organizations makes collaboration easier, they do not share the same agenda:

"I was not a member of the *nationalist left*. I had no relation. Here, everybody minds his or her own business. I wish I could see members of Batasuna, *Etxerat*, or *Askatasuna* meeting and agreeing on objectives, once per year. But that doesn't happen. They are independent until the end. And don't touch any of their issues because they are their issues. They work on those issues and you don't. That shocked me. I thought that was different." *TAT* Member. Interview 7

The importance of *TAT* in this research

As with *Etxerat*, *TAT* is one of the organizations that denounce conflict issues from the pro independence point of view. Its actions made them to be

part in some initiatives with the Basque peace movement organizations. Probably it would like to be more involved, but the ideological pressure from the different organizations in the *nationalist left* is greater than their desire to have more collaboration.

The *TAT* was one of the organizations that members of *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* suggested should be contacted in the *nationalist left* environment. That environment is very isolated and difficult to penetrate and the most moderate members belong to *TAT*. *TAT* then made it possible for me to contact members of *Ettxerat*, but *TAT* warned about the extreme difficulties in contacting other organizations. In terms of methodology, *TAT* acted as a gatekeeper to that environment.

The Constitutionalist Movement and defenders of victims of terrorism rights

Basta Ya

Basta Ya (Enough) is a group created from *Gesto por la Paz* during the kidnapping and assassination of the local politician Miguel Angel Blanco in 1998. The members of *Basta Ya* publicly reject the use of dialogue in resolving the conflict, and contend the only solution is to stop ETA and its environment. The main members of *Basta Ya* are persons who suffered political violence in forms of threats, kidnappings or assassination attempts. Since 2008, *Basta Ya* members decided to pursue their aims using political means and created a political party, UPyD (Unity, Progress and Democracy) with moderate success. As a result, *Basta Ya*, as an active organization, lowered its public profile, only

appearing on important occasions or relying on personal opinions of its members as individuals.

History and nature of *Basta Ya*

The protests against the kidnapping of Miguel Angel Blanco were so fierce and popular that the different Basque peace movement organizations, mainly *Gesto por la Paz*, could not manage the situation without having an internal ideological debate. This debate, tied in with the support of different political parties for certain currents inside the organization, led to the creation of different grassroots groups defending social action against violence, but differing in their objectives for the final outcome of the conflict. One of the organizations that appeared at this time was *Basta Ya*.

The main difference between *Basta Ya* and organizations like *Gesto por la Paz* is its defence of one particular political situation in the Basque Country. That is, the defence of the actual legal framework that promotes the rule of law, the Spanish constitution and the political status of the Basque Country as a region inside Spain. Concerning the conflict, *Basta Ya* totally opposes the violence committed by ETA, defends the role of the victims of violence, and opposes any solution through dialogue. Another difference between *Basta Ya* and organizations like *Gesto por la Paz* is related to their methods of action. Instead of operating by what they call “reactive mobilization”, *Basta Ya* defends the idea of mobilizing without waiting for a call from the political parties or social organizations:

“We wanted to create a supra-party mobilization that was not directly channelled by the political parties, and not necessarily promoted by them. And, on the other hand, we wanted the people

to go to the streets to defend things they believed in or they found important and not only to protest against the violence” *Basta Ya* Member, Interview 3.

In the summer of 2007, some of the most prominent members of *Basta Ya* perceived the organization’s goals needed a more political approach, and as a consequence, the organization *Basta Ya* channelled all of its activism into the newly created political party, UPyD (Unity, Progress and Democracy). This political party went to the Spanish general elections in 2008 and gained one seat in the Spanish congress. From this success, *Basta Ya* has a means to influence Spanish politics⁷¹.

Since 2008, *Basta Ya*, as an organization, has been decreasing its activities. In April 2008, it shut down its website⁷², although it is still possible to access it. Finally, it has left its main actions to be guided by the personal opinions of *Basta Ya*’s most important members, and the organization only appears on specific public occasions, like public talks or important meetings.

The importance of *Basta Ya* in this research

Basta Ya is one of the few grassroots organizations in the Basque Country that defends the interests and opinions of victims of ETA. During the fieldwork, contacting these organizations and working to get them involved in the research has been difficult, and *Basta Ya* is the only organization that agreed to be involved. The role of the victims of ETA is an important one in the Basque Conflict. They have a heavy political influence and the social role of victims is not shared equally in society.

⁷¹ That is clear from accessing UPyD’s website www.upyd.org (15/05/2010)

⁷² www.bastaya.org (15/05/2010)

Generally, it is socially accepted that a victim of violence is a victim of ETA or a victim of terrorism, but does not include victims of State sponsored violence. This definition of inclusion in the term 'victims of terrorism' is a success of the mobilization by victims of terrorism organizations. However, it is important to evaluate their actions in relation to the Basque peace movement organizations. As I show later, these organizations, being very reluctant to collaborate or share any of the principles defended by the Basque peace movement organizations, have created an agenda in relation to those principles. For example, as it is stated before, *Basta Ya* appeared with a methodology designed to criticize the way of working of *Gesto por la Paz* and other social organizations.

Finally, some *Basta Ya* members share a membership with *Gesto por la Paz*. They are an active part of both organizations, creating a fluid, complex and unrecognized channel of communication. That dimension is worth exploring and it is addressed in chapter 8.

The Institutional organization

EGK (Euskadiko Gazteriaren Kontseilua)⁷³

The *EGK* (Euskadiko Gazteriaren Kontseilua) (Basque Youth Council) is a semi public institution funded by the Basque Government. It works as an umbrella organization for all the Basque youth organizations, targeting Basques between the ages of 14 and 30. Its main objectives are to defend the interests of young people through having a voice in any governmental decision-making process involving or affecting youth; promote youth participation in social and

⁷³ Basque Youth Council.

political issues; and importantly for this research, promote dialogue and reconciliation between young people in the Basque Country. That is not a minor issue, as I stated before the national cleavage cuts all layers of Basque society, including young people.

The *EGK* was created in 1986, when the first peace marches were called, and importantly, with its agglutination capabilities, the *EGK* became one of the few spaces where different views of the conflict could find a healthy debate.

History and nature of the *EGK*

The Basque Government created the *EGK*. The idea was to create an autonomous platform that works as a channel between Basque youth organizations and the Basque government. Though membership in the *EGK* is not compulsory, now around 55 youth organizations are members, and several others share ties and communication with it.

The *EGK* has a permanent commission and nine technical areas. The permanent commission is the ruling body of the platform, with directive positions. The technical areas are in charge of developing and implementing the different projects and are as follows: Administration, one for each territory; Education; Communication; Material conditions; Justice conditions, and; Coordination between areas. Apart from that, the *EGK* sponsors different forums where youth associations can share initiatives or debate between themselves.

Finally, it is important to note some of the ruling principles of the *EGK*. These principles can be found in *EGK's* website⁷⁴. These are, mainly, the creation of a space for debate and reflection by youth associations and to work for a peaceful society.

The importance of the *EGK* in this research

The *EGK* emerged as one of the organizations that were important to note in this research. During the early contact with *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*, it was clear that one of their fronts of action was the youth. In both, contacts were suggested for approaching the *EGK*, as an important step towards understanding youth reaction to the Basque peace movement organizations. With all its limitations, the *EGK* is a good meter for assessing the feelings of youth associations in the Basque Country. The fact that its ruling members are not civil servants, but limited time appointed members of youth associations.

Finally, as suggested, the contacts between peace groups and the *EGK* are important. During fieldwork, the *EGK* was promoting an initiative that entailed dialogue between youth associations of different ideological settings in the Basque Country. *Lokarri* sponsored this initiative. This initiative, called the *Bergara forum*, was created using inputs from various peace organizations:

“On the third issue, the *Bergara forum*, we created some sort of technical commission to follow the process. We meet once a month. There the director of *Lokarri* participates and we maintain contact with the director of *Baketik* and the director of *Bakeola*. Then we have the former *EGK*

⁷⁴ http://www.egk.org/en/What%20do%20we%20do_.html (15/05/2010)

president and the peace area director. Some people from *Lokarri* come as well...” EGK
Interviewee, Interview 4.

CHAPTER 6 – THE BASQUE PEACE MOVEMENT

ACTION FRAME

The aim of this chapter is to present the work of the Basque peace movement, specifically its way of perceiving the conflict and how this way is being projected onto Basque society as a whole. For this purpose, I describe what I have called the Basque Peace Frame, using collective action frame theory: Snow and Benford (1988; 1992; 2000), Snow et al. (1986), Tarrow (1992). These are the set of rules, values and beliefs two Basque peace movement organizations, *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*, try to translate into action by the rest of society. During this exercise, I find the first clues that allow me to establish that the Basque peace movement managed to create a peace frame of peace (Snow & Benford, 1992) that permeates the different organizations explained in chapter 5. This frame has some of the traits of a master frame and it might evolve on that, but it is not possible to affirm it at this point. This frame is almost identical between *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* with a few differences. These differences may seem small, but they are key to understanding how the different frame processes work. After explaining the Basque Peace Frame, I explore the core framing tasks and how they differ between organizations. Subsequently, I focus on explaining the different strategic framing processes, making an effort to highlight the differences between Basque peace movement organizations. Some questions are raised in the conclusions about the effect of this frame in important issues like the processes of creation of collective identity and the effectiveness of the Basque peace movement.

After explaining the frame, I expose the different collective identity creation processes that are in place in Basque society. I focus on the political collective identity because that is the process that explains the Basque peace movement. Basque peace activists were part of a submerged network of peace during the Dictatorship. This network felt the need to use different methods to defend their political goals, mainly rejecting the use of violence. The Dictatorship polarized political views in the Basque Country, and the defence of the Basque nation was associated with the use of violence. Therefore, ETA was a highly regarded political actor. The public space for protest was limited as the only protest allowed was to promote Basque nationalism and was contentious in nature. It was not until the arrival of democracy that the submerged peace network achieved its latent potential. This potential was also released by a sector of ETA members who challenged the use of violence. This questioning of the use of violence, and the creation of a different repertoire of action designed to counterattack the contentious nature of public protest, offered the tools needed to create a peace social movement, allowing the promotion of a reality that involved politics without violence. In that environment, Basque peace movement organizations started to propagate the frame they created. This frame used sympathetic collective identity networks as channels of diffusion.

How Basque peace movement organizations frame the Basque conflict

As part of the work of different social movements, the proposal of a new way of seeing the surrounding world is almost mandatory as they create new meanings or fields of new cognitive frameworks (Melucci, 1989: 35). The

creation of a framework is a consequence of the creation of any given collective identity (Melucci, 1996: 348). Social movements become 'agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers' (Snow & Benford, 2000: 613). They use what is called collective action frames. A collective action frame is defined as an active process-derived phenomenon that drives agency and contention to the level of reality construction (Snow & Benford, 2000: 614). Or, using Erwin Goffman's words (1974), 'schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large' (Goffman, 1974: 21). Generally, this approach is applied to specific actions or events well defined in place and time. The exercise I propose is to go a bit further and, instead of applying this approach to an event, applying it to an issue, in this case the Basque Conflict. This point is important as this master frame is the basis organizations use to create different collective action frameworks and, most importantly, it shapes the processes of collective identity that take place inside the organizations. Finally, this frame is not static, and it faces changes from the processes of collective identity mentioned above. I suggest that the Basque Peace Frame might be considered a master frame because, as I argue later, the Basque Peace Frame permeates most levels of social mobilization in the Basque Country. However, this is not proved in this research. A way to prove it would be to look further in social movements present in the Basque Country, like the environmental movement and the global peace movement. Master frames work as collective action frames but at a larger scale, giving other social actors the same meaning-attribution tools of the original social movement (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138; Snow, 2007: 390).

Some of this appears in the Basque Peace Frame but, as noted before, further research is needed.

The Basque Peace Frame

- The violence exerted by ETA and the Spanish State is the main source of suffering in the Basque Country. This is important in order to understand the nature of the Basque peace movement focusing on one specific kind of conflict (Carter, 1992: 15; Overy, 1982: 2) rather than a holistic peace movement that also exists in the Basque Country but is not part of this research (Ajangiz, 2002; Barcena et al., 1998; Casquette, 2006: 76-111; Gordillo, 2007).
- The only plausible move towards a reasonable conflict resolution scenario is the end of that violence in two ways: ETA should stop and announce its dissolution, and the Spanish State has to respect and enforce the democratic principles of the Rule of Law and Human Rights⁷⁵.
- The Basque social network is torn and divided by the violence derived from political goals, specifically national goals.
- The problems stated before are the main causes for the peace mobilization in the Basque Country. Society needs spaces to express itself about peace, and the Basque peace movement organizations provide them.

⁷⁵ *Gesto por la Paz* goals: <http://www.gesto.org/fines.htm> (28/09/2010) and *Lokarri* foundational document, page 4: http://www.lokarri.org/files/es/Constitutivo_Lokarri.pdf (28/09/2010)

- The demands of society and the problems stated before can only be resolved through a process of absence of violence and of reconciliation between the different parts of Basque society. This process has to be achieved with the active commitment of the different Basque political parties.

These five points are the common points in the Basque peace movement organizations that define the Basque Peace Frame. However, as I said before, there are a few main differences between *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. *Gesto por la Paz* relies on a social contestation of violence, based on symbolic actions. *Lokarri* incorporates a political message to its demands, offering a road map for conflict resolution. This road map includes the need of political dialogue between all political factions as well as the need of consultation of Basque society about its political future⁷⁶.

The Basque Peace Frame was created as a contestation to the politics of violence, which were in place in the mid 1980s. This frame was created by the processes of interrelation of diverse local groups in the Basque Country, what, later on, was called *Gesto por la Paz*. *Elkarri*, predecessor of *Lokarri*, adding the political project mentioned before, later incorporated this frame. At the beginning, the two organizations fed off each other, suffering a process of differentiation as time passed.

Background of the Basque Peace Frame

The Basque peace movement organizations described in this research, *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*, started their history during the mid 1980s.

⁷⁶ Description about the consultation defended by *Lokarri*:
<http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/consulta.pdf> (28/09/2010)

Democracy had just arrived to the Basque Country, and the changes derived from the transition period were becoming evident. The Dictatorship period was characterized by authoritarian repression all over Spain, with the exception of the Basque Country and Catalonia, with a totalitarian approach to the nationalist phenomena (Alvarez-Junco, 1994: 313). Social action in that period was galvanized around counter-dictatorship movements, with the actions of ETA as the clearest manifestation. The different political collective identity processes present in Basque society were private and mostly related to nationalism (Perez-Agote, 2008: 140). From those dynamics, it is possible to say that mobilization during the transition period was monopolized by a particular sector of Basque society: the *nationalist left* that is sympathetic with ETA actions. (Casquette, 2003: 20). The different networks that capitalized those collective identity processes suffered a mutation with the opening of the political structure, or the transition to democracy. Some of them remained as before, leaving the social mobilization for contentious political demands, but others, mainly small parochial groups, saw an opportunity to make public their demands for peace. These demands were submerged during the dictatorship period, when the public space was monopolized by contentious action against the Spanish regime (Casquette, 2003; 2005). These small groups conformed later what is known as *Gesto por la Paz* (Funes, 1998a: 39). The appearance of the *Gestos* (see Chapter 4) or highly symbolic public demonstrations against violence created the conditions to generate a new identity process. This process is derived from that new frame of analyzing conflict. Violence is not seen as a useful tool to achieve political goals and has to be rejected, as described later in this chapter.

This had a definitive impact in some social networks that found problems in the transition to democracy. These networks started to include identity consciousness in several campaigns. The best known was the protest against the construction of the *Leizaran* highway⁷⁷. This campaign was a success and created the conditions in which some of the groups could make themselves public. They took the Peace Frame that *Gesto por la Paz* developed, and they added the political proposal as a new variable. The people involved in that process created *Elkarri*, later known as *Lokarri*.

Another issue that might be interesting to look to explain the creation and success of the Basque Peace Frame is the possible effect of the new international scenario post 9/11. It is explained in the introduction the effect that the images of the deceased in the Madrid 2004 bombings had in Basque society. As the so-called 'war on terror' has influenced social action globally, I find a very limited impact in the Basque peace movement. This impact relates only to the total rejection of violence derived from the images of the Madrid trains. That was the last qualitative leap that the spiral of violence started by ETA years ago, first with the killing of two police officers by a person with only circumstantial connections to ETA, in a clear example of socialization of political violence (Aretxaga, 2004a), and the first killing of another police officer from the Basque Autonomous Police by ETA, in its first action of a new strategy to target the Basque police (Aretxaga, 2004b). The Madrid train bombings accelerated the symbolic fall of political violence justification in the Basque Country, but this

⁷⁷ The *Leizaran* highway was a project to connect San Sebastian with Pamplona that had fierce opposition, mostly from the ecological movement. More information in Chapter 4 and LETAMENDIA, F. (1994d) *Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A. Vol 3. E.T.A. y el Gobierno del PSOE*, San Sebastian, R&B Editores. Annex I.

was an effect that was already happening⁷⁸. It is possible to say, then, that the Political Opportunity Structure changed in a direction that was already there.

It is important to note here that the two groups use almost the same collective action frame towards the Basque conflict. Nevertheless, they differ in the processes. This is the next step of the analysis.

The Basque Peace Frame processes, tasks and features

As defined in the literature, the description of a frame needs something else. It is the social movements' role to promote and defend their ways of perceiving certain phenomena. These tasks are the core framing tasks (Snow & Benford, 2000) and the framing processes and features (Snow et al., 1986). In the case study analyzed here, all the tasks and processes are present in the Basque peace movement.

Core framing tasks

Collective action frames need to be reinforced, defended, and made tools of mobilization. They define the problem, the culprits and they offer a way of fixing it (Snow & Benford, 2000: 615). Snow and Benford (1988) refer to this actions as core framing tasks. They identify three main tasks, "diagnostic framing" (problem identification and attributions), "prognostic framing" and "motivational framing"(Gerhards, 1995: 230; Hunt et al., 1994: 191; Snow & Benford, 1988: 199; Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). The Basque Peace Frame is not different from others and these processes exist. They do not differ so much between organizations, but some particularities take place. These nuances are

⁷⁸ The effects of the 'war on terror' in the different dimensions of Basque politics are discussed deeply in ARETXAGA, B., DWORKIN, D., GABILONDO, J. & ZULAIKA, J. (Eds.) (2004) *Empire & Terror. Nationalism/Postnationalism in the New Millenium*, Reno, Center for Basque Studies.

based on the different approach that the Basque peace movement organizations have to political action.

Diagnostic framing

This task involves the identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality (Snow & Benford, 1988: 200; Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). Here, there is little dispute between the two organizations. The problem is political violence, and the attribution falls in ETA and the Spanish State. The identification of the problem is similar amongst *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*, but the role of the attribution requires a more detailed description (Snow & Benford, 1988: 200). There is no doubt about blaming ETA for the situation, but the role of the Spanish State is debated. *Lokarri* holds a position of a certain mistrust of the Spanish security forces and the Spanish state institutions paying attention to any denounce that involves them. As it is explained in chapter 8, this position draws *Lokarri* closer to organizations like the *TAT*. This position appears in the different publications and statements of the organization in order to prevent this kind of behaviour⁷⁹. *Gesto por la Paz* is more reluctant to manifest its position or denounce the actions of the Spanish police forces and the Spanish state institutions, at least publicly⁸⁰. The reason for this difference lays in *Lokarri*'s political proposal that demands a much tougher approach from the organization. The discourse of the Spanish state that has an eminent highly legitimated rhetoric, and its confrontational against the *nationalist left*, needs to be cracked to give an option for dialogue and negotiation. This need does not

⁷⁹ See *Lokarri*'s Magazine *Haritu* No 12, No 15 and No 16, and *Lokarri* denouncing violations of Human Rights: <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/lokarri-denuncia-las-miradas-parciales-a-los-derechos-humanos> (28/09/2010)

⁸⁰ But they are some exceptions: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/08-01-08%20NP%20torturas%20_1_.pdf (28/09/2010)

appear in *Gesto por la Paz*, but that does not mean that *Gesto por la Paz* is totally oblivious to the actions of the Spanish state. The opposition to the terrorism of state episodes of the 1980s-90s and the demands for clarification in different moments about police actions are just some examples⁸¹.

The attribution of blame is another matter. Sectors in both Basque peace movement organizations believe that political violence is consequence of a political situation that has been unsolved. This is the main position in *Lokarri*. In *Gesto por la Paz*, the main idea is the differentiation of politics from violence, so the political situation is good enough to provide a way to solve things. This approach is fully explained in chapter 4.

Prognostic framing

Lokarri and *Gesto por la Paz* not only highlight a problem, causes and perpetrators. They provide a solution and a way to achieve it. This is what different authors call prognostic framing (Snow & Benford, 1988: 201; Snow & Benford, 2000: 615). Both organizations defend the idea of reconciliation and the end of political violence to achieve a peaceful scenario. It is possible to draw a direct line between attribution and ways to achieve that scenario. *Lokarri* defends the idea of dialogue between parties. The way of ending this is to sit down and achieve a political agreement between political parties and social groups of different ideologies. *Lokarri* also sets some conditions for that to happen. It defends the idea of a desirable end of violence before that stage of dialogue and the commitment from both violent parties to adhere to a set of

⁸¹ The GAL (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) was in action at the end of the 80s and was responsible of several killings and kidnappings. The Spanish government financed these groups. For more information: WOODWORTH, P. (2001) *Dirty War, clean hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy*, Cork, Cork University Press.

'game rules' in that negotiation, the most important issues being openness, honesty and putting the will of Basque society before political goals⁸², amongst others. This approach is criticized by *Gesto por la Paz* as, in its opinion, it gives political relevance to ETA. For *Gesto por la Paz*, ETA is the main problem, as it is the actor that uses non-regulated political violence, so the way forward is to delegitimize that use of violence. *Gesto por la Paz*'s approach is more social, and *Lokarri*'s approach is more political. This relates to the nature of the organizations as explained in chapter 4. These differences are really clear in the next framing task, the motivational framing.

Motivational framing

By motivational framing I understand the different rationale that leads to mobilization in a social movement, a call to arms (Snow & Benford, 1988: 201; Snow & Benford, 2000: 617). Social movements are dynamic organisms that need and encourage action. Due to the qualitative difference in their objectives, it is in this field where the biggest differences between organizations rest. That is why I explain the different mobilization mechanisms of both *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*.

Lokarri

Lokarri proposes a political scenario that eventually will lead the different actors to a dialogued conflict resolution scenario. To achieve that, *Lokarri* highlights the importance of the actions of the different political actors and analyzes those actions to see the different social consequences (Funes, 1998a: 48; Funes, 1998b: 501). This analysis is perceived as useful and a big number

⁸² *Lokarri*'s document about the agreement: http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/El_acuerdo.pdf (28/09/2010)

of individuals, mainly intellectuals, take part in it. This is the main reason why *Lokarri* relies more on new communication technologies than *Gesto por la Paz*. The use of signature collection manifestos or opinion polls related to the conflict is one of the main tactics. In this strategy, the use of new technologies is central. It is not strange, then, that *Lokarri* has a vibrant webpage, a blog devoted to the peace process and has established several forums where it is possible to debate any issue related to the conflict⁸³ (Anton, 2009). The idea of debating and contributing to a possible conflict resolution gives *Lokarri* members the feeling that they are talking about 'real things' and providing 'real solutions', as seen in different meetings (FN. 05/06/2007). The importance of the political element in *Lokarri's* discourse can be seen in the way the organization approaches the different problems that arise. The main idea is to relate these problems with the effect that they will have in the possible political outcomes. Therefore, *Lokarri* will be keen to mobilize its members in campaigns denouncing political injustices, like the banned status of the *nationalist left* parties⁸⁴.

Gesto por la Paz

Gesto por la Paz chooses a more social approach to action. *Gesto por la Paz* was born as a social reaction to the existing mobilization dynamics,

⁸³ <http://www.lokarri.org> and <http://procesodepaz.org> (28/09/2010). See *Lokarri* in Twitter <http://twitter.com/lokarri> and *Lokarri* in Facebook: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Lokarri/114072771938567>

⁸⁴ Survey asking *Lokarri* members their opinion about the proscription of the *nationalist left* parties: <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-lokarri/campanas/encuesta-sobre-la-adhesion-de-lokarri-al-manifiesto-no-a-la-tortura-no-a-las-illegalizaciones-si-al-posible-desarrollo-de-todos-los-proyectos> (28/09/2010)

characterised by a high level of contention in favour of a particular result of the conflict, as explained later in this chapter. *Gesto por la Paz* achieved a great level of mobilization using a main message against violence. It developed the *Gesto* or 'Gesture', a silent mobilization that symbolized the standing of normal citizens against violence, explained in chapter 4. The message that *Gesto por la Paz* is trying to send is an antiviolence message. The idea behind the mobilization is rebellion. It is a new way of doing politics without using violence. Unlike *Lokarri*, which has a political component, *Gesto por la Paz* does not try to enforce any particular political project. The main objective is the social delegitimizing of violence. For that objective, *Gesto por la Paz* uses a symbolic rhetoric. The *Gesto*, or the wearing of a particular symbol, like the *Lazo Azul* or Blue Ribbon are key instruments to achieve the final goal. The main recipient is the social mass, and the main instrument is social empowerment.

Frame alignment processes

In the last two points we talked about the different messages, ways and ideas two Basque peace movement organizations have. A similar frame regarding the conflict, shared by both organizations, has been described. The particularities of each organization started to appear when describing the core framing tasks. The political proposal included in *Lokarri's* objectives seems to shape the way conflict is perceived and the way society has to be mobilized. Differences run deeper and are also related to the origins and background of both organizations as seen in chapter 4. After describing those two parts (frame and core framing tasks), it is important to focus our attention on the way organizations connect this frame with their members and their audience. That is

what Snow et al. (1986) called 'frame alignment processes' (Snow & Benford, 2000; Snow et al., 1986; Tarrow, 1992: 188).

For this analysis, I follow the different frame alignment processes described by Snow et al. (1986). From the three different kinds of framing processes (Snow & Benford, 2000: 623) I focus my attention on the strategic processes. These are processes with a utilitarian goal and with a specific purpose. It is important to note that all these frame alignment processes exist in the Basque peace movement organizations to a different extent. These processes are Frame Bridging, Frame Amplification, Frame Extension and Frame Transformation.

Frame bridging

Frame bridging relates to the linkage between two different, but not incompatible, frames (Snow et al., 1986: 467; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624). This bridging happens in two different levels, between Civil Society Organizations or individuals. In this case, we could agree that happens in both levels. The interpretation of the conflict shared by *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* and the way these organizations tried to communicate these ideas are two important factors to understand the mechanics of this process. With part of Basque society still relying on private means of identity creation (Perez-Agote, 2008: 106), it is very important to develop mechanisms to attract like-minded people. The case of *Lokarri* is particularly clear. The political component of *Lokarri's* discourse gives the vehicle that nationalist people need to understand the Basque Peace Frame. It is the same mechanism that Funes describe as the agglutination of dissidence (Funes, 1998a: 143) or, more theoretically, what McAdam calls *conscience transformation* (McAdam, 1988: 134). This process refers to the

slow change of nationalist individuals from a contentious state of mind to a pacifist view. Probably, they already had a preference for peaceful means of action but the strong association between violence and politics limited their strategic choices. With the appearance of the Basque peace movement and *Lokarri* they decided to change their mind (Funes, 1998a: 156).

The case of *Gesto por la Paz* and its bridging mechanisms is less clear. For several years, the main objective of *Gesto por la Paz* was to connect with the social groups that did not suffer directly from the conflict, especially the parts of Basque society that are normally sympathetic towards a non-nationalist project (Perez-Agote, 2008; Castells, 1998). The final objective of the organization is the whole society. The main method used was the creation of consciousness to build the necessary elements to promote a vision of violence that is perceived as unacceptable. The main objective was to create a critical mass of pacifist groups to counterattack the traditional view of conflict with violence. The attraction of like-minded groups to peace action was a huge success in the 1990s and it is possible to assert that the critical mass was achieved though not as *Gesto por la Paz* expected (Anton, 2007: 63). Some of the groups took parts of the organization's discourse and radicalized it. The clearest example is the victims of terrorism organizations like *Basta Ya*. This process is fully explained in chapter 8. The process used tried to make clear that the option of public action against violence was possible. This is an option that is still on today.

Frame amplification

Frame amplification relates to the efforts of making a particular frame stronger, specially when it is connected to relevant events (Snow et al., 1986:

469; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624). The kind of amplifications found answers to two different categories explained by Snow et al. (1986): value amplification and belief amplification. The most common kind of amplification in the Basque peace movement is value amplification.

The emergence of the Basque peace mobilization responded to the oppression that the identity processes endured from violent and contentious ideologies (Perez-Agote, 1998: 59; Perez-Agote, 2008). *Gesto por la Paz*' actions were based on a great value amplification manoeuvre: The *Gesto* is a way of saying 'here we are' and a highly visible and symbolic way of promoting the values of peace. *Gesto por la Paz* was soon aware of the potential of that and decided that that was the way to go forward. The demonstration of peaceful values after every killing became part of their identity. It is not strange that other campaigns were created using the same logic, like the *Blue Ribbon* (Funes, 1998a: 78-79). This message is still in place mainly because of the reluctance of some political groups in Basque society to abandon the old processes of identity creation. These are the *nationalist left* groups, and part of their ethos is to associate nationalism with the use of political violence (Muro, 2008: 113). Although, a slow changing process is happening, disassociating violence from politics (Castells, 1998; Perez-Agote, 1998; 2004). This model of values present in an important group in Basque society makes paramount the existence of mechanisms of frame reinvigoration and reaffirmation in the Basque peace movement organizations, mainly *Gesto por la Paz* (Snow et al., 1986: 429). However, *Gesto por la Paz* is not alone in this task. *Lokarri* feels that need as well. *Lokarri* was born from the same ideas than *Gesto por la Paz*, but with a political approach. The need of issuing a press release after every violent action

demonstrates that violence is not the way to resolve conflict. The more political approach of *Lokarri*, as well as the need of being different from *Gesto por la Paz* define the different mechanisms used for this task. Where *Gesto por la Paz* uses symbolic actions, *Lokarri* uses conferences and groups of experts supported by different mechanisms of direct participation (polls, forums, blogs) (Anton, 2009).

As it was said before, value amplification is the most important, but beliefs amplification is still in place. The idea of reassuring society that violent actors (especially ETA) are to blame is shared by *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. The only addition here comes from the closer scrutiny of the Spanish State actions by *Lokarri*. This organization is very concerned with the idea that the Spanish State is a fully, all-clear agent, that committed questionable acts in the past, but that is now fully democratic, fair and transparent. *Gesto por la Paz* shares the same concern but this issue has little impacts on their actions. The role of the Spanish State has full effects on the political proposal made by *Lokarri*. The lack of this kind of approach in *Gesto por la Paz* makes the use of resources in that matter minimal.

Frame extension

The search for other social groups that might be interested in any given frame is called frame extension (Snow & Benford, 2000: 625; Snow et al., 1986: 427). In practical terms, it includes different activities to expand the focus of the organization into other areas that are not normally covered by it. In the case of the Basque peace movement, this process is especially relevant in *Lokarri*, mainly because of its political nature. This is usually portrayed by the use of

external and well-recognized figures that are seen as impartial. The objective is to attract individuals that generally do not feel closer to the organization.

This is, by far, the least used of processes by both organizations, mainly due to the highly contentious nature of the conflict. The Basque peace movement organizations lived their lives struggling against a main frame that involves an acceptance of violence and a contentious nature of the mobilization. The nature of the process of identity creation left few spaces outside that process (Perez-Agote, 2008). This is why the next and last of the processes is the most important framing process with which *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* are involved.

Frame transformation

As it is noted through the text, the history of the Basque peace movement seems to be one of struggle between different conceptions of processes of collective identity related to the conflict. The traditional concept is based on the private stimulation of processes that accept violence as a legitimate way of achieving certain political results. The use of the public sphere was only intended to reinforce the result of these identity processes, resulting in a near monopolization of the public space for contentious marches. This was contested with the emergence of Basque peace movement organizations, especially *Gesto por la Paz*. What started as a struggle for public space became a full-scale dynamic struggle to define new mechanisms of creating identity around the conflict. This is the part both Basque peace movement organizations have been playing since their appearance.

Gesto por la Paz revolves around the issue of keying (Goffman, 1974: 43-44). A new way of managing identity comes from the new proposal of the

organization about the use of public spaces. *Gesto por la Paz* not only wants to make the peace issue public, it wants to change activities (redefine public mobilization). This defines the identity of *Gesto por la Paz* and keeps members informed about what is happening (Goffman, 1974: 45). Even now, when the struggle for the public space seems to be over, *Gesto por la Paz* still tries to change different aspects or perceptions, like the image of victims of violence or the way politics affects everyday life⁸⁵.

Lokarri shares the same goal. Nevertheless, its main objective is not the public and social space, but the political space. Basque society has a strong division around the national issue. This division also takes place in the political arena. It is true that *Lokarri* tries to change society's vision, but it makes a huge effort to conciliate the different political visions of political parties and institutions. Both organizations defend the concept of reconciliation. The difference is that reconciliation is more social than political in the case of *Gesto por la Paz* and more political than social in the case of *Lokarri*.

This could be seen as a case of transformation of a domain specific frame (Snow et al., 1986: 474). In this case, conflict is the specific domain. This approach has global connotations. These global connotations come from the particularities of Basque society. Both organizations focus their efforts on changing the perception of the conflict. They seldom try to change the vision of the world, for example. They preach peace, but peace in the Basque Country, not in the rest of the world. This does not mean that they do not share global ideas, but these are not their main concern. However, as I stated earlier, the

⁸⁵ *Gesto por la Paz* position regarding victims of violence: <http://www.gesto.org/pdf/situacionvictimas.pdf> (28/09/2010). See as well *Bake Hitzak* Nos. 60, 63, and 67.

particularities of Basque society make the ripple effects of this change broader than expected. The change proposed by *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* is not only a change in perceptions but a change of identity processes as well. Society itself would be affected in its roots, using a more peaceful, reasoned way of constructing identities. And this means a total change of rules for autonomous behaviour, defining the other and managing relations with peers (Melucci, 1996: 68-74).

Collective identity processes in the Basque peace movement

The Basque peace movement is the result of a combination of different processes that were in place long time before it appeared. These processes were social in nature, and they were the creation of new protest spaces, the creation of a perception to address a historical conflict. Using the words of Melucci, *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* are the visual consequence of a different set of orientations of action, of elements of structure and motivation that were combined in a variable manner (Melucci, 1988: 331). Therefore, to understand the different mechanisms of how the frame propagates among different social organizations, it is important to understand the different mechanisms of creation of collective identity that take place in the Basque Country. Traditionally, these collective identities revolved around one issue: the recognition of the Basque Country as a nation. In different levels, the Basque Country always had a relation with the Spanish State based on a mutual agreement. This relationship was not always cordial and violence broke out (Letamendia, 1994b) but always under the basic framework of a political agreement. Therefore, the construction of political identity in the Basque Country was equally carried out in the private sphere (friends, families, grassroots communities) and the public sphere

(political parties, open social organizations). The political structure was open and recognized. This process existed at two levels: at community level, that is, inside the families and the group of friends, and at social level, that is, towards external actors, like political institutions, schools and work places. These dynamics changed with the Franco dictatorship. During the Franco regime, everything that was Basque or related to Basqueness was banned from the public sphere. Public demonstrations were banned, and the use of the Basque language was forbidden. Basque identity was only maintained and nurtured at the communal level, or private level, inside the families and groups of friends (Perez-Agote, 2008). During the dictatorship, there was a struggle between two political identities, one that legitimated the Spanish State and another that did not. The later was the nationalist option, which embraced the disruption of the Spanish State using violence (Perez-Agote, 2008: 102). It was during the days of the dictatorship when ETA was created, not as an autonomous entity, but as an armed movement, consequence of the dictatorial repression. Some authors defend the idea that ETA could be better understood as a social movement with a violent repertoire than as a terrorist group in that time (Wieviorka, 1993: 169). With the arrival of the democratization process, the pacifist identity parted with the indissoluble association of nationalism and violence offering a new option: the pursuit of a nationalistic project had nothing to do with political violence. The rejection of violence was a key element to properly pursue that goal. As seen in chapter 4, both *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* have solid principles defending this idea. *Gesto por la Paz* defends the separation of conflicts, one political,

another violent⁸⁶. *Lokarri* has a well-developed political proposal that is based on the rejection of political violence.

Political collective identities are a recognized way of perceiving the other in the Basque Country. The Basque national identity is been constructed continuously for centuries and is well established as a defining political feature (Castells, 1998: 30). The national identity, therefore, works as an exclusive construction, thanks to the different processes of radicalization explained in chapter 6 (Perez-Agote, 2008: 135). This trend is changing as noted by various authors (Ibarra, 2005b; Perez-Agote, 1998) who have detected trends of inclusion in the Basque national identity. This is relevant for this research explaining the identity position of the nationalist left as this collective still relies in old ways of reproduction of identities. This fact makes the nationalist left less prone to defining themselves with any other political position but nationalist.

Every social movement starts from a field of common relations, a place where new meanings (Melucci, 1989: 58) are constructed. Melucci calls these fields “submerged networks” (Melucci, 1989: 60). These submerged networks function as a “system of exchanges, in which individuals and information circulates” (Melucci, 1989: 60) and they constitute the submerged reality of the movements during and after visible events (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992: 145; Melucci, 1988: 338). In the case of the Basque peace movement, its message was a new way of understanding and fighting politics. The processes of political collective identity created around the Basque identity during the dictatorship had a violent component (Perez-Agote, 2008: 101). The Basque peace

⁸⁶ See “To split violence and politics: an old and a good idea” by Imanol Zubero. In *Gesto por la Paz* fundamental issues: <http://www.gesto.org/separarviolenciaypolitica.htm> (28/09/2010) and *Gesto por la Paz* magazine *Bake Hitzak* No 58 “Separation of Conflicts”.

movement tries to enforce the idea of political identity without that violent component. The main difference between the network during the dictatorship and the movement that appeared in the 1980s was the arrival of democracy to the Basque Country. Before that, the idea of non-violence existed in Basque society, mainly in private circles. They lacked the social support to be public. During the dictatorship, any political action was meant as a stand for or against the national struggle. Most parts of society supported the idea of political debate without violence, but the meaning and significance of violence was becoming more important for some of the nationalist groups, mainly ETA. As it is explained by Casquette, during the dictatorship, political action in the public sphere was limited to the *nationalist left* agenda (Casquette, 2003: 20; Casquette, 2006: 125). This public political action took the form of marches and riots, and was contentious in nature. The social sector that monopolized this kind of protest, *the nationalist left*, was the closest to the armed struggle and ETA (Muro, 2008: 115). The *nationalist left* sector is explained in chapter 8.

The impact of that scenario in the processes of creation of a peace collective identity was significant in two ways. Firstly, it created a division between members of the *nationalists left* and pacifists. More specifically, it created an implicit division between being a nationalist and a pacifist because violence was associated to the former. Secondly, it limited the access of pacifists networks to the public space, hampering the emergence of social movements as access is one of the necessary elements for growth (Casquette, 1998: 81; Diani, 1992: 5; Tarrow, 1998: 71; Tilly, 1978; Tilly, 1984: 306). Therefore, the Basque peace identity during the dictatorship was characterized by questioning the use of violence as a political instrument and a high level of

latency (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992: 145; Melucci, 1989: 60; Melucci, 1996: 115) due to the lack of public space (Funes, 1998a: 90; Funes, 1998b: 494). In this scenario two dimensions emerged that were important to understand the generation of a peace collective identity during democracy: national identity and political activism. Both were contentious in the Basque peace movement organizations because they meant identification with the use of violence. It was not a coincidence that *Gesto por la Paz* defined itself as an apolitical organization with no national discourse.⁸⁷

The main factor that drove the transition from latency to visibility (Melucci, 1988: 338) in the Basque peace movement was the implementation of Democracy. This factor translated in an aperture of the Structure of Political Opportunity in the form of civil liberties, new political spaces, and the questioning of the use of violence by sectors inside the main armed actor, ETA (Letamendia, 1994c: 35; Ibarra, 1987: 104). This aperture of the Structure of Political Opportunity gave way to new forms of action for peace networks and, more importantly, gave some sectors inside these networks the possibility of using the public space to reject violence. As a member of *Gesto por la Paz* explains:

“Democracy was installed. The Socialist Party won the elections in 1982. We could say that the first democratic term worked as a bridge between the Dictatorship and democracy. It could be said that the situation in Europe was democratic. It was not a complete rupture with the Dictatorship, and ETA was still active but the people from the political-military fraction went out of the organization and said that things were different: one thing was then and another thing was now. Some political parties did not face ETA, and others as in the GAL case, used

⁸⁷ Elements that define *Gesto por la Paz*: <http://www.gesto.org/definicion.htm> (28/09/2010)

undemocratic methods. Then, well, society became the flag bearer, I think. Society said, “ETA cannot do it. No to ETA”. *Gesto por la Paz* Member. Interview 15.

The opening of the Political Opportunity Structure did not only bring new opportunities but also created some grievances, such as the unsatisfactory response of the new democratic political parties. However, the new scenario was enough to nest the process that made peace submerged networks evolve to a new social movement (Kriesi, 2007; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978).

This is the environment where peace collective identity was negotiated. The process of collective identity inside the Basque peace movement is based on one basic principle: the total rejection of the use of violence as a political tool. This principle is derived from the processes previously explained and was created to differentiate a new way of doing politics. Therefore, it is intrinsically tied to the traditions within Basque politics. With a national identity group that sees violence as a valid tool, the Basque peace movement makes the opposite stand. That element relates the Basque peace movement organizations with the rest of society as a degree of distinction, the Basque peace movement is created in opposition to the political identity dynamics that were in place during the Dictatorship (Melucci, 1996: 73). The frame explained at the beginning of this chapter is tied to this collective identity factor, so the groups that share the same identity trait will find it easier to adopt the Basque Peace Frame than other frames because, as Melucci states, it will be recognized and assumed as valid, while other identity groups will negotiate its status (Melucci, 1996: 73). This will be an exercise of recognition that will establish the Basque peace movement inside the different networks of relations in the Basque social environment (Hunt & Benford, 1994: 489). There are subtle differences at the

organizational level. Both organizations, *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* share the same fundamental pacifist trait, but the social nature of *Gesto por la Paz* makes the inclusion of national issues very difficult. In contrast, the organizational model defended by *Lokarri*, more functional and politically effective created to defend a political solution, makes possible the inclusion of national elements in their identity (Funes, 1998b: 501). Other differences come from their activism. In *Gesto por la Paz* a person becomes a member once they take part in a *Gesto*, while in *Lokarri* the same person has to participate in a campaign to collect signatures (See Chapter 4). These differences will be continuously in tension and negotiation, enriching the two organizations and their perspectives (Melucci, 1996: 76). This is subject to a deeper analysis in the next chapter.

Mechanisms of frame diffusion

The mechanisms of frame diffusion are tied to the tensions derived from the processes of collective identity explained earlier in this chapter. The continuous tension between different identity groups, especially between groups that see the use of violence as valid and the Basque peace movement, will define those mechanisms. This is explained in more detail in the following chapters, but, for now, it is possible to say that the frame will be better adopted in groups or networks that share similar identity traits with the Basque peace movement. This is a process of analysis based mainly on empirical data as works about frame propagation are few (Jennes & Broad, 1994; Jennes, 1995). Snow and Benford explain two different mechanisms: strategic selection and strategic fitting (Snow & Benford, 2000: 627), the difference being the active role taken by the transmitter of the frame and the adopter. Using the channels previously explained, it is possible to say that groups with a closer identity

background, such as *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*, engage the Basque peace movement in a process of strategic selection, and they are the active adopters of the Basque Peace Frame. In the rest of the cases, the mechanism is strategic fitting, with the Basque peace movement trying to change the perceptions of the adopter. These changes will be adopted depending on how close the identity process is between the adopter and the transmitter. As it is explained in chapter 8, the victims of terrorism organizations will be more receptive to *Gesto por la Paz*'s efforts, due to their close relation and shared past, while the *nationalist left* organizations will be more receptive to *Lokarri*'s efforts because there is a national component in their process of collective identity.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have defined the concepts of the Basque Peace Frame. This frame is mainly implemented and enforced by *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. These two organizations defend similar frames differentiated only by small differences. The similarities that I found between these Basque peace movement organizations suggest that this is a master frame, but this point needs to be clarified with research on other social movements. For purpose of this research is useful to say that it might be a master frame, stating its power. This answers the research question *Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame?*, and is discussed further in chapters 7 and 8. Subsequently, I stated that there are small differences between the Basque peace movement organizations explained mainly by the core framing tasks. These differences are based on the different nature of the Basque peace movement organizations. *Gesto por la Paz* has a more social approach with tactics and a philosophy closer to typical

peace movements as explained in chapter 4. That explains the use of symbolic methods of action like silent marches or the use of different symbolic material resources. *Lokarri* uses a more political approach because of the political project it defends. Its approach to conflict is similar to *Gesto por la Paz*'s, and proposes a political resolution of the conflict based on dialogue. This difference defines the approach of these two organizations to different framing processes.

The scope of this chapter is to present the Basque Peace Frame and its different details, but some implications have also been presented. Firstly, we have to consider the different effects that the frame has in the processes of creation of collective identity. These processes were very important to explain the political and social activity in the Basque Country, and it is a very interesting how the changes proposed by the organizations will shape those processes of collective identity in the future. Secondly, there is the question of effectiveness. The radical new proposal of the Basque peace movement organizations has been accepted as successful, but the main problem remains. Sometimes it seems that the Basque Peace Frame is struggling against deep contentious conflict frames inside different sectors of society. This question is not without importance. Going deep in the matter will give us clues about the weight of the peace social movement in the Basque conflict and how a social movement could shape the overall conflict resolution agenda. This is a very interesting question to apply in different case studies, not only the Basque Country. Finally, there is the research question *how has the Basque Peace Frame evolved?* As I said above, this frame appeared after the transition to democracy. It would be really interesting to see how the solidification and the acceptance of democratic values affected that view and how the atomization of everyday life and the

affects of the post-modern way of perceive reality will influence the work of *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. Finally, I presented the different processes of creation of collective identity that exist in the Basque Country. I focused on the creation of political collective identity as this is the factor that is addressed by *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. Members of both organizations were part of the submerged networks of peace that were in place during the Dictatorship. These submerged networks did not have access to public spaces because these spaces were monopolized by the national protest, which was contentious in nature. The main event that allowed the peace networks to flourish was the arrival of democracy and the questioning of the use of violence by former proponents of violence, in particular groups of ETA members. With the aperture of the public spaces and the development of a repertoire of action that was intended to counter the contentious nature of the nationalist protest, these peace networks were able to become a full social movement. That transformation created a fully articulated frame that was propagated using sympathetic collective identity networks. The mechanisms of that propagation are the main questions to be addressed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 7 – FRAME EVOLUTION WITHIN THE BASQUE PEACE MOVEMENT

In this chapter, I show the changes to the Basque Peace Frame in both organizations presented in the previous chapter. This exercise serves as a starting point in order to understand the following sections where I present a detailed analysis focusing on *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*. For this exercise, I describe the changes of the framework using a timeline that stretches from the beginning of the fieldwork period in 2006 to its end in 2008. The 'hard' fieldwork period was from May 2007 to February 2008, but I would like to add several months to this because I was in permanent contact with people who contributed to my research and I took several trips to the area during those two years. In addition, the beginning is marked with a major switch in the Basque peace movement's approach to the conflict, i.e. the end of the ETA ceasefire.

This analysis has three different parts. First, I describe the changes in the frame as a consequence of variations in the Structure of Political Opportunity. I divide this description using a time dimension, presenting the differences between the two periods divided by the ceasefire declaration of March 2006. The main part is devoted to explaining the different frame dynamics in both organizations during the fieldwork period. The last part is devoted to explaining the influence of those changes in the organizations themselves. The entire chapter attempts to answer the second research question presented at the beginning of this thesis, *how has the Basque Peace Frame evolved?*, and argues that the Basque Peace Frame has evolved mainly because of the interaction between organizations. In fact, I conclude that the

Basque Peace Frame would not have become a robust frame without that interaction.

Frame perception changes

In this section, I present a chronology of changes in the frame perception that the organizations passed through. Although *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* passed through similar processes, the nature of the structure of political opportunity was the determining factor that moved the changes in one direction or another. I divide the changes into three different parts: changes that happened during the ceasefire of 2006, changes that happened after the ceasefire during the fieldwork period, and a brief comment on some more recent developments. I focus primarily on the changes that took place after the ceasefire, for two main reasons: first, this was the period when most of the fieldwork was conducted, and; second, it was a time of uncertainty that made the two organizations redesign and undertake interesting changes in the perception and elaboration of the frame. The ceasefire period provided an excellent opportunity for *Lokarri* to enforce its political goals. When ETA broke its ceasefire, *Lokarri* tried to indicate that nothing had changed, that that was the time for conflict resolution⁸⁸. *Gesto por la Paz* moved from a state of inactivity, where it relied on political actors for progress in the peace process⁸⁹, to a new situation where the organization assimilated the same principles it

⁸⁸ See the press release by *Lokarri*, "society must take the initiative": <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-sociedad-debe-tomar-la-iniciativa> (18/08/2010)

⁸⁹ *Gesto por la Paz* reaction to the ceasefire declaration: <http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/06-03-23%20NP%20Comunicado%20ETA.pdf> (18/08/2010)

defended before the ceasefire and called for mobilization⁹⁰. The changes in frame perception are basically a description of the different processes of frame alignment that took place in the main frame previously described in chapter 6. I connect those changes with three different factors: the actions of Basque peace movement organizations, the actions of other social organizations, and the Political Opportunity Structure. Although the four mechanisms are present (Bridging, Amplification, Extension and Transformation) (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624; Tarrow, 1992: 188), they play a different role depending on the time and the Basque peace movement organization analyzed. For example, during the ceasefire, *Gesto por la Paz* stressed the idea of the recognition of victims of violence as a clear process of frame amplification. At the same time, *Lokarri* was involved in a strong campaign to portray the ceasefire as a great moment to achieve peace. In other words, there was a clear intention to transform the frame around the conflict (Anton, 2007: 67).

Pre-ceasefire and ceasefire period

Lokarri

Lokarri changed its perceptions dramatically during the ceasefire period. It started with changing from *Elkarri* (Funes, 1998a: 48; Zubero, 2000: 204) to *Lokarri* (Anton, 2007: 59). According to *Lokarri*'s diagnosis of the political

⁹⁰ Outcome of the internal meeting after the Madrid airport bombing:
<http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf> (18/08/2010)
 Calling for *Gestos* after the Madrid airport bombing (03/01/2007 and 05/01/2007):
<http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-03%20NP%20gestos.pdf>
<http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-05%20NP%20gestos.pdf>

situation, important issues, like pluralism and dialogue, were recognised⁹¹. The idea of a fragmented society was replaced with a new approach that perceived the conflict as nearing an end. *Lokarri* then assumed the role of catalyst seeking to speed up the process of ending the conflict. Its main goals constituted a defence of *Elkarri*'s achievements and the facilitation of a role for society in the conflict resolution process. *Lokarri* took an optimistic approach to the situation, looking for long-term objectives. The main idea was to reach, as quickly as possible, a hypothetical reconciliation scenario, with a well-defined roadmap involving three steps: first, the achievement of a political agreement; second, the elaboration of a social consultation; and finally, a process of social reconciliation (Lokarri, 2006b: 6).

Lokarri's perception differed from *Elkarri*'s in a number of ways. *Lokarri* frames the conflict in a similar manner, but its prognosis is different, *Lokarri*'s being more optimistic than *Elkarri*'s. That is derived from the fact that *Lokarri* assumes that most of the work done by *Elkarri* was successful. This is an opinion shared by a number of *Lokarri* members. During the interviews, when asked about *Elkarri*'s work, some of the interviewees' responses were very optimistic:

"I would like to stress *Elkarri*'s advancements, like going from a situation where dialogue was demonized to seeing it as a normal thing; from being a movement that nobody knew, to being in big meetings and receiving awards." *Lokarri* member, Interview 11.

⁹¹ Lokarri, Constitutive Text, 2006. <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri> (20/08/2010)

"Before the ceasefire, *Elkarri* understood that society has to assume those principles (Dialogue, Human Rights, Non Violence) and the politicians have to make those principles theirs. *Elkarri* then, assumed that its function and objectives are completed. It decided to close down because the mission was accomplished." *Lokarri* member, Interview 9.

The general agreement on *Elkarri's* success ensured the motivational drivers of the frame remained unchanged whilst other changes took place. The objective was still more political than social, and the members' interests still relied upon achieving a specific political change. The main problem in the motivational framing tasks arose from a change in leadership. *Elkarri* relied on a well-defined leader that embodied most of the ideals and objectives of the organization. The leader of *Elkarri* started his own peace research group, *Baketik*, one of the organizations involved in this research. The impact of that individual is explained in the next chapter. Some *Lokarri* members did not welcome the changes in leadership.

"I have to say that, I don't know, I respect people in *Lokarri* and I don't want to hurt them, but I think that the figure of (*Elkarri* former leader) is irreplaceable. Not only because of his ideas but also because of his working capacity." *Lokarri* member, Interview 11.

In fact, one of the biggest efforts made by the new directive body in *Lokarri* was to reclaim the values of its directive members.

"For me, (the director of *Lokarri*) is a leader. Maybe the shadow of (former director of *Elkarri*) is long. But I defend the figure of the new director. I think he is an absolute brilliant guy" *Lokarri* member, Interview 12.

The main changes that took place during the shift from *Elkarri* to *Lokarri* were due to an internal appreciation of the situation. A new project started, and that project needed to be differentiated from the old one. The change of leadership is due to that factor, as seen in early *Lokarri* meetings. The new message developed by *Lokarri* needed a fresh face to communicate it. Additionally, in my conversations with the former leader of *Elkarri*, he made clear that he was tired of his role in *Elkarri* and was looking for new experiences (Fn. 23/08/2007). Another factor that explains the change in the perception of the conflict is the need for motivation tools. Interestingly, *Lokarri* achieves this by amplifying the scope of the mission. It switches from defending political values to a longer-term objective, the achievement of a peaceful society in the Basque Country. The vision of the conflict defended by *Lokarri*, that society was ready for reconciliation, was perceived as too optimistic by various members of the organization (*Lokarri* Interviews 8 and 11). This fact led to frustration after the ceasefire.

To finish this description of the framing processes during the change from *Elkarri* to *Lokarri*, I take a quick look at the different framing processes, first of all, the role of bridging. During the transition from *Elkarri* to *Lokarri*, it is possible to see a change from peace activists to what I call 'peace creators'. The conflict was in one of the most peaceful stages in history⁹², which resulted in some members believing that the work was done⁹³. Accordingly, the change in motivational tools described above was tied to new mechanisms that sought

⁹² The last ETA killing before the creation of *Lokarri* was made in 2003 and one year before, in 2004, the right wing Spanish government was substituted by a more moderate central left government.

⁹³ *Elkarri*, VIII Assembly documents. <http://www.elkarri.org/actualidad/object.php?o=2210> (18/08/2010)

to present the case that visions of the conflict were in harmony with *Lokarri's* ideas. The clearest example of this is the feeling in some Basque nationalist circles that *Elkarri* was useless (Medem, 2003). The new organization, with new ideas and a fresh start, was to be a vehicle to change the perceptions that were in place in those social circles. This leads us to the broadening of the target community to whom the message was directed. The idea of doing something, of creating something, was communicated to young people. The change from the activist model to the volunteer model in social action (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004), was clear to *Lokarri* members. During a signature collection campaign with *Lokarri*, I witnessed the signing in of two young men that were convinced that *Lokarri* was about doing, not talking (Fn. 19/06/2007). Unfortunately, these kinds of episodes were not common. The final framing alignment process, frame transformation, changed as well, seeking to transform a perception of action based on political actors, to another type of action based on social actors without leaving the political proposal behind.

These changes in the frame perception were due to, as previously noted, external factors (change of government, lack of direct violence) and internal perceptions of reality. However, *Lokarri* did not see relevant changes in its collective identity processes. A sense of comradeship still lingered between members who went through the "ritual" of acceptance. In the case of *Lokarri* there was regular attendance at meetings and, most importantly, participation in a signature collection campaign (Fn. 14/06/2007). This set of rituals did not change, nor did the profile of the average *Lokarri* member. This is not an indicator of the success of the frame extension, something that would have to

have been measured through changes in the perceptions of *Lokarri*. Internally, during the fieldwork period, this was unclear.

“And in *Lokarri* I think that we didn’t have any project that we tried and had some impact. I don’t know if the consultation will have some impact. It is going to be a test to see if we have support or not. It is too soon to value that.” *Lokarri* member. Interview 9.

The collective identity processes did not change, and the change in the objectives and vision created a divide. This division started to appear following the failure of the ceasefire. On one hand, it was possible to perceive an effort from the directive body to create a new environment, using the objectives devised in the creation of *Lokarri*, on the other hand, a whole body of members tried to return to the “old ways”.

Gesto por la Paz

The story of *Gesto por la Paz* is a bit different. *Gesto por la Paz* is a well-established peace organization in the Basque Country. Its nature, goals and objectives have been explained in chapter 4. *Gesto por la Paz* was the direct consequence of the raising of the submerged networks (Melucci, 1989: 60; Mueller, 1994: 236) explained in chapter 6. It relied on social mobilization, and its main objective is to make society aware that political violence is an activity that should be rejected. The 2006 ceasefire was a decisive point in its history.

Gesto por la Paz assumed that its main goal might be reached, and Basque society could mature and reject violence. Until that moment, *Gesto por la Paz* enjoys a position as the main referent point in Basque society for peace mobilization. It is important to note that, since 1998, as a result of the massive

mobilizations of that year, *Gesto por la Paz* was gradually losing its role as the main peace social actor in favour of other organizations (*Basta Ya*, *Foro de Ermua*⁹⁴) and political parties (Funes, 1998a: 185; Anton, 2007: 63). Before the ceasefire, due to the symbolic nature of the organization, *Gesto por la Paz* shifted from social mobilization to raising social awareness amongst the victims of violence. This was a result of a sense internally amongst the group that the main objectives of the organization, the social awareness and mobilization, had been fulfilled:

“See, *Gesto por la Paz* never had the objective of perpetuity, or notoriety, or to be the main actor, or to be perpetuated for centuries. The main objectives of *Gesto por la Paz* (social awareness and mobilization) have been achieved” *Gesto por la Paz* member. Interview 18.

The initial reaction of *Gesto por la Paz* to the ceasefire is one of optimism. In a statement, the organization focused on maintaining the same messages about the role of the victims of violence, the delegitimizing of the use of violence, and the pivotal role that Basque society played to reach that point⁹⁵. In terms of frame changes, *Gesto por la Paz* started a period of decreasing frame motivation. A sense of accomplishment started to spread inside the organization along with the possibility of disappearance (Fn. 03/08/2007). The framing processes collapsed to a minimum and no real efforts were made to reach other members or to try to create new alliances. Mobilization, the main objective of *Gesto por la Paz*, started to be viewed as part of Basque society:

⁹⁴ *Foro de Ermua* is an organization that advocates for police action and no political concessions to the *nationalist left* political parties and organizations. Its profile is similar to *Basta Ya* (described in Chapter 5) but with a more radical approach.

⁹⁵ *Gesto por la Paz* reaction to ETA ceasefire: <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/06-03-23%20NP%20Comunicado%20ETA.pdf> (18/08/2010)

“We were created to promote a culture of peace, we were created to promote social awareness against violence and mobilization. And now nobody thinks that armed action will not be contested with social mobilization. Nobody believes that. So, what will be strange is the contrary, an armed action happens and nobody says anything, nobody calls for a march against it. That is taken for granted” *Gesto por la Paz* member, Interview 18.

The mobilization dimension was left aside. This was a direct consequence of the assumption that the majority of Basque society shared the Basque Peace Frame. Another cause is the social and symbolic component of *Gesto por la Paz*. When the options for conflict resolution started to go through a political process of negotiation, its role as a social organization diminished *Gesto por la Paz*’s impact. *Gesto por la Paz* started to assume a role of guardian of past achievements⁹⁶. The Political Opportunity Structure was favourable to organizations with a more political component, like *Lokarri*. That enabled *Gesto por la Paz* to concentrate on the symbolic side of its nature. The organization focused on two messages: the recognition of victims of violence and the separation of conflicts, explained in chapter 4. However, internally this is not felt as the main objectives:

“*Gesto por la Paz* was created to mobilize society. *Gesto por la Paz* was not created to support victims of violence or to defend prisoners’ rights or to promote a culture of peace or peace education programmes”. *Gesto por la Paz* member, Interview 18.

⁹⁶ *Gesto por la Paz* analysis of the situation in July, 2006, where the organization asked for prudence: <http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/06-07-15%20RP%20Situacion%20actual%20C1.pdf> (18/08/2010)

“Due to the ceasefire, we decided to limit our public work to the annual march and to some editorials in the newspapers, but we were always ready to do something when something happened”. *Gesto por la Paz* member, Interview 16.

Interestingly enough, in that moment, *Gesto por la Paz* started to make political demands with the hope of influencing the negotiation process⁹⁷, but those efforts were devoid of anything new. The framing mechanisms were unchanged during that period. In theoretical terms, it was the resonance of the framing mechanisms that changed (Snow & Benford, 1988: 199; Snow & Benford, 1992: 140; Snow & Benford, 2000: 619). Although the mobilizing potential of *Gesto por la Paz* and the Basque Peace Frame was and still is remarkable in the Basque Country, the amount of credibility that the organization lends to the Basque Peace Frame has decreased. The disappearance of political violence and the existence of other foci of mobilization are the main reasons for that:

“Today we might have 5 or 10 percent of the violence that we had when *Gesto por la Paz* appeared. Today *Gesto por la Paz* is less active. It is less active because the demand is lower. And society has created new mechanisms like *Elkarri*, now *Lokarri*, *Foro de Ermua*, *Basta Ya*, etc. So, new organizations have been created that are able to respond to certain things.” *Gesto por la Paz* member, Interview 17.

Of the main factors that determine frame resonance, *Gesto por la Paz* has to face a problem of centrality. With the ceasefire, the problems addressed by *Gesto por la Paz* started to lose salience (Snow & Benford, 1988: 205). This

⁹⁷ *Bake Hitzak* (*Gesto por la Paz* magazine) number 61, and their analysis of the situation on July 2006 <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/06-07-15%20RP%20Situacion%20actual%20C1.pdf> (18/08/2010)

loss of salience was due to the growing perception of the need for politics, which gave *Lokarri* an edge. Another problem deriving from this was the internal perception that the *Gesto por la Paz*'s ideas were separated from reality. That is, the Basque Peace Frame was losing experiential commensurability inside *Gesto por la Paz* (Snow & Benford, 1988: 208; Snow & Benford, 2000: 621).

The appearance of new organizations and the greater role of the political parties in peace mobilization generated greater efforts on the part of *Gesto por la Paz* to maintain a mobilization discourse. At the same time, the long period without significant armed actions culminated in the ceasefire announcement, and Basque society began to view violence as a distant phenomenon. This notion of armed violence as being a thing of the past became common inside *Gesto por la Paz*, leading some members to question the relevance of the organization and its efforts to promote the Basque Peace Frame. In short, it questioned why should people be ready for mobilization if there is nothing to mobilize for.

Basque peace movement organizations

During the ceasefire period, *Lokarri* became the main enforcer of the Basque Peace Frame in the Basque Country. The Political Opportunity Structure was suitable for its demands, which achieved heightened salience to the detriment of *Gesto por la Paz*. The moment required a more 'political' focus, and, between the two main Basque peace movement organizations, *Lokarri* was the one with a fully developed political agenda. This environment drove *Gesto por la Paz* into retreat, leaving the framing efforts to *Lokarri*. For its part, *Lokarri*, due to the organizational change, assumed full responsibility. All the aspects of the framing efforts were activated. The process of political

negotiation was seen as a perfect way to end the political violence. *Lokarri* took the prognostic and motivational aspects of the Basque Peace Frame, offering a full route to conclude political violence through a meaningful process of political consultation and social participation. For this reason, *Lokarri* started a pledge for society to take part in the process of political consultation and participation. This process is also evident in changes in the strategic framing. *Lokarri* tried, with some success, to attract members of other organizations to the idea of a peaceful conflict resolution based on dialogue and social consultation. At the same time, *Gesto por la Paz* used that time to restructure itself. The organization started an internal process of debate around the important question of whether to end mobilization. *Gesto por la Paz* abandoned most of its framing efforts undermining its potential to make the Basque Peace Frame resonate. The existence of an organization that was more suited to a scenario of political negotiation (*Lokarri*) made the role of *Gesto por la Paz* less important. However, that period of internal debate in *Gesto por la Paz* created the mechanisms that defined its framing efforts in the post-ceasefire period suggesting parallels with the struggle over social relevance that *Lokarri* endured during the ceasefire.

Post-Ceasefire period

Lokarri

The end of the ceasefire put *Lokarri* in a strange position. The organization devoted its resources and efforts to making society aware of the irreversible nature of the peace process. This fact explains *Lokarri's* response to the armed action that ended the ceasefire. In a press release condemning the

bombing of Madrid airport in December 2006, *Lokarri* clearly stated the “irreversibility” of a process suggesting there was no “going back”⁹⁸. From that moment, the priority in *Lokarri* was maintaining the conditions to achieve a dialogue-based conflict resolution. In subsequent press releases, the demands were to publicly acknowledge the need for a complete and open peace process. *Lokarri* demanded ETA engage in an unconditional truce and alerted them to the possibility of the political elites once again using past antiterrorist policies⁹⁹. The irreversibility factor was going to be a permanent part of *Lokarri*’s message and it affected the way the organization framed the conflict. The idea of ‘no return’ to a pre-ceasefire situation was carefully debated inside the organization. This idea appeared in the internal documents describing the important issues to be discussed by *Lokarri* members. The general objectives for 2007 were to maintain social expectation to be able to participate, contribute to the idea of irreversibility and to facilitate social participation (Lokarri, 2007a: 3). Another important factor in the efforts to develop the Basque Peace Frame was the role of society. The role of society is one of the key elements in *Lokarri*’s discourse, but during the ceasefire the organization placed too much expectation upon the political elites and ETA. With the change of the political scenario, *Lokarri* focused again on the role of Basque society, making it central in a hypothetical peace scenario. This is a consequence of an internal process of critique that stated the lack of work towards social mobilization and the

⁹⁸ *Lokarri* press release, 30 December 2006 <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/lokarri> (21/01/2011)

⁹⁹ *Lokarri* press release “society must take initiative” 5 January 2007 <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-sociedad-debe-tomar-la-iniciativa> (20/09/2010), and press release “ETA has to take a step forward” 10 January 2007 <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/eta-debe-dar-un-paso-mas> (20/09/2010)

feeling of pushing towards a specific political agenda, the *nationalist left* one (Anton, 2007: 67), (Fn. 14/02/2007). The need to maintain a coherent position towards the new political scenario meant *Lokarri* faced a dilemma: the idea that its initiatives were not adequate for the new political moment and the growing feeling inside the organization of “being pushed” towards the original goals, like achieving a social consultation. Some members started to demand an internal reflection about the objectives:

“The importance of the consultation, of participation, of the people, giving a voice to the people and all of that, to me they are very interesting ideas that can be achieved. But it is ok if we stop to think about what the organization’s ideas are.” *Lokarri* member, Interview 8.

“So we maintain the objective of the consultation, but we make it adequate to the actual context. It is not that we are going to make a consultation to reinforce an agreement that does not exist, but we are going to make a consultation to make society participate and to say that we do not want a return to the past and we do not want to be blocked or excluded, or a return to violence.” *Lokarri* member. Interview 9.

That period was marked by a potential change in the Basque Peace Frame. Unlike *Gesto por la Paz*, which saw its vision of the conflict reinforced, *Lokarri*’s perceptions were challenged. Generally, inside *Lokarri* it was possible to see an enlargement of the problems to be addressed (return to violence, social despair). This generated greater flexibility and a wider scope of influence. However, the Basque Peace Frame had to be redeveloped for a wider audience (the whole of Basque society) in contrast to the audience addressed during the ceasefire, i.e. the political elites. The Basque Peace Frame started to lose resonance during this period mainly because of the lack of internal credibility of

the organization. These issues of violence and social despair were losing salience, and interest was returning to *Gesto por la Paz*. As stated before, members started to question the actions of *Lokarri*, and in some internal meetings, some members even suggested the dissolution of the organization (Fn. 05/06/2007). However, the main problem was of salience (Snow & Benford, 2000: 621). Although there was an effort to extend the mobilization potential of the Basque Peace Frame to the whole society, it failed to fit with some sectors of the population. Indeed, a paradox emerged: at the same time that *Lokarri* started to attract young people, it became clear that the young individuals did not realize what the organization stood for. During a campaign to collect signatures for a consultation petition, I had an opportunity to talk with some young people that gave their signature to the initiative. In response to questions on whether they knew of *Lokarri* or why they signed the petition, they responded with general replies indicating that it was because *Lokarri* 'does something against the war' (Fn. 19/06/2007). This fact was acknowledged inside the organization, and as a consequence resulted in the creation of flashy initiatives and the use of media to promote the group (Fn. 09/02/2007):

"See, it is complicated to find new initiatives. Very complicated. For example this campaign to collect signatures is nothing new, but the general content of the initiative is original" *Lokarri* directive member, Interview 12.

The role of the media deserves special attention. Over the course of the history of *Lokarri* (as *Elkarri*), access to the media was granted because of the special relevance of the Basque conflict (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005: 117). In the role as *Elkarri*, the organization could focus its efforts in framing the peace

issue. Now, after years without armed actions and a failure of the peace process, *Lokarri* had to deal with something that was not accustomed to: access to media (Gamson, 1998). That had an impact on the diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 287). In the case of *Lokarri*, communicating the problem to the wider audience it was looking for, was problematic. The issue was losing salience, and the internal discussions were not helping to make the Basque Peace Frame relevant. As some members of *Lokarri* stated during interviews:

“With everything that is happening right now I think that we had to move more. A lot more demonstrations, a lot more marches. Everybody has to participate.” *Lokarri* member. Interview 11.

“I do not know what is going to happen. If as an organization you are not able to achieve anything in a year and suddenly the political tone changes and suddenly you do not know what to do, at the end you say ‘If I do not know what to do, why am I still here?’” *Lokarri* member, Interview 8.

These problems were overcome by the core sentiment of *Lokarri* members, in part through the cultural inheritance derived from *Elkarri*. One of the most important ideas from *Elkarri* was called “insistentism”, or the idea that to be successful, *Elkarri* members had to insist on the idea of peace through dialogue. As the former leader of *Elkarri* describes it, insistentism consists of three points: first, to insist; second, to insist; and third to keep insisting on the same ethical principles ‘in good or bad weather, with the wind behind you or against you’ (Fernandez, 2006: 66). This was a very internalised

principle within *Lokarri*. Its members could have doubts about the organization's actions, but they still had to insist. This was a key part of their identity as *Lokarri* members. The second issue was that most of the members followed the "militant" or traditional membership model (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 100). That model describes a highly committed member that is able to devote time and resources to follow the organization's goals. More importantly, the membership is part of his or her identity processes (Funes, 1998a: 85). This was a recurrent theme during the interviews. Most of the interviewees stressed personal problems inside the organization, but they justified their actions through a "sense of duty". After being very critical over the future of *Lokarri*, I asked one interviewee what they thought they should do. The answer was "The same, follow the same road, that is the only remedy" (Interview 11). After being asked for their position after the end of the ceasefire, another interviewee reflected on this issue in the following way:

"... it is true that we, in the most difficult moments, maintained our identity. At least for testimonial purposes, for the idea of being there, as we said in *Elkarri*, the "insistentism". It was very difficult but nobody will be able to doubt that we were there." *Lokarri* member. Interview 8.

In conclusion, due to the changes in the political landscape, *Lokarri* tried to stretch the Basque Peace Frame to include more issues, like social frustration and to move from a narrow audience (political parties and armed organizations) to a much wider one (the whole of Basque society). This is a clear example of frame extension (Snow et al., 1986: 472; Snow & Benford, 2000: 625). This was confronted with a growing sense of frustration inside the

organization, which affected the mobilizing potential of the frame, losing resonance and salience. The mobilizing potential was preserved through the old members thanks to a culture of “being there” that came from the former organization, *Elkarri*, and thanks to the specific model of membership evident inside *Lokarri*. As I explain now, the end of the ceasefire had a different effect on *Gesto por la Paz*, reinforcing its perception of the conflict.

Gesto por la Paz

Gesto por la Paz had a moment of crisis during the ceasefire, which left the organization at a crossroads. On the one hand, it was satisfied with the end of ETA violence, but, on the other hand, *Gesto por la Paz* insiders began to raise the question: now what?

Gesto por la Paz focused on the symbolic dimension to promote its ideals. The organization stressed the importance of the messages it had previously sent: the disavowing of violence, the separation of conflicts and the recognition of victims of violence. At the same time, *Gesto por la Paz* still retained its mobilizing potential, but that mobilizing potential was not fully achieved without the exercise of violence from ETA. As it has been described, the main symbolic act of mobilization by *Gesto por la Paz* was the *Gesto* or gesture. This potential was retained after the bombing in Madrid airport, which resulted in the killing of two people¹⁰⁰. However, *Gesto por la Paz* faced one problem: following a process that started at the end of the 1990s, the political elites were using the *Gestos* as a political tool to reject violence (Funes, 1998a: 182; Anton, 2007: 67). The first thing that came from the organization was a

¹⁰⁰ <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-03%20NP%20gestos.pdf> and <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-05%20NP%20gestos.pdf> (both 20/09/2010)

message requesting social mobilization¹⁰¹. At the beginning of 2007, several demonstrations were organised to protest against ETA. One common disagreement between political parties was the motto of these demonstrations. *Gesto por la Paz* used this disagreement to advocate for its role as a unifying social force against violence¹⁰². This issue was revisited in different documents that sought to make *Gesto por la Paz* a point of reference again, as well as political agents¹⁰³. Finally, at the beginning of 2007, *Gesto por la Paz* used its traditional march for peace to advocate for awareness of the new situation. The calling of this march had a new element, in which the message sent to the political parties included an element of cohesion. The second action of *Gesto por la Paz* was to reclaim its other most symbolic element, the Blue Ribbon. During the first half of 2007, different political parties suggested the use of the Blue Ribbon to show disapproval of nationalistic political positions. Confronting this, *Gesto por la Paz* released a document clarifying the origins and proper use of that symbol, reclaiming it to show rejection against political violence¹⁰⁴.

The main points that *Gesto por la Paz* advocated during that period were the struggle to regain the lost potential for mobilization, reclaiming its symbols and enforcing the idea of the separation of conflicts. It is possible to say that a new cycle of protest started the moment peace expectations emerged (Tarrow, 1998: 142). For *Gesto por la Paz* it was an opportunity to once again grasp the discourse that was successful in the past. It was a moment of revitalization:

¹⁰¹ Outcome of the internal meeting after the Madrid airport bombing: <http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf> (18/08/2010)

¹⁰² Asking for a new motto for marches: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-07%20A_Necesitamos%20otro%20lema.pdf (21/01/2011)

¹⁰³ <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf> (21/01/2011)

¹⁰⁴ About the use of the *Blue Ribbon*: <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-03-07%20NP%20Lazo%20azul.pdf> (18/08/2010)

"We say that this is not a good time to close down (the organization). Not after the rupture of communication, not after the Madrid bombing, the 30th of December". *Gesto por la Paz* directive member. Interview 18.

Some members of *Gesto por la Paz* saw this in a pessimistic light. Although the need for the organization was more apparent than before, the overall feeling was that *Gesto por la Paz* did not have to be there. However, the organization started to build up its dwindled mobilization potential. This led to a different contribution to the Basque Peace Frame, in which *Gesto por la Paz* had an additional problem that had to be addressed, the lack of social participation. The organization tried to revive the former role as a catalyst of social mobilization. However, this did not find the same support from the society that it had before. If diagnosis and prognosis were framed in the same way, then the motivation had to be different. The Basque Peace Frame did not resonate as before. *Gesto por la Paz* tried to find a reason for that, and the first reaction was to blame the political elites:

"Social response is important. Society is tired. Society says no, it is tired, but it is true that nothing happened. ETA breaks the ceasefire and the politicians are not able to articulate anything. Or they do not want to" *Gesto por la Paz* member. Interview 16.

"I was almost sure that the *nationalist left* was about to keep itself apart from the violence. To me, that was very important. I was sure that the use of political means was serious. And it was not." *Gesto por la Paz* member. Interview 16.

Of the different points that can affect a frame resonance (Snow & Benford, 1988: 205; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624), *Gesto por la Paz* had to deal with a change in the system social belief, the old frame transformation process was there again (Snow et al., 1986: 473; Snow & Benford, 2000: 625). The framing efforts were maintained with the same attribution of roles and the same path to a solution, but the years without political violence meant the problem was seen as a distant issue. Violence had lost its centrality among Basque society¹⁰⁵. Following frame theory, the issues raised by *Gesto por la Paz* and, to a certain degree, by *Lokarri* had a lower priority than before (Snow & Benford, 1988: 206). These issues worked on another dimension, losing credibility with the whole of society (Snow & Benford, 2000: 620). All these factors did not cause despair amongst the Basque peace movement organizations. They interpreted the situation accurately and took logical steps, *Lokarri* focusing on its contribution on a political solution and *Gesto por la Paz* starting an internal debate about its future.

However, the change of political scenario opened new options for *Gesto por la Paz*. *Gesto por la Paz* interpreted the new scenario as a change of pace, a new cycle of protest characterised by an intensification of the conflict between social actors (Peace Social Movement, *nationalist left* movement), the political elites (institutions, political parties) and the social organizations with similar messages (Tarrow, 1998: 144). It is important to note that this cycle was different because it was possible to identify the first signs of exhaustion inside the Basque peace movement organizations. Inside *Gesto por la Paz* the biggest

¹⁰⁵ The reasons of that are out of the scope of this thesis, but it is important to note that the media played a major role in that trend. After the major outburst in the late 1990s, media started to not portray the consequences of political violence.

issue was the task of reviving the potential for mobilization. *Lokarri* saw in that moment that it had to take the role from the political institutions. *Gesto por la Paz* extended the Basque Peace Frame to the whole of society. When ETA released the final communication ending the ceasefire, *Gesto por la Paz* interpreted this as a threat against everybody in the Basque Country and called for a massive march. In this calling, *Gesto por la Paz* stated that:

‘Today, all citizens, regardless of the political party they vote for or even if they do not vote, today, all of us have to put aside our personal options and unite around the basic idea of defending our right to life and freedom’¹⁰⁶.

Therefore, *Gesto por la Paz* recovered the two things that had previously seemed obsolete, mass mobilization and conflict with the political elites.

These changes in the frame efforts were not as well received by the social masses as *Gesto por la Paz* expected. Still, the problem of political violence was seen as a far removed problem that did not affect the everyday life of Basque society. *Gesto por la Paz* thus faced a new problem. The organization had to change the framing effort and try to align this with the new set of beliefs that seemed to have emerged. In theoretical terms, *Gesto por la Paz*, in the last years, has been involved in a task of frame amplification (Snow et al., 1986: 469; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624), trying to raise awareness about victims of violence, but forgetting the task of making people aware that the best resolution of the conflict was through peaceful means. *Gesto por la Paz* became involved in a process of frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986: 473) as well as frame amplification, effectively trying to make society aware of the danger of violence and trying to convince it of the need to use peaceful means.

¹⁰⁶ <http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-02-02%20RP%20Manifestacion.pdf> (18/08/2010)

This issue put *Gesto por la Paz* in a difficult situation due to the resources needed for those tasks and the growing feeling of frustration inside the organization. It was a moment of invigoration indeed, but an invigoration that the organization might not be able to afford.

Frame influence between Basque peace movement organizations

Lokarri and *Gesto por la Paz* are a consequence of each other. The actions and nature of both organizations are determined by what the other does. On one hand, *Gesto por la Paz* is not likely to adopt a political cause as part of its discourse if *Lokarri* is already working on that issue. On the other hand, *Lokarri* will never adopt a symbolic and social way of working because that dimension is being exploited, rather successfully, by *Gesto por la Paz*. Since 1992, when *Elkarri* was created, the two organizations were living in each other's shadows with, in some cases, overlapping membership and collaboration on different initiatives¹⁰⁷. It is true that *Elkarri* appeared to occupy a gap that *Gesto por la Paz* left unattended, that of the political demands of a social movement (Funes, 1998a: 48). *Elkarri*, on the other hand, did not try to encroach upon areas in which *Gesto por la Paz* was working, such as the creation of incentives for social mobilization against violence (Funes, 1998a: 39). Most of the empirical work done on the relationship between *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* was done when the impact of the Basque peace movement was at its peak (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b; Zubero, 2000; Tejerina, 2001).

¹⁰⁷ An interesting example is the "Maroño" agreement in 1995. In this agreement, several peace groups decided to take a common approach to peace in the Basque Country based on the use of peaceful dialogue. <http://www.elkarri.org/en/pdf/WhatIsElkarri.pdf> (pg. 9) (20/09/2010).

These analyses focused on the objective factors of the organizations and how their models differed. They did not stress the idea of the consequences of their interrelated activities and the fact that their mutual influence built the model for peace mobilization in the Basque Country. It was their differences that shaped their organizational structure, their strategic orientation and repertoire of action. The consequence was a highly rich frame that became, with time, the Basque Peace Frame described in chapter 6. It is possible to say, for analytical purposes, that *Gesto por la Paz* is the symbolic side of the Basque peace movement and *Lokarri* the instrumental side. There is a sense of specialization within both organizations. This sense of specialization is not shared within the organizations, and every intention to meddle was met with distrust. One example was the intention of *Elkarri* to prevent the celebration of *Gestos* during 1995 (Funes, 1998a: 140). A member of *Gesto por la Paz* commented on that episode:

“It is true that in that time more than one person advised us not to undertake the mobilizations. When the counter-mobilizations started, yes, people told us. But we couldn’t stop. We couldn’t stop because someone was insulting us” – *Gesto por la Paz* directive member. Interview 18.

The same perception existed in *Lokarri*. After all the time spent focusing on social awareness, the idea that *Lokarri* members have of *Gesto por la Paz* is that the latter was unable to find a political solution to the conflict:

“*Gesto por la Paz*, yes, it was very good. Every time someone was killed, a march, an act of mourning has to be called. It was a denouncement, but that was it. I think it was ok and sometimes I tried a *Gesto* but it didn’t work. However, meant *Elkarri* something else to me. They

explained things to me. You have to learn more than to be against violence and nothing more. Yes, you have to be against violence, but you have to analyze.” *Lokarri* member. Interview 11.

The perception inside the Basque peace movement organizations is not one of interdependence. Amongst *Lokarri* members there is a feeling that they came about as an evolution of the situation, an effort to give the Basque conflict what was needed: a solution. Some *Lokarri* members even suggested that *Gesto por la Paz* was not useful in a scenario without violence:

“For me, as there are not armed actions, they don’t make too much sense. I know that they had the peace education workshops and the thing with the prisoners, but in the end, it was the banner that made them mobilize. That was the more important factor about them. Then with the ceasefire... They even made some people redundant. They changed offices even.” *Lokarri* member. Interview 8.

From the *Gesto por la Paz* point of view, *Lokarri* was seen as a different organization, more focused on politics than on peace. This approach was taken by some researchers that did not see *Lokarri* as part of the Basque peace movement (Zubero, 2000: 202; Tejerina et al., 1995). This idea deepened the concept defended by some researchers and members of *Gesto por la Paz* that *Elkarri* had political roots in the *nationalist left* (Funes, 1998a: 47; Funes, 1998b: 506).

“At the beginning *Elkarri* was a bit different, it was something that was not in our environment, they came from a different world. They wanted to promote dialogue, with a more political structure, more debates and things like that. It is an organization we share little with. Our

spaces and motives are different. It was clear, the leader came from that world, and he was a city councillor for *Herri Batasuna*¹⁰⁸." *Gesto por la Paz* member. Interview 15.

This perception of difference between organizations produced a paradoxical situation. On paper, the mobilization and symbolic power of *Gesto por la Paz*, combined with the institutional experience and instrumental approach of *Lokarri* might look like a powerful weapon to achieve results, but their potential is based on their difference, which they are proud of. The headquarters of both organizations are, by coincidence, in the same building and members of both organizations have friendly personal relations. During fieldwork, I found myself after a meeting with *Lokarri* members sharing a drink with *Gesto por la Paz* members that decided to go to the same bar. After enquiring why they were unable to work together being close, knowing each other and having the same perception about the conflict, the response was that they had different tempos, different views (Fn. 10/09/2007). They are friends condemned to compete, and from that competition comes their potential.

From a framing point of view, it seems that the Basque peace movement is a strong and vibrant one. Despite the problems faced during the last years, the Basque Peace Frame described in chapter 6 is unavoidable for any group, organization or individual that tries to become a peace activist in the Basque conflict scenario. The difference lies in nuances in the processes of frame alignment and in the way the frame convolutes. As described in that previous chapter, these nuances make the frame bigger and stronger, so strong, in fact, that even the political institutions had to use that same approach to protest

¹⁰⁸ *Nationalist left political party*

against violence. This leads me to the last part of this chapter: the creation of cultural codes derived from the frame.

The framing efforts of the Basque peace social movement have been highly successful. This success has been a consequence of the everlasting feedback, pulling and pushing between the two main organizations, *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. Following the literature, the main cultural consequences are those related to beliefs, values and opinions (Earl, 2007: 512). The impact is so big that peace activism is locked in the Basque context. The frame developed by the Basque peace movement defines the ways of action, the repertoire and the attribution of a situation so solid that trying to propose alternatives is unheard of. This success brought several consequences. At the organizational level, both *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* became highly specialized, the former in maintaining and creating symbols and the latter in political action. With the decrease of political violence, *Gesto por la Paz* was being drawn to the edge of action, defending victims of terrorism rights, stressing the importance of meanings and defending the idea of separation of conflicts. This struggle for cultural meanings (Melucci, 1996: 99) is what defined *Gesto por la Paz* since its creation. *Lokarri* became specialized in achieving political outcomes, focusing on campaigns looking for a political consultation or calling political parties to action.

Another consequence of the Basque Peace Frame success, although unintended, was a surplus of legitimacy that the political institutions enjoy. Blaming ETA for the violence without properly addressing the different problems that came from the state apparatus gave the idea that there was only one problem. The overall perception made it very difficult for different organizations

ideologically near to ETA to operate, as I explain in the next chapter. However, the most important problem derived from this idea was the battle that ensued with the political institutions when they tried to use the Basque peace movement methods to address the conflict. The last time it happened, in 1998, the process ended in the fragmentation of *Gesto por la Paz* and in a steady decline of the mobilizing potential of the organization (Funes, 1998a). *Lokarri* had to compete with different initiatives from the political institutions to channel social participation in the conflict¹⁰⁹. In some cases *Lokarri* decided to collaborate with those initiatives, but in most cases the organization was drawn in a competition to create more social impact. This concern was reflected in an informal conversation with the director of *Lokarri*, when he stated that some media had detected that the Basque government surpassed them in terms of media coverage (Fn. 30/03/2007).

This sense of “live and let live” defended by both organizations conceals a cultural interdependence that created a very powerful Basque Peace Frame that shapes all aspects of peace action in the Basque conflict. Even the political institutions take the tools and approaches developed by the Basque peace movement organizations when they have to stand against violence. If this is true, it raises the question of what happened with other social organizations? In the next chapter, I explain how different social organizations have incorporated the peace message, in an implicit or explicit way and how they shape their messages to achieve social impact taking into account those variables.

¹⁰⁹ The most important was the “konpondu” (to fix) initiative. A web forum created to collect social opinions about the conflict. This initiative was closed after the end of the ceasefire.

CHAPTER 8 – THE EXTERNAL IMPACTS OF THE BASQUE PEACE FRAME

To approach the different organizations explained in chapter 5, I divided them into four categories, using their objectives and characteristics as a basis for grouping. This differentiation is been explained in chapters 3 and 5. In these chapters it has been stated that this categorization is methodological in nature and does not try to eliminate the inherent complexities inside the relationships that occur in the Basque society. The first category includes organizations that are devoted to peace research or social solidarity. In this category are *Gernika Gogoratuz*, *Baketik* and *Bakeola*. The organizations in the second category share the same political idea or goal, the *nationalist left*. These organizations are *TAT* and *Etixerat*. They appeared to respond to issues directly related to left-wing Basque nationalists involved in the conflict. Its ideological opposition to the second category organizations defines the third category. *Basta Ya* is an organization created to defend the current political status quo and to defend the rights of victims of terrorism violence. Finally, the *EGK*, which has its origins in the political institutions, fulfils the last category.

These four categories attempt to represent the main ideological tendencies among social organizations that address issues related to the Basque conflict. They represent the entire national ideological spectrum that exists in Basque politics and the different positions, inclusive, exclusive, pro or anti independence (Perez-Agote, 2008; Letamendia, 1997; Ibarra, 2005b). The *nationalist left* organizations (second category) and the defenders of the status quo (third category) represent the most extreme positions, with the rest in the

middle. It is important to note that *Bakeola*, is tied to the Catholic Church, a very powerful agent of socialization in Basque society (Perez-Agote, 2008: 145). The only organization that cannot be positioned within a nationalistic ideology is the *EGK*. This organization, however, deals with Basque youth issues and, as it is described in chapter 5, includes youth organizations that reflect a variety of national ideologies. This last category is useful as a test. It shows that common identity ground is needed to understand the frame propagation.

In essence, the organizations in the four categories address different conflict issues. These issues include amongst others:

- Rights of the family members of ETA prisoners;
- Rights of victims of torture made by the police forces;
- Research in peace and conflict;
- Promotion of an ethical vision of conflict resolution to be applied in the Basque Country;
- Peace education;
- Victims of terrorism rights; and
- Defenders of the political status quo and youth rights.

These issues are present in most of the organizations that try to raise conflict issues in the Basque Country. However, the four categories of organizations identified above are not the only organizations that work on these issues. It is important to briefly explain the organizations that are not present in this research.

I found it difficult to contact organizations that lay at the extremes of the national ideological spectrum. To effectively overcome this challenge, it was possible to develop a different strategy and access organizations with similar

and, in some cases, overlapping knowledge of the issues at hand. The clearest examples are *Askatasuna*¹¹⁰ and the *Terrorism Victims Association* or *AVT*¹¹¹. In the first case, it was an issue of practicability (Lofland, 1996: 26). *Askatasuna* is an organization devoted to denouncing the conditions of ETA prisoners¹¹². It was, and still is, a banned organization with most of its members in prison or with criminal charges of ETA membership. This, according to some people close to that organization, made gaining access very difficult (Fn. 02/07/2007). A tentative approach was made through the *TAT* with no success. *Askatasuna* at the same time is the organization with more mobilizing potential among the pro-independence Basque *nationalist left* social organizations. To overcome that setback I tried to contact another *nationalist left* organization that shared similar objectives, *Etixerat*. The logic was that *Etixerat* was legal. I collected information about *Etixerat* first, trying to understand the differences with *Askatasuna*:

"*Askatasuna*, now I can't use that name because it's banned, is the anti-repressive organism. *Etixerat* is in charge of giving assistance to the family members, of arranging buses. On one hand, they (*Askatasuna*) work denouncing, marching, data collecting and to raise money for the prisoners, to pay medical assistance, etc. What happens now is that *Gestoras*¹¹³ is illegal, I

¹¹⁰ Freedom in Basque. Banned organization.

¹¹¹ AVT stands for Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo, in Spanish.

¹¹² Since the beginning of its actions, ETA used its prisoners as another front of struggle. In response, the Spanish government devise a policy to maintain ETA prisoners scattered and far away from the Basque Country. For more information: IBARRA, P. (1987) *La Evolución estratégica de E.T.A.*, San Sebastian, Kriselu.; LETAMENDIA, F. (1994b) *Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A. Vol 1. E.T.A en el Franquismo*, San Sebastian, R&B Editores., or DOUGLASS, W. A. & ZULAIKA, J. (1990) "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32,(2) 238-257.

¹¹³ Former name of *Askatasuna*. The original name was *Gestoras pro-amnistia* or Pro-amnesty promoters in Spanish.

can't use that name. *Askatasuna* is illegal too so now we use *Amnistiaren Aldeko Mugimendua*¹¹⁴. Inside of that is *Etixerat*." TAT member. Interview 7.

That last fact is highly contentious. In the same interview, the interviewee declares that the relations between *Askatasuna* and *Etixerat* are far from cordial.

"And I can tell you that *Askatasuna* and *Etixerat* don't have a good relationship. They always have an argument about the time to call a demonstration and things like that" TAT member. Interview 7.

The complexity behind the *nationalist left* network is explained later. The fact that *Etixerat* was an accessible organization was encouraging and provided the further insight necessary for this research.

The other organization that proved difficult to approach was the *AVT*, and there were a number of reasons for this. The first problem I found was the absence of a gatekeeper. This was compounded by the fact that some of the members of the *AVT* are people that, besides being targets of ETA violence, had a past membership with *Gesto por la Paz*. Accordingly, the vast majority had an unfavourable view of the Basque peace movement organizations. The second problem is that the *AVT* is a Spanish organization, based in Madrid, making *AVT* difficult to reach due the travel required. The third problem was its highly complex nature. Although it claimed to be representative of all victims of terrorism in the country, some organizations representing regional victims of violence did not recognize it. More significantly, it was in an open conflict with the newly created victims associations of the 11th of March. This organization,

¹¹⁴ Movement Pro-Amnesty in Basque. This movement does not have a legal structure, it is the name given to the same structure that holds *Askatasuna*.

which was created after the bombings on the Madrid trains in 2004, did not allow its members to be part of the AVT due to ideological differences. The different messages received from different people near the AVT, suggested a Basque Country based organization would be better, and I focused my efforts on *Basta Ya*, *Foro de Ermua*¹¹⁵ and *Covite*¹¹⁶. I gained access to the first organization largely through the personal openness of one member of the directive body. In the case of *Covite* access proved more difficult. I tried to contact them several times, using phone, fax, email and even a direct visit to its headquarters. I only got a response several months later, when I was in the advanced stage of writing up, in late 2009, telling me that *Covite* was studying my proposal. That was the last response. I tried to contact them again in 2010, with no luck. After exploring the data obtained from *Basta Ya*, I decided that, due the advancements in the research, it was too late. The *Foro de Ermua* case is simpler. After trying to contact them using the same methods, I received a negative response. An interview with a *Basta Ya* member may account for the difficulty in gaining access to *Foro De Ermua*:

“... *Foro de Ermua* has a little presence in the Basque Country. It has some known members in Bilbao, but, basically, that is it. It is a group that moves a lot to Madrid, that is great, but we always insisted in the importance of civic activism on the streets. Not making press releases and things like that. These were the things that *Foro de Ermua* was doing.” *Basta Ya* member. Interview 3.

¹¹⁵ Forum of Ermua in Spanish. It is an organization created after the assassination of a local politician from a small town called Ermua, Miguel Angel Blanco, in 1998. The organization rejects any kind of negotiation with ETA or any Basque nationalism political party or organization. <http://www.foroermua.com/web/> (20/10/2010)

¹¹⁶ Acronym for Terrorism Victims Collective. It was created in 1998 to defend the rights of ETA victims in the Basque Country and to achieve a status of political reference in a hypothetical pacification scenario. <http://www.avt.org/> (20/10/2010)

It is important to note that, with *Basta Ya* and *Etixerat*, it was possible to explore the whole scope of social reactions to the conflict in the Basque Country. In particular, they gave me the opportunity to include two important issues, the victims of terrorism and the ETA prisoners. However, to be able to assess with certainty what those collectives think and how they reacted to the Basque peace movement, it was necessary to develop a deeper exploration of the organizations mentioned.

In this part, I have explained the analytic division of the organizations in four groups with some limitations that the choice of organizations brought to this research. Now, I explain each group in more detail and how they reacted to the efforts to frame the Basque peace movement.

Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz

These organizations act in the periphery of the Basque peace movement because their main objectives are related to peace research and peace education, not mobilizing society. *Baketik* and *Gernika Gogoratuz* are peace research centres. *Bakeola* is a catholic peace education organization that is more concerned with direct work in schools and with impoverished people than mobilization. Accordingly, one may question why these organizations were identified as important? The peace social movement in the Basque Country, as explained in the last chapter, is highly centred in *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz*. The nature of *Gesto por la Paz* as a coordinator of local peace groups made it the perfect hub for peace action. Whereas the clever use of resources by *Lokarri* (or *Elkarri*), driven by the “specialization” that comes from the

competition between peace groups, made other peace organizations¹¹⁷ with a political agenda disappear in the past. The place of these organizations in this research is due to different reasons, depending on the point of view, but, for now, it is important to say that they are generators of intellectual and cultural goods used by the Basque peace movement organizations widely. From *Lokarri's* point of view, as it used more pressure groups to channel its demands, it needed experts to support its perspectives (Funes, 1998b; De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 97). This is a need that appears in social movement organizations with a structural approach to action (Carter, 1992: 20; Overy, 1982; Zald & McCarthy, 1987a; Zald & Ash, 1966; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam et al., 1996a). The work of *Lokarri* needed the production of reports that accounted for the current political situation¹¹⁸, and accordingly *Lokarri* used experts in some of its initiatives. The social observatory¹¹⁹, for example, started as a document explaining the political situation regarding the conflict. A team of experts, university professors and personalities well known in the Basque Country created this document. This need of qualitative knowledge ensured *Lokarri* was keen to build bridges between the different peace research organizations, not least to ensure the accumulation of information. The relationship with *Gesto por la Paz* is more tenuous. The social nature of the organization meant the need

¹¹⁷ One example is *Bakea Orain*, created in 1992. This organization was created by members of *Gesto por la Paz* who felt the need of a more political approach to the Basque conflict. They never faced the opposition from *Lokarri* (*Elkarri* in that time) and they even collaborated with them in several initiatives. Finally, the clever use of resources by *Elkarri* (being able to struck alliances with the political party in power in that time, the PNV) and the lack of mobilization spaces filled by *Gesto por la Paz*, made them to cease activities in the late 90s.

¹¹⁸ Best examples: CHAPMAN, S. (2006) *Report on the Basque Conflict: Keys to understanding the ETA's permanent ceasefire*, Bilbao, Lokarri. (<http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/Inform.pdf> (20/09/2010), and the "Social Observatory" initiative, where some intellectuals describe the political scenario regularly. This initiative was open recently to the public. <http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/observatorio-social> (20/09/2010)

¹¹⁹ For the first Observatory publication: <http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/observatorio.pdf> (20/12/2010)

for peace research was less important. Instead it favoured using popular personalities and appealed to cultural values during their events. However, the influence of both organizations upon *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* work is considerable. This could be explained using social movement network theory (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Diani, 2007; Diani, 1998). The analysis of networks that exist between the Basque peace movement organizations and *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*, gives some insights into some of the most important issues regarding frame propagation. These are, from the Basque peace movement organizations' point of view, the effects on participation; the assessment of the relative strength of the Basque Peace Frame; and the influence of personal networks. I stress the importance of shared collective identity networks, as they are the key link to understanding the frame diffusion. This last point leads to the issue of leadership, often overlooked, but crucial to understanding the work of one of these organizations, *Baketik*, founded and directed by the former director of *Elkarri*. From *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* point of view, the important effects are that the Basque Peace Frame permeates their discourse and ethos, therefore, the importance of that permeation in the research and action direction of them and their capacity to create a significant feedback process into the Basque peace movement organizations.

It is interesting to note that the relationships between organizations are not only present at the utilitarian level and they do not just use each other to achieve a goal. Rather, these relations are a consequence of the collective identity building that happened before. *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* come from the same submerged networks explained in chapter 6. In

essence this is the result of what Melucci calls “hidden networks”, a consequence of an overlapping of ideas, ideologies, and individuals between the Basque peace movement organizations and these organizations (Melucci, 1989: 70; Diani, 2007: 339). The unique characteristics of Basque civil society, with its dense identity groups, its dynamic collective action and its limited numbers amongst the population, created a perfect environment for the existence of those networks. Consequently, it is not a surprise to find that some of the individuals involved in *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* were involved in the early peace groups of the 1980s and 1990s.

“I remember ... [in the late 1980s] ... I was studying for the exams to access the university and something made me make contact con *Gesto por la Paz* during that time. I started my degree and I was very involved with *Gesto*. After that I started to be in contact with *Elkarri* as well”.
Bakeola member. Interview 1.

The *Bakeola* interviewee’s experience is present in the other organizations members that were interviewed. Indeed, it is clear when it comes to analyzing an organization such as *Baketik*, that it was created from the experiences and personal will of the former director of *Elkarri*. In the book that forms the basis of *Baketik*’s ethos, the director states that everything is the consequence of his life experience in collective action on a range of issues, from environmental protest to his role as director of *Elkarri* (Fernandez, 2006: 17).

The intellectual exercise that we are going to embark upon now includes the description of those networks, how they were created and their nature. It concludes with an analysis of how those networks affect the Basque peace

movement organizations and *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*, focusing on the different effects described.

The people behind *Gernika Gogoratuz*, *Bakeola*, and *Baketik* were part of that original populace that was engaged in social action in the early 1980s. As explained in the last chapter, these groups were responsible for the creation of the local peace groups that were the backbone of *Gesto por la Paz* and the environmental protests that determined the origin of *Elkarri*. These networks of likeminded people served as a communication channel to create the new meaning of protest in the early days of democracy. These networks were based on the defence of Basque cultural values, created in the private sphere and with a highly emotive component (Funes, 1998a: 85). This dense network of relations was particularly active at the local and parochial level (Perez-Agote, 2008: 131). During the Franco years, these networks were key to understanding the modern dynamics of the *nationalist left*. Some authors (Funes, 1998a; Tejerina, 2001) describe these networks with two different categories: the catholic, parochial level and the pro-independence level. However, I argue that the relationship between these two is more complex than it first appears. While Funes argues that both *Gesto por la Paz* and *Elkarri* networks had impacts independent of one another (Funes, 1998a: 89-92), it is perhaps more accurate to view these as intertwined in a complicated relationship. The main difference is the perception of the use of violence for political means, as explained in chapter 6. The peace network rejects the use of violence, but that does not mean that pacifists do not share a common nationalist goal. Therefore, they struggle with the *nationalist left*, but they are compelled to understand each other. As was noted in the last chapter, *Gesto por la Paz* was a consequence of

the new political scenario. However, I would like to go a little further and suggest that an analysis of *Gesto por la Paz* during its beginnings is more likely to conclude this was a countermovement that was both new and novel. The field of social protest in the early years of democracy was monopolized by the *nationalist left*, which used public space to advocate for independence. This was carried out using contentious and disrupting methods, like marches that often evolved into riots and low level urban warfare (Casquette, 2003; Casquette, 2006). The local peace groups broke with those dynamics, proposing a new means of using the public space that was non contentious and highly symbolic. In fact, it was the complete opposite; a silent demonstration of social discontent emerging as a consequence of the dynamics that were going on in the social network that created those groups. That sense of innovation and success encouraged members of those networks to try new experiences closer to their own fields. In the case of *Gernika Gogoratuz*, it was not a coincidence that university professors created it:

“That year (1987), *Gernika Gogoratuz* was created. *Gernika Gogoratuz* is an association formed by men and women tied with the UPV (Basque Country University), mainly with a pedagogy background who were involved in the pacifist movement. That group of people were interested in concepts like image-enemy and perception of threats. These concepts determine and orientate the work of the peace studies research centre”. *Gernika Gogoratuz* member. Interview 6.

Another explanation for the dense nature of the peace network was the need for these networks. The network had to overcome a well-established set of affective relations that was the *nationalist left*. Therefore, an even stronger

network was needed (Diani, 1998: 246). The consequence of all of this is the creation of a network that thrived in the new democratic environment and needed innovation and 'newness' to survive. The realization that something new could be done for peace and the tradition for social action based on dense social networks generated the perfect scenario for the creation of organizations outside the Basque peace movement. These organizations deal with issues related to peace, but outside the structures of collective action adopted by earlier groups. *Baketik* was created as a result of the direct experience of an individual who was seeking to provide an opportunity to explore new social dimensions. The main consequence of the sharing of collective action networks and individual overlapping is that the impacts of the Basque peace movement organizations on those organizations became more varied, as well as facilitating the existence of a significant feedback process between them.

***Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz* network effects on the Basque Peace Frame**

As previously stated, most of the people involved in *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* were, or are, part of the Basque peace movement. Some are active members of either *Lokarri* or *Gesto por la Paz* or they work as individuals in any of the local peace groups. This has direct consequences in the way action is framed within *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*. The most important issue regarding this area of research is that these organizations share the conflict diagnosis with the Basque peace movement organizations. This diagnosis is as follows: the main problem is the political violence, ETA and, more significantly, the Spanish state causing this problem. This political violence is the extreme consequence of a conflict with historical roots in the

Basque national identity. Finally, this conflict and, therefore, the political violence, caused a deep divide in Basque society. This division can only be healed through a process of mutual understanding and reconciliation.

The innovation that the pacifist movement brought into collective action in the 1980s created the spaces needed to apply the above diagnosis to new dynamics to tackle the conflict. The most interesting thing about this process is the capacity that *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* developed over time to constructively criticize the work done by the Basque peace movement organizations. I use *Bakeola* as an example. During the interview done with *Bakeola*, the interviewee praised the work done by the Basque peace movement organizations. However, because the specific ethos of *Bakeola*, a critique is made about how the Basque peace movement organizations overstate the importance of political violence in the everyday life of the Basque.

“I think that what is called the Basque conflict is separated from social reality. You have political parties. It is an ideological conflict with, consequently, a lot of pain and suffering in different collectives, but the overwhelming majority of the society lives in a different plane. So, the people live with everything good and bad in this life and the conflict is upon the people who have their freedom compromised; or the people who are in jail and their families; or the people who are victims of political violence; or suffered human rights abuses, but the overwhelming majority, the rest, I would say 95% of the society, of people, of human beings, of Euskadi and Spain, their lives go in another path, it is another thing.” *Bakeola* member. Interview 1.

Bakeola does not reject the work done by the Basque peace movement organizations; on the contrary, the organization is present in several pacifist

initiatives¹²⁰. A direct effect of this critique is the influence that *Bakeola* and *Gernika Gogoratuz* have on the Basque peace movement organizations initiatives that are not directly related to their ethos. The work of *Gesto por la Paz* about peace education¹²¹ and the direct involvement of *Lokarri* in the Basque network of associations for peace education is a perfect example of this¹²².

Therefore, it is plausible to say that through their relationships with the dense pacifist networks of the 1980s, some members of the Basque peace movement organizations and *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* have created strong feedback channels. Those channels are based upon the collective identity processes that existed inside the mentioned peace networks. That “Peace identity” is the key ingredient that gives strength to the feedback process between the Basque peace movement organizations and *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*.

Before finishing, it is interesting to analyze *Baketik*, created and directed by Elkarri’s former director, Jonan Fernandez. *Baketik* is, therefore, a direct consequence of the Basque peace movement.

“I had a 14 years experience in *Elkarri*, which was a social movement for the dialogue, the agreement and non-violence in the Basque conflict. From that experience came the opportunity

¹²⁰ *Bakeola* director and *Lokarri* director know each other personally. They work together in different initiatives regarding peace education and they have a strong presence in different social networks advocating for peace initiatives.

¹²¹ See the document “Educar para la Paz” (To Educate for Peace) created by *Gesto por la Paz* in 2001 <http://gesto.org/pdf/educarparalapaz.pdf> (20/10/2010). This document was created jointly with *Gernika Gogoratuz* and *Unesco Etxea* (UNESCO in the Basque Country).

¹²² “Foro de Asociaciones de Educacion en Derechos Humanos y por la Paz (Forum of associations for education in Human Rights and Peace) http://www.bakeola.org/archivos/experiencias/16_es_Foro%20de%20Asociaciones%20liburuxka.pdf (20/10/2010)

to create a centre that combined ethics and conflict. That was the consequence of what I learned during those 14 years of experience in *Elkarri* and during the 7 years before that when I was involved in the Leizaran Highway protests.” *Baketik* member. Interview 2.

When I had the opportunity to interview a *Baketik* member, the interviewee and the *Baketik* team made clear that they were only going to speak about *Baketik* and not about their *Elkarri* experience (Fn. 23/08/2007). *Baketik* considers it important to avoid being identified with *Lokarri*, but as I exposed in the last chapter, the shadow of the former *Elkarri* director is long amongst *Lokarri* members. Jonan Fernandez does not like to appear much in *Lokarri* meetings, but his appearance in public acts lends legitimacy to *Lokarri* actions, especially for *Lokarri* members¹²³. This fact, and his impact on some members, could make him a “movement intellectual”, a justification for a movement that now produces strategic proposals (Barker & Cox, 2001). Another consequence is the high level of appreciation that *Baketik*’s work has inside *Lokarri*. This is key to understanding possible changes in the Basque Peace Frame, because issues brought up by *Baketik* frequently appear in *Lokarri* meetings.

To conclude, the bonds created inside the pacifist networks of the 1980s and 1990s were the roots for the channels of interaction between the Basque peace movement organizations and *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*. These channels have consequences at the organizational level (in the case of *Lokarri*) and at the individual level (in the case of *Gesto por la Paz*). In both cases, which are not mutually exclusive, the main bonding factor is the pacifist identity created and nurtured inside those pacifist networks. The sharing of that

¹²³ He contributed with some opinion articles to *Haritu*, *Lokarri*’s magazine. See *Haritu*, no. 5.

collective identity and the sharing of the conflict diagnosis makes possible a fluid communication between the Basque peace movement organizations and *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz*. These communication channels have been directly influential in the dynamics of participation, leadership and frame propagation. *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* are used by the Basque peace movement organizations as examples of their success. This is perhaps not a conscious linkage, but it is a consequence of some of *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* members belonging to the pacifist networks. This gives the Basque peace movement organizations a strong advantage in promoting participation, internally and externally (Diani, 2007: 345). Indeed, the linkage “forces” the Basque peace movement organizations to participate in different projects outside their sphere of influence, as *Lokarri*’s work in the forum for education on human rights and peace clearly illustrates. The leadership is another area that is influenced by the communication channels; the clearest example of this is with *Baketik*. However, some of the prominent members of *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* were active members of the local peace groups and those allegiances are difficult to forget. Finally, the Basque Peace Frame has been influenced in an interesting feedback process. The issues treated by *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* are appearing inside the Basque peace movement organizations, providing new ways to tackle the conflict and introducing new concepts, like ethics of conflict resolution, and academic concepts in the Basque peace movement organizations vocabulary. This reinforces the importance of social reconciliation. In this regard, it is worth acknowledging the role of the Basque peace movement as a source of new ways of understanding society. It provided a new

means of understanding politics, without violence, in the context of an apparently enduring association between violence and nationalism. The absence of violence was the starting point for providing a glimmer of hope for a reconciliation scenario. Thus, the Basque peace movement organizations are generators of a new analysis of society (Cox & Fominaya, 2009: 4).

To finish this section, it is important to note that *Gernika Gogoratuz*, *Bakeola*, and *Baketik* are not the only Basque organizations devoted to research or solidarity work. There are more, including the previously mentioned *Unesco Etxea* or *Bakeaz*, another peace research centre. They have slightly different ways of acting, but the differences with *Baketik*, *Bakeola*, and *Gernika Gogoratuz* in terms of this research are minimal.

The nationalist left organizations: Etxerat and TAT

It has been stated that the linkage between the Basque peace movement organizations and the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations is the shared pacifist collective identity. In the case of this category, the *nationalist left* organizations, the identity is not pacifist, but nationalist. Political collective identities are a recognized way of perceiving the other in the Basque Country. The Basque national identity is been constructed continuously for centuries and is well established as a defining political feature (Castells, 1998: 30). The national identity, therefore, works as an exclusive construction, thanks to the different processes of radicalization explained in chapter 6 (Perez-Agote, 2008: 135). This trend is changing as noted by various authors (Ibarra, 2005b; Perez-Agote, 1998) that detected trends of inclusion in the Basque national identity. This is relevant for this research explaining the identity position of the nationalist left as this collective still relies in old ways of reproduction of identities.

The organizations that belong to the *nationalist left* network have been constructed as a mirror image of the society they try to overcome (Letamendia, 1997: 19). This network was the result of the propagation mechanisms that the nationalist identity had in place during the Dictatorship years (Perez-Agote, 2008: 133). The result is a high-density network with few communication channels with the outside. This network has organizations devoted to dealing with any aspect of the conflict in *nationalist left* terms. This network had many denominations in different academic works¹²⁴. The *nationalist left* is a high-density network with a high structural interdependency (Funes, 1998a: 92; Requena, 1994: 38-53). That means that there are plenty of communication points between organizations¹²⁵ in the *nationalist left*. These organizations enjoy smooth and clear channels between them. According to the portrayal presented by Funes (Funes, 1998a), this network is perceived by outsiders as enjoying a great homogeneity. However in contrast to the view of the cited author, that does not mean a perfect homogeneity inside. During this research it was possible to see, thanks to interviews and interaction with members of the network, the differences between organizations in the *nationalist left*. The main issue was a high level of competition in terms of the ability of different organizations to articulate the message of the network. Every organization tries to emphasise its message to the other organizations and, therefore, to send its

¹²⁴ Two of the most popular are: *MLNV* (Basque National Liberation Movement) and the more generalist, *Izquierda Abertzale (nationalist left)*. The *MLNV* respond to a need to give political objectives to the network, but it is not a machine working homogenously for Basque freedom. The second respond to a need of social and political categorization. If the vast majority of the people in the network are left-wing nationalists, not all Basque left-wing nationalists are in the network. The defining difference is the acceptance of violence as a political mean.

¹²⁵ As noted at the start of the description, there are organizations that address almost every issue related to the conflict. Some of them are: *Askatasuna*, which address the political rights of ETA prisoners; *SEGI*, which address the role of young people in the conflict; *TAT*, used in this research that gives protection and legal counsel to victims of police tortures and *Etixerat*, also used in this research, that fights for the rights of ETA prisoners' family members.

message to the outside. The two organizations in this research, *TAT* and *Etixerat*, are an example of the least successful organizations in this competition. This is because the main component of the network is political and these two organizations have a more social agenda. Indeed, although the political issue is present in *TAT* and *Etixerat*, it is not central. As was noted in chapter five, that creates problems between organizations in the *nationalist left*.

“If you are talking about something and then, cases of torture appear, for example, then you have to talk. But that’s not the rule. That only happens occasionally” *Etixerat* member. Interview 5.

This does not mean that the organizations in the *nationalist left* are disconnected, only that their network is not homogeneous. It is important to say that various authors identify the *nationalist left* as a pyramidal structure, with ETA at the top and the social organizations at the bottom, thus presenting a robust, hierarchical exterior appearance as the defining trait (Llera Ramo, 2003; Mata, 1993). This fact has been influenced by the “vanguard” image that ETA has had since its origins (Ibarra, 1987; Letamendia, 1994b). However, the evidence suggests that this kind of analysis lacks methodological insight and does not take into account the complexity of the *nationalist left* network. This is not the same as saying that ETA does not have open communication channels to the *nationalist left* organizations, but negates the monolithic, top-down nature of the *nationalist left*, as presented by those authors.

The *nationalist left* has very solid communication channels among its organizations. This leads to a well-developed sense of solidarity between them which enables a high degree of social control inside the *nationalist left* (Funes,

1998a: 94). This leads to one of the main problems the *nationalist left* has: its inability to adapt to Political Opportunity Structure changes (Muro, 2008). The rigid mechanisms of comfort and control do not make them amenable to changes in the political opportunity structure and make it difficult to assess the impact of those changes when they do occur. It is difficult for the organizations to perceive flaws in their strategy, and change is more difficult. This is exacerbated by the non-inclusive nature of the network, a consequence of the contentious nature of the network in the Dictatorship (Ibarra, 2005b: 188). This puts the organizations in a difficult position and the most common answer is to adapt their discourse to the surrounding reality through more difficult explanations, making them perceive injustice in almost every aspect of their social life.

“Everybody who is kept in isolation is being tortured. For me. Simply a person in that environment... The person who is in isolation knows that he cannot communicate with anybody and nobody will be able to contact him. That is intimidation. It is fear. Even if they tell you using good manners.” *TAT* member. Interview 7.

“At the beginning we had some rights violated to fight against, like the dispersion. But things have changed. The change the law to prevent ETA prisoners enjoying any rights, just like any other prisoner” *Etixerat* member. Interview 5.

Inside the *nationalist left*, the two organizations included in this research are, perhaps, the most open to change. *TAT* and *Etixerat* are two legal organizations (unlike most of the organizations in the *nationalist left*). Their message is not exclusively political, but has a great social and emotional ingredient. Most importantly, the message is open to all of society, not only the

members or sympathizers of the *nationalist left*. In the case of the *TAT*, it offers its services to all those that feel they are victims of torture, even if the degree of success in resolving these claims is limited. To do otherwise would be counter to the objectives of the organization.

“We, as a principle, there are lot of people tortured and we contact them. Some of them do not want to know about it. Not a lot, maybe 1% of the cases. Maybe because their parents are against us, maybe because they don’t want to give us their testimony. Maybe because the Ertzaina takes them and the less relations with us the earlier they will get out. But when the people know about us they like our work” *TAT* member. Interview 7.

Etixerat, on the other hand, tries to spread its vision of injustice to all society. That is not done with a political end in mind, but with an emotional component. *Etixerat* is one of the most symbolic organizations in the *nationalist left* and uses white neck scarves as a badge of its identity¹²⁶. The most important difference between other *nationalist left* organizations is that they are not antagonistic in nature. For this research, these are the most interesting organizations because this is where the Basque peace movement organizations have more possibilities to enter the *nationalist left*.

Frame effects on the *nationalist left*

The *nationalist left* does not share the same vision of the conflict as the Basque peace movement organizations. For them, the conflict is a historical struggle for the rights of the Basque people. These rights are national rights that have been negated by the Spanish state, which ultimately bears sole responsibility for the current situation. ETA is just a consequence of the

¹²⁶ <http://www.etxerat.info/nortzu.php?lang=es> (20/10/2010)

repressive action that comes from the Spanish state. That repression has been particularly hard during the Dictatorship and, for some sectors of the *nationalist left* that did not change with democracy. To solve the conflict, it is imperative for the Spanish state to recognize the rights of the Basque people, end the repression and let the Basque people decide their own future without external influences (Ibarra, 2005b; Letamendia, 1994b; Zirakzadeh, 1991).

The Basque peace movement organizations have affected these organizations using an action-reaction dynamic. The *TAT* reacted to *Gesto por la Paz*'s work for victims of ETA highlighting the torture problem. *Gesto por la Paz* is an example of a negative impact inside these organizations. When asked about the lack of contact with *Gesto por la Paz*, the *TAT* member was very clear:

"I see it is quite difficult. I've seen it. It was an act to support victims of ETA organized by *Gesto por la Paz*. And that is what *Gesto por la Paz* is. We are not going to go there. We think that the victims have to be addressed using other ways. They are making categories" *TAT* member. Interview 7.

Etixerat has a more negative opinion of *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri*. Regarding the latter, the feeling inside the organization is that they are well funded and do not follow the right objectives. Concerning *Gesto por la Paz* they feel that the organization only focuses on one side of the conflict.

"When someone says that it is a group that works for peace and for making disappear all violence expressions, then, they don't do it. They don't even present them like that. They are groups created against violence committed by ETA. And there, we clash." *Etixerat* member. Interview 5.

That does not mean that the relationship between the Basque peace movement organizations and the *nationalist left* is completely negative. Both *Lokarri*, in its various documents devoted to describing the social situation¹²⁷, and *Gesto por la Paz*¹²⁸ supported different initiatives to ban torture and to acknowledge the rights of the prisoner's family members. The relationship with *Lokarri* is more interesting for this research. The origins of *Lokarri* and its political proposal make the organization closer to both *TAT* and *Etixerat*. Maria Jesus Funes, for example, asserts that *Elkarri* was a response from the *nationalist left* networks to the Basque peace movement (Funes, 1998a: 47; Funes, 1998b: 502). Part of the social base that formed *Elkarri* had a dualistic membership in the *nationalist left* and pacifist networks, but that does not mean that *Elkarri* was a nationalist project. This is the consequence of the homogenous exterior image of the *nationalist left*. *Elkarri* was created as a consequence of the political situation and the evolution of the Basque peace movement. The people that created *Elkarri* shared similar identity trends as the people involved in the *nationalist left*, but were not part of it. This issue makes *Lokarri*, as the most direct expression of *Elkarri*, better accepted inside both the *TAT* and *Etixerat*. Those channels of acceptance work in two ways, as explained, *Lokarri* is better accepted and the demands from *TAT* and *Etixerat* are easily included in *Lokarri*'s ethos.

¹²⁷ <http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/observatorio-social> (20/10/2010)

¹²⁸ <http://gesto.org/delitosterrorismo1.htm> (20/10/2010). *Gesto por la Paz* document advocating for a fair treatment of ETA prisoners. And http://gesto.org/prensapdf/08-01-08%20NP%20torturas%20_1_.pdf (20/10/2010), denouncing a case of possible tortures.

"With *Lokarri* we have a good relationship. They always sign when we ask, they support us. Very well. They even asked us to do something and, if we couldn't, they didn't have any problem with that. It is not because we didn't want to. It was because we are very slow taking decisions" *TAT* member. Interview 7.

In conclusion, the impact of the Basque peace movement organizations on the *nationalist left* organizations analyzed in this research is subtle. This is because the identity trend is different. With the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations they share the same contacts and collective identity, but with the *nationalist left* the identity clashes if the issue of violence is raised. The acceptance of the use of violence by the *nationalist left* during the Dictatorship is what made the peace networks assume their identity trait rejecting violence. There are no open feedback channels and the changes are based in an action-reaction model. The Basque peace movement organizations reacted to this by supporting more initiatives that came from *TAT* or *Etxerat*. An interesting case is *Lokarri*. The shared past with the *nationalist left* gives it a more positive view inside *TAT* and *Etxerat*. It is important to note the difficulties of the *nationalist left* to react to changes in the Political Opportunity Structure. This makes the Basque peace movement organizations use frame amplification processes to get inside those organizations. Finally, the analysis of the *nationalist left* gives the most important fact about Basque social interaction: the sharing of a collective identity, which is key to understanding the channels of influence. As I present in the next part of this chapter, the existence of common identity trends that worked for *Lokarri* and the *nationalist left* do work similarly for *Gesto por la Paz* and the victims of terrorism organizations.

Basta Ya and the fight for victims of ETA rights

The organizations that defend the victims of terrorism rights lie in the opposite end of the ideological spectrum from the *nationalist left*. They support the role of the Spanish State and most of them, including *Basta Ya*, defend a political settlement that does not contain any concessions towards Basque nationalism. The most interesting characteristic about these organizations is that they are a direct consequence of the amazing success of the Basque peace movement, specifically *Gesto por la Paz*. The majority of members of these organizations identify with the local peace groups. They started to develop a pacifist identity, the same process explained in the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations section. They stressed the importance of retaking the public space to protest against violence, a process performed by *Gesto por la Paz*, as explained in chapter 4. From the massive public mobilization that happened in 1997 (Funes, 1998a: 7) and the existence of an organization that was advocating for a political solution (*Elkarri*), came the perception that political demands could be articulated. From that group of factors appeared organizations, such as the *Foro de Ermua* and *Basta Ya*. Of these two organizations, I focus on *Basta Ya*. The reasons are explained at the beginning of this chapter, but also because *Basta Ya* reflects the two key components of this kind of organization: the defence of victims of terrorism, and forthright opposition to the nationalist project in the Basque Country. To some researchers, *Basta Ya* belongs to what is called the “Constitutionalist Movement” (Chapman, 2006: 14). This denomination stresses the political position of those organizations and omits their role for the victims of ETA. In contrast, this role is crucial to understand *Basta Ya* as it is the final

consequence of *Gesto por la Paz*'s efforts to make the society aware of the suffering that some people were going through. The 1997 events however politically committed members of *Gesto por la Paz* decided to abandon the organization. This collective of people were those who suffered the violence from ETA more directly. They started in *Gesto por la Paz* because it gave them the opportunity to protest against the political violence. But instead of developing a pacifist identity; they collectively created an enemy figure. They did not only rejected violence, but they rejected the people who supported violence in the first place. After 1997, they perceived that the Basque peace movement was not enough and they decided to create new organizations that stood directly against ETA violence and the nationalist political ideology.

"We created *Basta Ya* because we were convinced that was a need to organize a civic mobilization, in the streets, in the public spaces. More importantly, covering three key issues: for the victims of terrorism; to defend the constitutional political frame and against terrorism, specifically against ETA, but against any kind of terrorism as well" *Basta Ya* member. Interview 3.

Basta Ya belongs to a network that perceives anything that is Basque nationalist as a potential enemy. This network, called here the constitutinal movement, has strong channels of communication between its members and rejects any kind of inputs that come from nationalist organizations. In the case of the *nationalist left* that rejection is absolute. Over the course of *Basta Ya*'s evolution, the political side of the organization has been growing and, at the moment of writing this thesis, *Basta Ya* exists only as a brand, its members being part of a political party called *Union, progress and democracy (UPyD)*,

with moderate success¹²⁹. The other organizations in the constitutional movement work as pressure groups for the Spanish parties, specially the right wing parties. They protest against any policy that could advance the cause of the Basque nationalist, even the moderate ones. For this research, we have to abandon those trends and address an important question: With a common past, what is the role of *Basta Ya* in relation the Basque peace movement organizations?

Frame effects of *Basta Ya*

The *Basta Ya*'s vision of the conflict is the total opposite of the vision of the *nationalist left*. The only culprit of the political violence is ETA and the organizations that surround it. *Basta Ya* has a narrow vision of the enemy and assumes a bivalent view in which people are for ETA or against ETA. If the rejection of ETA is ambiguous, it is assumed that ETA is supported. The only possible solution for the conflict is the total dissolution of ETA and the penal punishment of any ETA member.

The most interesting conclusion of my analysis is that these organizations can articulate an aggressive message because of the spectacular success of the Basque peace movement during the end of the 90s. The efforts that *Gesto por la Paz* made to advocate for the victims of ETA and to break the social silence that surrounded the conflict made possible the space for *Basta Ya* to send its message. An interesting consequence of this is the unusual need for social support that *Basta Ya* requires. Such support is not necessarily active and real per se, rather presents a perception of overall support for the messages it sends. Expressions like "the people are tired", or "the majority of

¹²⁹<http://www.upyd.es/> (20/10/2010)

society needs...” are common in *Basta Ya*’s discourse. Therefore, when the nationalist groups are mentioned, they are categorized as a small minority.

“The problem here is that we have a small minority of fanatics, very violent, whose expression is ETA and they don’t accept any of the democratic principles on which this society is based”
Basta Ya member. Interview 3

The need for this subjective support is key to understanding the objectives of *Basta Ya*. It took the powerful message that was articulated by *Gesto por la Paz* and tailored it to the defence of the victims of terrorism. *Basta Ya* have maintained this message in a very clear, simple way and have benefitted from the success of the Basque peace movement is a message that is very difficult to question. That has direct effect on the framework generation of the Basque peace movement organizations. It is very difficult to speak negatively of the victims of terrorism. It is difficult to question their role as political figures. The victims have a powerful role as pressure figures and their discourse is perceived as politically legitimate. *Lokarri* felt the need to put the rights of the victims up front in its political proposal. *Gesto por la Paz* concentrated in promoting the victims’ rights during this research. On the other hand, the political component of *Basta Ya* does not enjoy such popular support. The sectarian vision promoted by *Lokarri* of the political approach from *Basta Ya* gave *Lokarri* a solid ground to affirm its political proposal. This issue ensured the *Basta Ya* had a bad opinion of *Lokarri*.

“About *Lokarri* we don’t have any relations. They tried to involve us in their acts but we always said no. *Lokarri* (in that time *Elkarri*) has a big problem. They signed the Lizarra accord. That

was for us a frontal attack to democracy because that was an accord to exclude half of the Basque population. And more importantly, to exclude to the victims of terrorism, the people who is persecuted and attacked. And, as far as I know, *Lokarri* never rectified about it. For us they are another organization in the nationalist world. We never shared their idea to resolve the conflict” *Basta Ya* member. Interview 3.

In conclusion, *Basta Ya* belongs to a set of organizations that developed their collective identity based on the rejection of ETA violence and Basque nationalism. This gave them communication channels at the individual level with some *Gesto por la Paz* members, but none with *Lokarri*. The effects between *Basta Ya* and the Basque peace movement organizations are based in an action-reaction dynamic more than a process of dialogue. This dynamic is centred in the political messages. The defence of victims of terrorism message is the most powerful tool that *Basta Ya* has, giving the Basque peace movement organizations a narrow margin of action about it. Following *Basta Ya* message about it gives a plus of credibility to the Basque peace movement organizations frame. For *Gesto por la Paz* that is not a problem because that defence of victims of terrorism was always present, but for *Lokarri* it raises some questions. Inside the organization exists a feeling that the victims of terrorism are overestimated in the conflict, but the majority of *Lokarri* members are aware that raising those concerns in public can damage the political message *Lokarri* is sending.

Other organizations: The EGK, a coordinator of youth groups

In this category are the organizations that are not part of the other three categories explained in this chapter. The main characteristic of the

organizations here is that they are created from the institutions to address social issues, although they work in an autonomous way. The best example is the Basque Youth Council or *EGK*¹³⁰. The *EGK* is an organization created to coordinate the different cultural and social youth organizations in the Basque Country. As such, the *EGK* exhibits a number of different interactions that happen between those organizations, including the different ideologies and ways of seeing the Basque conflict from a youth perspective. During an interview with the *EGK* member, it was made clear to me that the conflict was one of the issues that the *EGK* was working on with the youth organizations. The role of the *EGK* in this issue can be defined as a moderator (Fn. 21/05/2007).

The approach of the *EGK* to the conflict has been influenced by two factors: The conciliatory nature of the organization and the personal position of the people running it. By far, the most important is the second factor. At the time of writing, the people in the directive of the *EGK* had experience in the student movement and the Basque peace movement. Those persons were looking actively towards a conflict resolution approach from a youth perspective.

"In the sphere of peace we have two areas, one is called "Euskadi nearer" that tries to encourage people that belong to other youth councils to come here and see how is the situation. The second are the dialogue forums trying to promote contact between organizations. These two are related to the Basque Conflict" *EGK* member. Interview 4.

In all these efforts, the *EGK* tried to incorporate the Basque peace movement organizations in different projects. Those projects have opened

¹³⁰ www.egk.org (20/10/2010)

channels of communication between the Basque peace movement organizations and the youth organizations but these channels are insufficient and narrow at best. This is because those channels are all through the *EGK* and because the organizations themselves often have positions on the conflict. However, it is important to note that not all youth organizations in the *EGK* address conflict issues and, in the Basque Country, it is not uncommon for a cultural organization to explicitly avoid conflict related issues. In reality, the *EGK* works as an aggregator of demands that are not directly addressed by the youth organizations. It makes little sense to say that the conflict is a youth issue only because the *EGK* address it. A consequence of this is that every effect depends of the personal involvement of the directive body of the *EGK*. This channel, which appears direct and clear, in reality is an artificial channel with little effect on cultural factors related to the conflict in the Basque peace movement organizations, like the generation of a collective action frame.

Frame effects of the *EGK*

From the *EGK* directive body emanates a vision of the conflict taken from the Basque peace movement organizations. The *EGK* rejects any kind of political violence, but such rejection is a one-direction process. There are not direct channels of communication between the youth organizations and the Basque peace movement organizations. This is because those channels are not the product of a relational process that emerged from the generation of a collective identity. The main difference between the process lead by the *EGK* and the different processes explained in this chapter is that the *EGK* do not use the collective identity networks that were created in the past. The *EGK* lacks the cultural tools that make the message meaningful. Therefore, the effects of the

youth organizations on the Basque peace movement organizations through the *EGK* are almost nonexistent. This is a very important fact that shows that the Basque society works on the basis of common identity trends created in close cultural networks. In terms of this research, it is possible to use the *EGK* as the control indicator, showing that the lack of those cultural foundations makes the effect between cultural and social organizations very difficult. A shared identity process is essential for social interaction. That interaction may be contentious, but still has need of those identity processes to have a meaning effect.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I analyzed the different patterns of interaction between the Basque peace movement organizations and the rest of the organizations related to the conflict. These patterns of interaction set the context of how the Basque Peace Frame interacts with the discourse and ethos of the other organizations. Firstly, I presented four different categories of social organizations: the Basque Peace Non Movement Organization; the *nationalist left* organizations, the constitutional organizations that defend the rights of victims of terrorism and an example of an institutional organization that addresses youth issues. In the first category, the pacifist identity created during the formation of peace networks in the 1980s is crucial to understanding the collaboration between the Basque peace movement organizations and the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations. This network and their shared identity explain the almost identical conflict framework used by the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations. This issue changes in the next two categories, which are based on a national identity, but both have shared links with the Basque peace movement organizations. I explained the nature of the

nationalist left, and how this network prevents the organizations that are part of it developing mechanisms to react to changes in the POS effectively. The *TAT* and *Etxerat* are the most susceptible organizations to change and have assumed part of the Basque Peace Frame, specifically the issues related to reconciliation. These effects are possible thanks to the shared channels created in the past, more with *Lokarri* than with *Gesto por la Paz*.

Something similar happens with the constitutionalist organizations. These organizations are a direct consequence of the success of the Basque peace movement during the 1990s. *Basta Ya* represents this category. The organization took the discourse about victims of terrorism and, using the fact that the Basque peace movement was becoming successful, developed a very aggressive message that is now very difficult to counteract. Finally, the last category shows that the existence of a shared network and shared identity processes are critical to understanding the impact of relations between social organizations in the Basque Country. The *EGK* uses its position to try to enforce the Basque peace movement organizations ideals among youth organizations, with little success. The existence of common ground in identity is essential to start a meaningful process of interaction in the Basque social environment.

CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS

This thesis began with the presentation of three research questions that structured my approach to the overarching question of this thesis, which is analysing the contribution of the Basque peace movement to framing the Basque conflict. The answers to these questions form the foundation of my research findings, and having explained the object of study and methodology, and analysed the data, it is time to re-state the answers to those questions, noted here with their related hypotheses:

1 – Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame? *The Basque peace movement organizations have created a Peace Action Frame to understand the conflict. This Basque Peace Frame can be considered a Master Frame.*

2 – How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? *The Basque Peace Frame has evolved over time. This evolution was caused by the mutual interaction between Basque peace movement organizations and the interactions with other Basque Civil Society Organizations based on identity networks.*

3 – What is the impact of the Basque Peace Frame on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict? *The Basque Peace Frame created an impact on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict. That impact was possible due to the existence of common collective identity networks between the Basque peace movement organizations and the Basque Civil Society Organizations.*

In these conclusions, the findings are revisited based upon the analysis presented in this thesis. This represents the final iteration of the theory presented in chapter 2 and the analysis presented in chapters 4 to 8. The

details of the Basque Peace Frame are presented here with connections to the different parts of the thesis, providing a complete picture of the research at hand. The findings are derived mainly from two parts of the theoretical body presented in chapter 2: collective action frames and social movement impacts. I argue there is a master peace frame in the Basque Country; that Basque Peace Frame was created in the peak of a protest cycle and has been evolving ever since,. Finally, it is important to note that such a powerful element in the collective action scenario causes a significant impact on social life. The nature of the impact is demonstrated in the social and cultural sphere, and internally on the norms and symbol creation mechanisms of Basque society. These mechanisms have passed through significant change since the Franco dictatorship years, in particular regarding the use of public space. The rearranging of the meaning creation mechanisms focuses on the perception of the utility of the use of political violence (Ajangiz, 2002: 40). This is not denying the existence of a frame impact at the structural level, but, as described in chapters 7 and 8, collective identity processes are key to understanding the social action and interaction in the Basque Country. In the particular case of the Basque peace movement, this thesis shows how collective action was developed against a set of cultural values that supported silence and internal acquiescence to political violence (Funes, 1998a: 55), in order to create an idealistic claim to reject publicly any kind of violence. Now, this claim permeates all of Basque society. In the Basque case, the peace social movement is truly a generator and creator of new norms (Melucci, 1996: 318). Through this thesis, I have sought to address and explore each of the different sub-questions and,

thereby, answer the main research question: *How has the Basque peace movement impacted on the social and political culture of the Basque conflict?*

The Basque peace movement organizations *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* were able to develop a different approach to the conflict. During the Dictatorship, the norm of political struggle as associated with violence was embedded within Basque society. The Basque peace movement broke with that assumption. The arrival of democracy allowed the Basque peace movement organizations to use public space to mobilize against the use of violence for political means. The questioning of that violence from sectors inside ETA, and the availability of political spaces to advocate nationalist issues, facilitated that task.

This conclusion would not be complete without also considering a further philosophical question that emerges from this research: what is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario? As a contribution to the broad body of social science knowledge, this thesis suggests the possibility of a bridge between social movements theory and conflict resolution theory, proffering some suggestions of how to design a comprehensive approach for societies in conflict. Other central contributions are the application of frame theory to a whole social movement. As argued throughout the text, this is both plausible and achievable, diverging from the traditional idea of applying frame theory to punctual actions or campaigns (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Johnston & Noakes, 2005). The final contribution is in the field of social movement impacts. For methodological reasons stated by various authors (Casquette, 1998: 203; Ibarra, 2005a: 300; Tarrow, 1998: 162), the study of social movement impacts has been a neglected area of research, and most of the research carried out

has tried to measure the degree of impact on public policy (Giugni, 2007; Ibarra, 2005a: 308; Kriesi & Wisler, 1999; Moore, 1999). This research demonstrates a way to explore the cultural impact of social movements. It defends the idea of using frame theory as a valid starting point in shedding some light on the different outcomes that social movements can achieve in modifying a society's values and codes of conduct. In the case of the Basque peace movement, social movements achieved a high degree of social impact, placing the peace movement discourse as part of the 'know-how' of the culture for dealing with political violence issues. While the case of the Basque peace movement cannot be extrapolated to elsewhere, the ideas and questions that are central to this thesis can be used in different scenarios, with different, but exciting, answers.

I conclude this chapter by highlighting the open questions that remain. Is the social awareness of these means for confronting political violence a consequence of the Basque peace movement's actions or did it begin as a small interaction that both the social movement and society followed? What are the likely future outcomes? These questions are contemplated, but more detailed research would be required to pursue them thoroughly. I also suggest the use of discourse analysis to understand, in detail, the intentions and interactions of the Basque peace movement organizations and the rest of society. These questions open up different avenues for developing this research and provide new ideas to probe deeper into Basque social life, into conflict resolution theory, and into social movements research.

The creation and maintenance of a master frame

A master frame is a collective action frame that becomes a multi-movement action frame. Master frames are modes of punctuation, attribution,

and articulation that colour and affect any number of social movement organizations beyond the movement for which they were created (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138). In essence, a master frame is a meta frame. It conditions the creation and contents of other collective action frames inside the same social group. In the Basque Peace Frame case, it has some of the elements that may lead to suggest that the Basque peace movement has been able to create and develop a master peace frame. However, in the scope of this research more evidence is needed to categorically make that assertion. It is clear that the Basque peace movement, and the Basque Peace Frame have had a significant impact on Basque society's perceptions about the conflict. This may lead to the assumption that other social movements have been influenced as well, but more data and research is needed to reach this conclusion. The idea that ETA and the Spanish state are the main contributors to political violence appears even in the discourse of some pro-independence organizations, as exposed in chapter 8. This attribution has led organizations that supported violence from one actor or the other, to question that violence. Victims of terrorism organizations are beginning to question some methods used by the police, and the *nationalist left* organizations (see chapter 8) now disregard the use of violence to achieve political means. It is important to note this questioning of the use of violence, legal or illegal, is not total. Rejection of violence is not motivated by moral, but rather utilitarian, arguments. Nevertheless, this rejection of violence can be regarded as a consequence of the successful use of public space by social movements. It would be necessary, however, to look further into the work of other social movements, that are not

directly related to the conflict, like the environmental movement, and the global peace movement, widely present in the Basque Country to expand this idea.

The high regard that victims of terrorism have in Basque society is a consequence of the Basque peace movement's actions. This is not an expected outcome as this fact has been used by some organizations to promote their goals (see section dedicated to *Basta Ya* in chapter 8). However, the promotion of victims' rights is directly linked to the perception of injustice promoted by the Basque peace movement organizations. As argued in chapter 7, the Basque Peace Frame used available public space to propagate, starting a process of transforming the conflict frames that were in place at that time. This process of frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986: 473; Snow & Benford, 2000: 625) was helped by a Political Opportunity Structure (POS) that had new democratic values, and the rise of a new protest cycle (Tarrow, 1998: 143) that started with the new use of public space, giving the opportunity to a silent mass of people to express themselves (Funes, 1998a: 63). It looks like, with the data in hand that the creation of a master frame is present, and follows the pattern presented by Snow and Benford (Snow & Benford, 1992). The organizations that created the Basque Peace Frame at the beginning of the protest cycle were the organizations that led the evolution of that frame to, possibly, a master frame (examples of other organizations are given in chapters 5 and 7). *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* were extremely successful in their amplifying efforts that made the Basque Peace Frame the competitive frame it is today. Now, in the Basque Country, it is very difficult to conceive of any other kind of activism against political violence that does not share the Basque Peace Frame explained in chapter 6. Even with the decline of the cycle of protest in the Basque Country,

that Basque Peace Frame is still in place. The Basque Peace Frame became important again with the ceasefire in 2006, with the two organizations advocating for the same principles. It is true that, with the diminishing of political violence (or a diminishing perception of the importance of political violence), the most symbolic aspects of the Basque Peace Frame will lose relevance, as the main component of peace groups, the rejection of violence, will lose its contentious nature. That makes the future of *Gesto por la Paz* dubious, but, as their members have said, the end of the organization is something assumed and welcomed, as shown in chapter 7.

The Basque Peace Frame propagated among the Basque social movement organizations using the networks built in the past. To be meaningful ways of communication, these networks needed to be grounded in shared collective identity processes. This shared set of ideas are very important in understanding the propagation of the Basque Peace Frame (Melucci, 1996: 349). This process is similar to the process that Gould describes, as the relevant information is not channelled through the network, but is defined by it (Gould, 1998: 38). This creation of identities, that comes from the Dictatorship years and the powerful use of public space by the Basque peace movement, is important to our understanding of the generation and sharing of a powerful frame (Polletta & Jasper, 2001: 292). The Basque Peace Frame was easily adopted by groups that share the same collective identity with the Basque peace movement organizations (see section dedicated to the organizations focused on peace research and social work in chapter 8) and the Basque Peace Frame worked as a shared bond of solidarity (Hunt & Benford, 2007: 448). In conclusion, the Basque Peace Frame generated by the Basque peace

movement organizations is a powerful frame that suggests the possibility of being a master frame. However, it is not possible, with the data at hand, to categorically make that assertion. For that more research is needed in other social movements present in the Basque Country. The mechanisms of propagation, based on shared networks and identities still work today. The “specialization” of the two main Basque peace movement organizations created a very strong frame that not only gave easy access to peace mobilizations in the Basque Country, but constrained it as well. Therefore, it is very difficult to conceive of any other kind of peace mobilization related to the Basque conflict than the one offered and led by *Gesto por la Paz* or *Lokarri*. The fact that the sources of the problem are shared by the different Basque social organizations, as well as the main claims (victims of political violence by *Gesto por la Paz*; the need for some kind of political agreement by *Lokarri*; and the rejection of violence by both) made by the Basque peace movement organizations, is an important issue in understanding the nature of the frame. Now it is important to understand the mechanisms that mark the evolution of the Basque Peace Frame and the effect on other social organizations.

From submerged networks to meaning creators. The evolution of the Basque Peace Frame

The Basque Peace Frame was created during the first years of mobilization, in the 1980s. However, the Basque Peace Frame has been evolving ever since. The main ingredients of the Basque Peace Frame have been modified by different factors. The main objective of this research was to explore the creation of, and the changes in, the Basque Peace Frame. I chose

to look at a period of time that began in 2006, with the declaration of the ceasefire by ETA. That moment was a moment of “revitalization” for the Basque peace movement. *Lokarri* had to rethink most of its strategy and *Gesto por la Paz* gained centrality amongst social actors. Therefore, looking closely, it was possible to identify the mechanisms of change and evolution of the Basque Peace Frame, and, following that, the mechanisms of impact on the Basque peace movement through other organizations. In this research, I identified two sets of mechanisms of frame evolution: internal and external. The internal mechanisms, explained in chapter 7, are a consequence of the special relationship that *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* have. The symbolic nature of *Gesto por la Paz* gave the social movement the cultural codes and symbols to enact the Basque Peace Frame, making the frame alignment processes well grounded, especially the frame transformation and amplification processes (Snow et al., 1986: 469, 473). The role of *Lokarri* was largely to make this process congruent; to present a solid and credible political option. This made *Gesto por la Paz* specialized in the creation and maintenance of symbolic resources and left *Lokarri* to try to transform the Basque Peace Frame into a political tool. This is one of the issues that makes *Gesto por la Paz* a traditional Basque Social Movement organization and *Lokarri* closer to a pressure group (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 85; Funes, 1998b: 501). In theory, this could mean a very powerful and productive team, but it is important to note that *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* perceive themselves as mutually exclusive. In theoretical terms, this results in the appearance of new frame alignment processes, mainly the change from frame transformation to frame amplification (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Benford, 2000). The differences between the organizations could

be described as social and political. The motivation *Lokarri* provides is to achieve a political agreement, and *Gesto por la Paz* provides the means to reject violence through social action. These two approaches, tested by the two organizations, gave the Basque Peace Frame a significant amount of space to articulate itself, and it is that testing between *Gesto por la Paz* and *Lokarri* that has expanded and strengthened the Basque Peace Frame. The political objectives of *Lokarri* always had a social edge thanks to *Gesto por la Paz*'s actions and this benefit is reciprocated by *Lokarri*, as explained in chapter 7. One last point to make in this regard is the strange situation in which the two organizations co-exist. They are personally very close, with members who are personal friends. They even have their headquarters in the same building, using different apartments, but this does not make collaboration easier. As I personally witnessed, they are so specialized that a joint project is almost impossible. The organization and decision making processes needed to achieve a political objective are not the same as the mechanisms needed for social action. This is explained in chapter 4, as *Lokarri* requires a different organizational model than *Gesto por la Paz*.

The other set of factors that define the evolution of the Basque Peace Frame are the external factors. These factors are the changes in the POS and the influence of other organizations. The POS is defined by Tarrow as the 'consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people's expectations for success or failure' (Tarrow, 1998: 76). For the Basque peace movement, the consolidation of democratic values and the changes in mobilization dynamics were important issues for the framing efforts.

Democratization enabled social questioning of ETA and its methods (Ibarra, 1987; Letamendia, 1994b), which was followed by a decreasing perception of ETA as a problem by Basque society and a consolidation of the favourable perceptions for the role of political institutions¹³¹. The relevance of this issue for this research is the gradual shift in terms of blaming efforts, from ETA to a more abstract concept of political violence. This is one of the reasons why *Gesto por la Paz* focuses more on the situation of victims of political violence, and *Lokarri* on the conditions for political agreement, than on the situation of ETA itself. The second issue is the change of mobilization dynamics. These dynamics are changing from a 'militant' model, with a highly committed activist, which stresses collective identity, to a 'cooperation' model, with a more flexible activist that stresses personal and moral rewards. This is particularly well explained by De la Peña and Ibarra (2004). The main effect on the Basque Peace Frame is the prevalence of the amplification processes over the transformation processes. The defence of the victims of terrorism taken by organizations like *Basta Ya* locks the discourse of the Basque peace movement organizations into that issue, making it difficult to raise awareness about victims of state violence, for example. This issue makes relevant the collaboration of organizations like *TAT* and *Lokarri*, based on old identity networks, to incorporate the awareness of all victims in a plausible political resolution scenario.

The Basque Peace Frame evolved from the days when the public space was barred for peace networks, evolving from a transformative frame to a more inclusive frame that tries to include all aspects of mobilization around the use of political violence. The main consequence of this evolution is a growth in the size

¹³¹ To explore that is important to follow the surveys made by the *Euskobarometro*. <http://www.ehu.es/euskobarometro/> (20/01/2011)

and power of the Basque Peace Frame. As recounted in chapter 6, this means the Basque Peace Frame is even used by political institutions when they intend to protest or make claims against political violence.

The significance of the Basque Peace Frame on the social perceptions of the Basque conflict

The Basque social perception about the conflict today is different from 30 years ago. It is not the intention of this research to affirm those perceptions have changed as a result of the actions of the Basque peace movement organizations. However, it is plausible to say they have contributed to a considerable degree. One of the difficulties of this work was finding an appropriate methodological framework for analyzing the cultural impact of the Basque peace movement. The lack of proper tools in an understudied area made me ask the same questions as most of the authors I have read for this research (Amenta & Young, 1999; Casquette, 1998; Earl, 2007; Ibarra, 2005a). I explain the cultural impacts following Gamson's idea of the mediation system (Gamson, 1998), but rather than using the media as the other end of the constituencies with whom I have worked (the Basque peace movement organizations), I use the identity networks explained in chapter 8. It is this field of symbolic and personal relations that defines those networks and the linkage between the Basque peace movement organizations and society. This is the field where the changes are enacted, particularly the perception of the use of violence as a political tool, and it is possible to say that the Basque peace movement organizations gained much acceptance. During the fieldwork period, it was clear that the closer the social organizations were to the Basque peace

movement organizations the more dependent upon the Basque Peace Frame they were. This demonstrates a high degree of acceptance of the Basque Peace Frame (Gamson, 1998: 70), and suggests therefore that the social organizations were more prone to be influenced by the Basque Peace Frame. In the case of the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations, the relationship is quite clear, as they share most of the same perspectives. However, even in the organizations that are further from the Basque peace movement organizations' identity cluster, that relationship can be traced. The main meaning of the existence of organizations like *Basta Ya* is the primary demand of the Basque peace movement organizations: recognition for the victims of violence. Even in organizations that were closer to ETA's frame, like *TAT* or *Etixerat*, the idea of the use of violence for political means is being challenged. This is one of the main achievements of the Basque peace movement organizations. At the beginning of their protest, the violence was not a contested issue. Society had a "rule of silence" in relation to the violence. The only use allowed for public space was to protest for political independence. Now, this has entirely changed with the public space being used to protest against violence and the end of the "rule of silence". The Basque peace movement organizations challenged a whole social form (Melucci, 1993: 248). With the creation of the Basque Peace Frame, the Basque peace movement is setting the guidelines for understanding any event or issue that derives from the conflict. This was one of the structural issues that some organizations faced during my fieldwork, as they had to accommodate their discourses to the established Basque Peace Frame. This was the case with *TAT*, who had to

include an element of rejection of political violence in their discourse to sustain their claims.

One cultural outcome that is derived from the action of *Lokarri* is the acceptance of a political agreement as a plausible outcome by the *nationalist left* organizations and political parties. This is a breakthrough, as political action by those organizations was previously determined by its contentious and antagonistic nature. Finally, the most important outcome, perhaps, is the social realization that an alternative to the use of violence exists. When an act of political violence occurs, the widespread reaction is that such violent action was unnecessary, was ineffective, and that an alternative to the suffering experienced is possible. This perception is not new; what is new is the public perception of it, derived from the use of public space by the Basque peace movement. These cultural impacts also take their toll on the Basque peace movement organizations. Their actions have to be coherent with their values; therefore they lost some flexibility in reacting to new issues, and their actions have to be public. *Gesto por la Paz* calls for an annual march against political violence every January. *Lokarri* prepares and implements projects based on public participation, using new technologies (Anton, 2009). During this research, it was clear the Basque Peace Frame created by the Basque peace movement organizations is a powerful tool that shapes social action around the conflict in the Basque Country. This master frame stepped outside of the boundaries of the Basque peace movement organizations and became an independent entity that is not only shaped by the organizations, but also shapes the Basque peace movement organizations. The Basque Peace Frame changed cultural perceptions in Basque society about the conflict, like the perception of the

enemy (the Spanish or the Basque nations) and the outcome of violence. Without intending to, the Basque Peace Frame also gave the *nationalist left* organizations a new way of making politics by making the adoption of political agreements acceptable to their members. For future generations, this factor may be profoundly important. What has yet to be determined is the strength of these changes.

How does the Basque peace movement impact on the social and political culture of the Basque conflict?

The Basque peace movement organizations *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* emerged from submerged networks created during the Dictatorship. These networks have, as a central identity trait, the rejection of the use of violence to achieve political goals. These networks had very limited access to the public space because political protest was centred on Basque national claims. These claims were highly contentious and deeply associated with the use of political violence. The arrival of democracy to the Basque Country gave the opportunity to these peace networks to become a social movement for two reasons: first, the opening of new public spaces of protests, with the legalization of public protesting and the introduction of political pluralism, and; second, the questioning of the violence from some social sectors¹³². This new environment allowed the perception that the public space was available for protesting. The Basque peace movement started to develop a new way of protesting. This new way had to fit two purposes, namely, to fit into the new political environment, and to confront the social groups that still defended the use of violence. This

¹³² The split of ETA in 1976 is a consequence of that questioning process.

new kind of mobilization was based on the opposite ethos of the contentious nationalist mobilization. If the latter was violent and full of noise, the peace mobilization was peaceful and silent. This new way of mobilization succeeded in winning the public space and created the perception that new ways of political protest were possible. This new way of approaching politics, rejecting the use of violence, is the main contribution of the Basque peace movement to Basque society. Today, the use of violence is no longer seen as a plausible tool to achieve political means. The Basque peace movement organizations were able to create a frame that permeated most of the social layers that, now, prevents even the mere suggestion of using violence. The Basque peace movement organizations were able to detach themselves from nationalistic politics and propose a new way of approaching those politics. They did that cleverly using the social spaces and developing a specialized nature that helped them to work efficiently. To explore the Basque Peace Frame is to study that process where the rejection of violence impregnated Basque politics and Basque social life.

Contributions to the body of knowledge

This research contributes to social movements theory, especially to the fields of frame analysis and impacts analysis. The literature around frames is mostly theoretical, with a few examples devoted to practical analysis (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Johnston & Noakes, 2005). This research attempts to give a particular example of how to apply frame analysis to a case study. More importantly, this research tries to demonstrate that frame analysis can be applied to a whole social movement over a significant period of time. This study of the Basque peace movement shows that the analysis of a collective action frame could be a useful tool in understanding the different types of attribution

inside a social movement. It argues for the need to differentiate ideology from frame, as the Basque peace movement also tried to distance itself from political ideologies. With the conception of a frame as a constant exercise of attribution, it is possible to have an indicator of change over time. This exercise, in this case, gave valuable information that has shed some light on important issues, including social movement impacts, variations in participation, mobilization and identity, and could be an interesting approach to use in other environments. One problem with this approach, however, is the dependence on the temporal dimension, so it will be less useful in understanding the impact of new modes of mobilization that have not yet experienced a period of evolution. These problems could be addressed; perhaps, using the Strategic Action Fields approach, developed in recent years (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Armstrong, 2005; Diani, 2012). This approach holds that collective action actors hold up in Strategic Action fields or SAFs. These are a meso level social order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of any given field, the relationships in that field, and the field's rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011: 5). This approach has the virtue of offering different methodological tools to operate with the complexities inherent to social interaction as it conceives social movements on a set of social relations instead of a set of aggregates (Diani, 2012: 19). It is an interesting proposal for further research about the topic. Social movements impact is the second field of knowledge this research is contributing to. The field of impacts analysis is a very narrow one, mainly due to the methodological limitations explained before. However, some insights can be derived from the comparative exercise carried out in this research. It is true that special precautions must be

taken to reach the point of assessing some results, such as social movement impacts, but the use of other techniques and approaches, like discourse analysis, can give some support for these conclusions. My personal motivation for this study of social movements impacts is not to give a comprehensive set of tools to analyze them, but to encourage the idea that a solution to the conflict is possible. The use of frame comparison over time can lead to clarification of some of the impacts that social organizations have in social life. Perhaps, as the Basque peace movement did, this vision that a solution is possible will open new ways to develop a comprehensive approach to the study of cultural impacts made by social movements. Finally, I would like to devote some words to the contribution of this research to the field of peace studies. The main objective is to further understanding of the importance of social action to achieve a given conflict resolution scenario. Without the study of social trends, it is not possible to comprehend a situation when a conflict resolution plan has to be implemented.

What is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario?

The question that drove this research was to consider the power of civil society in a conflict resolution process. Traditionally, the conflict resolution field has been dominated by the idea of an agreement between elites, which was also one of the solutions the Basque Country was hoping for. However, this research has shown that social organizations can change social perceptions about a conflict. The study of any given social movement is the study of society itself, as the mechanisms that control the mobilization, identity and participation

inside that social movement are the same as those working in the rest of the society. The Basque peace movement teaches us that, in the Basque Country, a shared collective identity network is essential to reaching an agreement and achieving recognition. These gaps between social groups are the gaps the Basque peace movement tried to bridge. Failing to recognize these mechanisms is an element that will make any conflict resolution experience difficult. In this particular case, the solution will be to socialize the conflict resolution process, using the same networks that helped to enforce the Basque Peace Frame. This research attempts to demonstrate that the practice of taking into account what society thinks and feels can be extrapolated to other scenarios. It is important to note what lies behind 'society' is not a representation of social organizations, but a deep study of social relations, how ideas propagate, how civil society works, creates and destroys. In the case of the Basque Country, this issue could be the difference between a permanent conflict resolution scenario and a temporary situation when political violence is not useful, but not totally discarded.

Open Questions

This thesis has been an exciting trip that took me almost six years to complete. During that time, I had the opportunity to understand, in detail, part of the society I am from and the people of the Basque peace movement. The work these people have accomplished is remarkable. They helped to achieve an outcome that looked almost impossible 30 years before: the achievement of peace and end of violence. This research tried to analyze to which extent the efforts of peace movements were in vain, or successful. Finally, it is clear that some efforts were successful, and other outcomes were unexpected. While

there are questions that remain unanswered, I hope to engage with some of these in my future research, while I would encourage fellow researchers to engage with others, for example: to what extent are the informal networks significant in understanding the frame expansion? How can we develop a comprehensive approach to analyze the cultural impacts of social movements with some validity? How can we analyze the unexpected impacts of social movements? Is it possible to develop a model to apply the same principles to other environments?

Some of these questions are very ambitious and probably, as when I started this research, some people will try to answer them. While I have concluded that the questions can have no definitive answer, the journey in trying to answer them may shed some light on the fascinating world of social action. However, that is another research.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 - INTERVIEWS TECHNICAL DATA

Profile of the interviewees providing: Name of the organization, gender, age, education level and date of the interview.

Order:

1. **BAKEOLA**
BAKEOLA: Male, 31, Higher Education. 12/06/2007.
2. **BAKETIK**
BAKETIK: Male, 45, Higher Education. 23/08/2007.
3. **BASTA YA**
BASTA YA: Male, 47, Higher Education. 02/08/2007.
4. **EGK**
EGK: Male, 24, Higher Education. 21/05/2007.
5. **ETXERAT**
ETXERAT: Male, 46, Basic Education. 05/02/2008.
6. **GERNIKA GOGORATUZ**
GERNIKA GOGORATUZ: Female, 40, Higher Education. 26/06/2007.
7. **TAT**
TAT: Male, 31, Higher Education. 02/07/2007.
8. **LOKARRI**
LOKARRI (Alava - Araba): Male, 45, Higher Education. 20/08/2007.
9. **LOKARRI**
LOKARRI (Bizkaia): Female, 25, Higher Education. 14/06/2007.
10. **LOKARRI**
LOKARRI (Guipuzkoa): Male, 36, Higher Education. 28/06/2007.
11. **LOKARRI**
LOKARRI (Navarra): Female, 52, Higher Education. 27/06/2007.
12. **LOKARRI**
LOKARRI (Coordination Committee): Female, 36, Higher Education. 27/06/2007.
13. **LOKARRI**
LOKARRI (Barcelona): Female, 36, Higher Education. 31/08/2007.
14. **GESTO POR LA PAZ**
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Alava - Araba): Male, 30, Higher Education. 31/07/2007.
15. **GESTO POR LA PAZ**
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Bizkaia): Male, 52, Higher Education. 14/07/2007.
16. **GESTO POR LA PAZ**
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Guipuzkoa): Female, 50, Higher Education. 30/08/2007.
17. **GESTO POR LA PAZ**
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Navarra): Male, 58, Higher Education. 11/09/2007.
18. **GESTO POR LA PAZ**
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Permanent Commission): Female, 34, Higher Education. 03/08/2007.

APPENDIX 2 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Introduction

- Make an introduction showing the interviewee key concepts of the research. Ask for authorization about the use of the information. Show the document involving informed consent, anonymity and video/audio issues (See attach). Assume the commitment to send a copy of the transcription of the interview.
- Some methodological issues:
 - a. Try to connect with the interviewee in his/her own experience as a member of a specific organization. Try to adapt the language depending on the ideological approach of the interviewee and the organization he/she belongs.
 - b. Make a difference between the specific experience the interviewee has about his/her organization and the experience he/she has about other organizations, first part is intimate and the second is external.
 - c. Try to be as casual as possible; don't ask the questions as in a questionnaire. Try to have the most similar experience to a conversation. It's possible to affirm something before a question or after, or guide the interviewee in certain parts of the interview.
 - d. It's useful to use comparative examples about other similar international experiences.

2. Relations / Role of the organization

- Which organizations lead or led the social action related to the Basque conflict? Are the same now? How is your organization's relation with these organizations? If your organization is one of them, how is the relation with other social agents? Which social agents are closer to your organization? Which are further? Why?
- To which social sectors (youth, church, seniors, certain kind of organization, independent left, etc.) do you think your organization should start relationships? Why they are important more than others?
- Do you think if exist any consensus or disensus between the different organizations related to the conflict about the ways to resolve the armed conflict? What it is? Which are the points of union between organizations?

3. Problems

- Which were the biggest threats and risks that your organization had to face? Are the same now? If not, which are now?

4. History / Structure / Internal Factors

- Since are you member of this organization? What were the motives that made you being part of this organization?
- Tell me about the start of the organization and its evolution.
- What was the moment the organization started / you became a member? Why do you think it was proper moment?

- What is its structure? It has changed since you are a member? Why?
- Which steps can you identify in the history of the organization? Can you describe its moments of success? And failure? Why do you think they were a success? And a failure?
- In your opinion, during which initiatives, moments, the members mobilized most? And less? Why? During which initiatives, moments, you mobilized most? And less? Why?
- What were the motivations to make the initiatives you mentioned before?
- Do you think it was a clear strategy and a clear goal in the organization's actions? What is this strategy and goal? Do you agree fully? Why?
- Which are the cultural and ideological values of your organization? Did they change in the past? Do you think they're going to change? Why?
- What is the women's role in your organization? Describe it. There're specific issues that the women make relevant?
- What is your opinion about the use of violence? Do you think is justification to use violence? How the violence shaped the work of your organization?

5. Effects / Impacts

- Do you think that the alliances and the different social initiatives made by your organization with other organizations helped the strategy of your organization? And theirs?
- How the external action shaped the actions of your organization? Influx from other organizations? Influx from the political sphere? Basque? Spanish? International? How important are they?
- How your organization shaped the external factors? How it shaped the actions of the following organizations? How it shaped the political sphere? Basque? Spanish? International? In your opinion, what is the importance of your organization referring to the conflict? Is a primal reference? Needs more attention?
- Which the following political ideologies affect your organization (Nationalism, Left wing nationalism, socialism, right wing, Left wing, "non-nationalism"). Why?
- What do you think was the role of your organization in the cease-fire declaration? Direct, indirect? Do you think your organization helped to create the conditions to that? Can your organization create similar conditions now? Why?
- What is the impact of your organization in the society? Do you evaluate it as positive? Why? Do you think about it as an accomplishment of your organization alone?

APPENDIX 3 – STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEWS

Statement of Informed Consent Effects of Basque Peace Social Movement Organizations Research Project

This consent form is to make sure that you understand what is involved in this research project, and how we intend to use the information you are giving.

I will not use any names or other identifying features when I write about what I have found out. All identities will be kept confidential, unless you specifically give permission to acknowledge you. I will not do anything with this information that you do not give permission to do.

I understand that my participation in this research project is voluntary and I understand that I can withdraw at any point without giving a reason. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about my involvement in this research project.

I agree to the researcher transcribing the interview, keeping it safely on computer, and using it for the purposes of this study. I understand that only the researcher and his supervisors will be allowed access to the interview transcript.

Providing my identity is kept confidential, I give permission for University of Bradford researcher to use the information that I am about to give in the following ways:

- In preparation of a PhD thesis to be defended at the University of Bradford.
- In any events or written reports which tell the communities who have contributed to the research about the research findings.
- For academic or policy related purposes, which help to make the findings of the research known.

I understand that I will be sent a copy of the transcript of the interview when this is available, and a short summary of the final thesis.

I hereby assign the copyright in my contribution to the University of Bradford.

Signed: _____

Name: _____ Date: _____

I would like my copy of the interview and report sent by: Post ☐ Email ☐

Address: _____ Email: _____

I have explained the purposes of this research. I agree to keep all interview details confidential.

Name: _____ Signature: _____

APPENDIX 4 – FIELD NOTES

09/02/2007 – Conversation with the director of *Lokarri*.

14/02/2007 – Visit to *Lokarri*'s Headquarters.

30/03/2007 – Conversation with the director of *Lokarri*.

10/04/2007 – Meeting with *Gesto por la Paz* member (gatekeeper).

21/05/2007 – Interview with *EGK*.

05/06/2007 – *Lokarri* provincial internal meeting (Bizkaia).

14/06/2007 – Interview with a member of *Lokarri*.

19/06/2007 – Work with *Lokarri* members in a signature collection campaign to support a social consultation.

02/07/2007 – Visit to the TAT and Interview.

14/07/2007 – Interview with *Gesto por la Paz* member. Bizkaia.

03/08/2007 – Interview with a member of *Gesto por la Paz*. Directive.

23/08/2007 – Interview and visit to *Baketik* Headquarters. During that visit I had the opportunity to talk with the former leader of *Elkarri*.

10/09/2007 – Meeting with in *Lokarri* headquartes. Aftewards sharing a beer with *Lokarri* and *Gesto por la Paz* members.

24/09/2007 – *Lokarri* General Assembly.

23/12/2007 – Visit to *Etxerat* in San Sebastian. They were protesting locked in San Sebastian cathedral for a week.

05/02/2008 – Interview with *Etxerat*.

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Foundational Document, Objectives, Structure and Principles:
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The Agreement. Reflections and proposals to build a coexistence agreement:
http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/EI_acuerdo.pdf

For a Political Consultation:
<http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/consulta.pdf>

A proposal to inform and participate in the Consultation:
<http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/informar-participar-consulta.pdf>

Social Observatory Initiative. General Description and goals:
<http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/observatorio-social>

First Social Observatory Document:
<http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/observatorio.pdf>

Web Initiatives

Lokarri on Facebook:
<http://www.facebook.com/pages/Lokarri/114072771938567>

Lokarri on Twitter:
<http://twitter.com/Lokarri>

Blog about the Peace Process:
<http://procesodepaz.org/>

Web Forums about the Basque political situation and the peace process:
<http://lokarri.org/es/participa/en-los-foros/>

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<http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-oportunidad-de-abrir-un-proceso-de-paz-y-normalizacion>

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<http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-sociedad-debe-tomar-la-iniciativa>

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<http://www.elkarri.org/>

What is *Elkarri*:
<http://www.elkarri.org/en/pdf/WhatisElkarri.pdf>

VIII Assembly Documents (Last meeting before the transformation into *Lokarri*):
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Gesto por la Paz

Main webpage:
www.gesto.org

Documents and Initiatives

Main Goals:
<http://www.gesto.org/fines.htm>

Declaration of Principles:
<http://www.gesto.org/principios.htm>

Definition of the Organization:
<http://www.gesto.org/definicion.htm>

Guidelines for Mobilization:

<http://www.gesto.org/movilizacion.htm>

Organizational Model:

<http://www.gesto.org/organigrama.htm>

Finances and Budgeting:

<http://www.gesto.org/financiacion.htm>

“Educar Para La Paz” Educate for Peace document:

<http://gesto.org/pdf/educarparalapaz.pdf>

Position about Victims of Violence:

<http://www.gesto.org/pdf/situacionvictimas.pdf>

Position about ETA prisoners:

<http://gesto.org/delitosterrorismo1.htm>

The Separation of Conflicts:

<http://www.gesto.org/separarviolenciaypolitica.htm>

Position about the social unrest as a conflict strategy:

<http://www.gesto.org/pdf/violenciapersecucion.pdf>

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Results of an internal meeting describing *Gesto por la Paz* objectives (14/01/2007):
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<http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf>

Reaction to the ETA's announcement finishing the ceasefire (02/02/2007):
<http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-02-02%20RP%20Manifestacion.pdf>

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<http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-03-07%20NP%20Lazo%20azul.pdf>

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Main Webpage:
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Basta Ya

Main Webpage:

<http://www.bastaya.org>

UPyD, *Union, Progreso Y Democracia* (Union, Progress and Democracy)

Webpage: <http://www.upyd.es>

EGK

Main Webpage:

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Etixerat

Main Webpage:

<http://www.etxerat.info>

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- No. 58 – *Separación de Conflictos* (Separation of Conflicts)
- No. 59 – *Excarcelación de presos de ETA* (Release of ETA prisoners)
- No. 60 – *Las Voces de las Víctimas* (The Voices of the Victims)
- No. 61 – *Deslegitimación de la Violencia* (The Delegation of Violence)
- No. 62 – *Ante la perspectiva de Paz* (Before the Peace perspective)
- No. 63 – *Reconciliación de la Sociedad hacia las Víctimas* (Reconciliation of Society before the Victims)
- No. 64 – *Reacciones frente a la Violencia* (Reactions against Violence)
- No. 65 – *¿Tiene precio político la Paz?* (Has Peace a political price?)
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